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The Minnesota Supreme Court
1962 - 1963
The Minnesota Supreme Court Note comprehensively surveys significant decisions of the 1962-1963 Term, of the
Minnesota Supreme Court [hereinafter referred to as the
Minnesota Court or simply the Court]. The cases selected
were thought to represent new developments in Minnesota
law and also to present perplexing questions common to
most jurisdictions; accordingly, the decisions have been
evaluated in terms of Minnesota law but the Minnesota
Court's results have frequently been compared with the law
of other jurisdictions,so that the analysis is universally applicable.Also, the Note analyzes 1963 Minnesota legislative
enactments thatrelate to the case problems and that reflect
new answers to these problems. While the cases are discussed separately, they are arranged according to the general legal issue involved. In addition, the Note statistically
summarizes all cases decided by the Court this Term.

THE TABLES
The data contained in the following Tables summarize the
October, 1962 to October, 1963 Term of the M\innesota Supreme
Court. So that the reader can evaluate these Tables comprehensively, the Review presents a detailed statement of their purposes
and bases.
Tables 1,11, and III concentrate primarily on patterns of opinion-writing and voting among the individual justices. Table I tabulates the written opinions of each justice according to the disposition represented and, also, categorizes the number of votes cast by
him, indicating abstentions as well as dissents. Although Mr. Jus-
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tice Nelson declared the Opinion of the Court most often, Mr. Justice Otis wrote the greatest number of opinions, dissenting more
often than any other justice. In contrast, Mr. Chief Justice Knutson did not register a dissenting vote during the Term and Mr.
Justice Nelson only dissented once. Table 11 lists the total number of decisions this Term and classifies them according to whether
the opinion was unanimous, per curiam, or with a dissent or concurrence. Table III endeavors to determine the alignment among
the justices by measuring the extent of their disagreements. It
records the number of cases in which the justices voted for opposite dispositions plus the number of cases in which the justices
voted for the same disposition but did not join in an opinion; that
is, the total number of cases in which the justices disagreed. Although a clearly defined bloc is not discernible, Table III shows
that Justices Otis and Murphy disagreed most often while, among
the justices that were on the Court for the full Term, Justices
Nelson and Knutson disagreed the fewest times.
Table IV categorizes by origin all of the cases disposed of by
the Court this Term; the primary purpose is to show the number
of cases appealed from each judicial district, commission, department, or board and the number of cases that originated in the
Court itself. For this purpose, per curiam decisions and cases dismissed without consideration of the merits are counted as dispositions. Table IV also indicates the disposition ordered where the
Court's decision required further consideration by the trial court.
Table V indicates the general subject matter of the main issue
in all cases considered by the Court this Term, excluding the cases
that originated in the Court itself; in areas of high interest the
subjects are subdivided to indicate the subject matter more specifically. Table V shows that Criminal Law cases dominated although there also was a large number of Tort cases. Table V is
also designed to indicate the relative success on appeal of cases appealed by the defendant below compared with those appealed by
the plaintiff below. It shows that the defendant appealed more
cases to the Court than did the plaintiff and that the defendant
also was able to obtain a reversal in a greater proportion of the
cases appealed.
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Table I
AcTIoN oF I mImVAL JusTCES
OPM-NoNS WrTTE

VoES

0

0

Knutson, C. J .......

22

2

0

24

196

0

1

Gallagher, F., J.* .......
Gallagher, T., J........
Murphy, J............

0
9.5
.7

0
0
0

0
3
5

0
28
32

49
192
189

1
4
7

1
1
1

Nelson, J ..............

34

0

0

34

195

1

1

Otis, J ...............

33

1

7

41

181

10

2

Rogosheske, J..........

26

3

2

31

188

4

3

Sheran, J.* ........... 15
Gallagher, F., Comm.*..
4
Per Curidam ........... 11
Totals ............... 197

0
0

0
0

15
4
11
-20

109

0

2

6 17

27 12

* Mr. Justice Sheran was appointed to the Court January 9, 1903, replac-

ing Mr. Justice Frank Gallagher who retired January 8, 1903 and was appointed Commissioner.
a. Includes concurrences.
b. Excludes cases when the justice was not a member of the Court at the
time of the argument and submission of the case.

Table II
Number of Cases

Percentage of Total

Unanimous ...............

166

84.8

With Concurrence Only ....
With Dissent .............
Per Curiam ................

8
17
11
197

1.5
8.6
5.6
100.0

192
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Table III*
ALIGN MNT OF JUSTICES

E
0

Knutson Cd

Knto

...

0

Murphy.......T

Nelson .......

Otis ..........

g

3

1

Z

W

1E4..

0

4

9

1

C

0
0

4
8

3
12

1
2

1
8

4

0
1

100

180

179

184

184

183

184

2

00
3

1

D
C
T

2

4

4
2
6

0
0
0

0
0
0

2
0
2

N

47

49

48

49

48

D
C
T

1
0
1

6
4
10

10
3
13

5
0
5

8
0
8

N

99

179

178

184

183

D
C

2
0
2

9
4
13

13
3
16

5
0
5

N

100

180

179

184

D
C
T

0
0
0

5
4
9

11
3
14

N

100

180

180

D
C
T

4
0

4

8
0

8

N

95

176

D
C
T
...
Rogosheske
*

0 0

-bo

1

D

N

Gallagher,T.

9

l
7

Kus.....T

Galagher,F..

4

3

0

1

03

N
99
"D" represents cases before the Court in which the justices voted for

opposite results. "C" represents cases in which the justices voted for the same

result, but did not join together in an opinion. "T" represents the total num1
ber of cases in which the justices did not join together in an opinion, i.e., the
total number of cases on which the justices disagreed. "N" represents the total
number of cases in which both justices participated. This table excludes all
per curiam decisions.
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Table IV
SOURCES or CASES DISPOSED OF
DIss'osiTioN
0

DisPosITIoN

7

1st Judicial Dist ..........

10

9.nd Judicial Dist .........
3rd Judicial Dist . ........
4th Judicial Dist . ........
5th Judicial Dist . ........

30 24
17
8
49 27
6 3

1b

3a

6
7"
9.0
3

2
29

5C
41
9

1h

1

o
S
2

6th Judicial Dist .........

6

2

3

7th Judicial Dist . ........

8

7

1

1

8th Judicial Dist . ........
9th Judicial Dist . ........

8

3

5e

3

1

11

7

4

3

1

loth Judicial Dist ........

21

17

41

2

1

Board of Tax Appeals .... 2
Industrial Commission ....i10
Dept. of :Employment .....
1

2
8
1

2

1

Supreme Court .........

179 116
58
5
18 Absolute Discharged

Prohibition ...........

4

4

Mfandamus ...........
Quo Warranto ........

7
1

3

Certification ..........

I

Discipline ............
:Election .............

I
3

Habeas Corpus .....

2o9

1

12

4

111
197-

a-Includes two cases that were reversed in part and affrmed in part, and
a third case that was affirmed as to one plaintiff and reversed and a new trial
granted as to the second plaintiff.
b. Case affirmed as to one plaintiff and reversed and a new trial granted
as to the second plaintiff.
c. Includes one case that was remanded for trial without reversal.
d. Includes one case reversed in part and affirmed in part.
e.Includes one case where the appeal was dismissed for want of jurisdiction and a second that was dismissed because the appeal was frivolous.
f. Includes one case that was remanded without reversal or affirmance.
g. Both cases dismissed because appeal taken from a nonappealable order.
h. Case dismissed because appeal taken from a nonappalable order.
i. Includes two cases that were remanded for trial without reversal.
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Table V*
FnL DisPosiTioN

OF CASES
APPmAL

DISPOSITION ON

Cases Appealed Cases Appealed
by Defendant
by Plaintiff

SUBJECT MArTE

TOTAL

.,

_

_

0

1

2

0

Damages ..............

1

0

0

1

Restitution ............
Other .................
Courts ..................
Costs .................
Jurisdiction ............
Res Judicata ..........
Other .................

0
2

0
1

2
1

2
2

2

0

1

0

2a

0

2

1

1

0
1

1
0

0
1

0
0
0

0
0
0

4
7

1e

Constitutional Law .........
Contracts ................ 12

Criminal Law ............

12

34

b

Coram Nobis ..........
Habeas Corpus ........
Other .................
Domestic Relations .......
Election Contests .........
Evidence ................

4
4
6

1
1
2

1
0
0

1
1

FELA ...................

1

0

0

Insurance ................

6

2

1

Labor Law ...............
Mechanics Lien ...........

3
1

2
0

1
0

1
3
0
0

1

2

0

0

9"
1
20
2d

0
0

0
1

Excludes 18 cases that originated in the Supreme Court itself.
a. Includes one case in which judgment was affirmed without prejudice to
plaintiff's right to apply for vacation of judgment.
b. Includes one case that was dismissed as frivolous.
c. Case remanded without reversal or affirmance.
d. Includes one case that was remanded without reversal or affirmance.
e. Includes one case that was affirmed in part and reversed in part.
*
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Table V

(continued)
DisposrimoN oN APPEAL
Cases Appealed Cases Appealed
by Defendant
by Plaintiff
1
Z
ToTAL

SUBJECT MATTER

1

if

4

1

3C

0

1h

0

3
3

0
1

2
21

0
0

1
1
2
2
1
1

0
2
0
0
1
1

0
1
6
0
1
1

1
2
2
1
1
0

2

0

1

2

1

1

0

1

1
Governmental Immunity.
6
Personal Injury ........
Other .................
6
0
Trusts and Wills ..........
3
Workmen's Compensation.. 11
Total .................... 1179 148

2
1

1
4

0
3

4
0

1
6

1
2

Municipal Government

....

Procedure ................

7

15

Appealable Orders ......

Review ...............
Other .................
Property ................
Assessment ............
Eminent Domain .......
Other .................
School Districts ..........
Public Welfare ...........
Taxation ................
Torts ...................
Civil Damage Act ......
Damages ..............

18

3
4
3
.26

20

.72

39

f. Case remanded without reversal or affirmance.
g. Includes one case that was dismissed for want of jurisdiction and two
cases that were dismissed because appeal taken from a nonappealable order.
hi. Case dismissed because appeal taken from a nonappealable order.
i. Includes one case affirmed as to one plaintiff and reversed and a new
trial granted as to another plaintiff unless a remittitur.
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CIVIL DAMAGE ACT

OPERATOR'S LIABILITY FOR ILLEGAL SALE TO MINOR
WHERE LNTOXICANT CONSUMED BY ADULT

COMPANION

By Drunkeness, Men do often times shorten their dayes; goe out of
the ale-houses drunk, and break their Necks before they come home.
Instances not a few might be given of this, but this is so manifest, a
man need say nothing.'

Under the common law a person injured by an act of an in-

2
toxicated person has no remedy against the seller of the liquor.

The rationale underlying this doctrine is that the act of drinking
the liquor is more proximately the cause of injury than is the remote act of selling it.' As a result of the temperance movement
in the late nineteenth century, however, a number of states en-

acted legislation to control commercial liquor traffic; these laws,
presently in force in several states, 4 are variously referred to as

Civil Damage Acts or Dram Shop Acts. They are directed at and
impose liability on dram shop operators for injuries resulting

from the illegal sale of intoxicating liquors. Although these acts
are frequently so construed as to approach strict liability, only

the Illinois statute creates liability regardless of the total absence
of fault or wrongdoing by the dram shop operator.' The Minne1. Bunyan, The Life and Death of Mr. Badman, in LIFE

AND DEATH OF

MR. BADWNmrAND THE HOLY WAR 49-50 (1905).

2. See Cherbonnier v. Rafalovich, 88 F. Supp. 900 (D. Alaska 1050);
Belding v. Johnson, 86 Ga. 177, 12 S.E. 804 (1890); Beck v. Groc, 245 Minn.
28, 70 N.W.2d 886 (1955); Seibel v. Leach, 233 Wis. 66, 288 N.W. 774 (1039).
See also Comment, 12 BAYLOR L. REV. 388 (1960).
3. See Cherbonnier v. Rafalovich, 88 F. Supp. 900 (D. Alaska 1950);
Hitson v. Dwyer, 61 Cal. App. 2d 803, 143 P.2d 952 (1943); Beck v. Groc,
245 Minn. 28, 70 N.W.2d 886 (1955).

4. ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 121-22 (1960); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 4,
§§ 715(a)(6), 716 (1953); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (1961); IowA CODE
§ 129.2 (1949); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 61, § 95 (1954); Micu. CoMp.
LAws § 436.22(2) (1948); MINN. STAT. § 340.95 (1961); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 202.070 (1961); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 16; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-331,
-332 (1953); N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-21 (1959); OHIO REV. CODE §§ 4399.01,
.02 (Page 1953); ORE. REV. STAT. § 30.730 (1961); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN.
§§ 3-11-1 to -5 (1957); S.D. CODE § 5.0208 (1939); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7
§ 501 (1958); WASH. REV. CODE § 71.08.080 (1959); WIS. STAT. § 176.35
(1957); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 12-34 (1957).
5.
Every person, who shall be injured . . . shall have a right of action
. . . against any person . . . who shall, by selling or giving alcoholic

liquor, have caused the intoxication, in whole or in part, of such person ....
IL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (Supp. 1961).

In interpreting this statute the Illinois Supreme Court has held that a
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sota Civil Damage Act, in relevant part, provides:
Every. . person who is injured in person or property, or means of
support, by any intoxicated person... has a right of action ...
against any person who, by illegally selling, bartering, or giving intoxicating liquors, caused the intoxication of such person, for all damages
sustained .. . .6

In Murphy v. Hennen,7 the Minnesota Supreme Court declared that the Civil Damage Act imposed liability on a dram
shop operator who sold intoxicating drinks to a minor, although
the liquor was consumed by the minor's obviously intoxicated
adult companion who subsequently injured the plaintiffs. The
Court concluded that defendant's liability could be premised either on the fact of an illegal sale to a minor or on the fact that
defendant furnished liquor to an "obviously intoxicated" person.
The act provides an action for one injured by an intoxicated
person against any person who caused the intoxication "by ilegally selling, bartering, or giving intoxicating liquors." Furnishing or selling liquor to an "obviously intoxicated" person, as was
the adult companion in this case, is illegal.8 Construing the statute to create liability where the dram shop operator has in effect
furnished liquor to a person who the operator knows or ought to
know is intoxicated, even though the liquor was in fact sold to
another person, appears reasonable. To rule otherwise would allow an operator to escape liability merely by selling to a person
legally entitled to be served who would then transfer the liquor
to a person not so entitled to it because of intoxication or minor-

ity.
Although it appears justifiable to premise the defendant's liability in Murphy on a sale to an "obviously intoxicated" person,
the Court was also required to consider whether liability could
be predicated on the fact of an illegal sale to a minor, for the jury
had been instructed that they could find liability upon either basis. The defendant argued that liability should attach under the
act only when the liquor is consumed by a person not legally entitled to be served and that the subsequent transfer by the minor
to his adult companion was an intervening act that became the
cause of action arises if "the alcoholic liquors served to him in defendants'
tavern contributed in some degree, no matter how slight, to his intoxication."
Osborn v. Leuffgen, 381 Ill. 295, 298, 45 N.E2d 622, 624 (1942). See also
Moran, Theories of Liability, 1958 U. I,. L.. 191, 195-97.
6. MrNx. STAT. § 340.95 (1961).
7. 119 N.Wad 489 (Mim. 1963).
8. MrKN. STAT. § 340.14(1) (1961); see Strand v. Village of Watson, 245
Minn. 414, 72 N.W.2d 609 (1955).
9. 119 N.W.2d at 492.
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proximate cause of the intoxication and of the resulting injury.
The Court responded by pointing out that the act creates a right
of action against the seller whenever there has been an illegal
sale and that any sale forbidden by statute, such as a sale to a
minor, constitutes an illegal sale under the act- the intended
regulatory purpose of the statute 0 would be thwarted if defendant's construction were adopted.
The Civil Damage Act seemingly reflects a legislative judgment that an unreasonable risk exists in selling intoxicants to minors- there is a belief that if a minor were served liquor he
would cause an injury. In Murphy the injury did not result from
a risk that the legislature had contemplated in prohibiting such
sales, for the person consuming the liquor and inflicting the injury was an adult. The Court's conclusion, however, is consistent
with its established position concerning proximate cause: if a
party commit an act that he "ought, in the exercise of ordinary
care, to have anticipated was liable to result in injury to others,
then he is liable for any injury proximately resulting from it, although he could not have anticipated the particular injury which
did happen."" According to Minnesota doctrine, the existence of
proximate cause depends on whether an efficient cause intervened
- lack of foreseeability is irrelevant.' 2
Murphy indicates, however, that the efficacy of holding a remote illegal sale as the basis for imposing liability on the dram
shop operator is doubtful-it is submitted that the act should impose liability only where the liquor is consumed by a non-entitled
person. In Benes v. Champion 3 the Court found a seller of "moonshine" liquor liable under the act although the person consuming
the liquor and causing the injury was not the buyer; any consumption would have constituted an illegal furnishing or sale
since the liquor itself was illegal. In Murphy the ultimate consumer was a person legally entitled to be served. The defendant's
liability, therefore, should be based only on a finding that the
ultimate consumer was, to the defendant's knowledge, obviously
intoxicated. Such a construction would prevent an operator from
10. The Court has spoken frequently of the penal or admonitory objective
of the Civil Damage Act. See Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 370,
82 N.W.2d 365 (1957); Adamson v. Dougherty, 248 Minn. 585, 81 N.W.2d
110 (1957); Hahn v. City of Ortonville, 238 Minn. 428, 57 N.W.2d 254
(1953); Fox v. Swartz, 228 Minn. 23, 36 N.W.2d 708 (1949).
11. Christianson v. Chicago, St. P.M. & 0. Ry., 67 Minn. 04, 97, 60 N.W.

640, 641 (1896).
12. Dellwo v. Pearson, 259 Minn. 452, 107 N.W.2d 859 (190}1).
13. 186 Minn. 578, 244 N.W. 72 (1932).
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escaping liability merely because the sale was made to a person
entitled to be served rather than directly to either a visibly intoxicated person or a minor who, to the operator's knowledge,
would consume the liquor. The same reasoning 4 leads to the conclusion that any technically illegal sale should be ignored where
the liquor is to be consumed, to the operator's kmowledge, by an
entitled person.

A myriad of conditions could result in a sale being illegal. Sales
of intoxicating liquor without a license, 15 during certain hours,'
to a student,' 7 to a prostitute, 8 to a parolee, 1 are among those
sales declared to be illegal. To found liability upon the sole fact
of any such sale without considering the relationship of the sale
to the subsequent intoxication and injury places a severe burden
upon the dram shop operator.

0

In each case the operator's lia-

bility can most fairly be governed by his kmowledge, actual or
constructive, of the age, identity, or condition of the person who
will consume the intoxicant.'
Notably, several courts have recently utilized common-law
principles of negligence to impose liability upon dram shop operators.F In 1958.a Pennsylvania court's had little difficulty in find-

ing that the operator was negligent in serving liquor to a visibly
intoxicated person. In the leading case of RappaporWt v. Nichols,2 4
14. See text accompanying note 8 &upra.
15. MiN. STAT. § 40.11 (1) (1961).
16. Mnq-. Sz&T. § 340.14 (1) (1961).
17. MaNrN. STAT. § 340.73 (1) (1961).
18. Mnm. SmTT. § 340.73 (1) (1961).
19. M m. STAT. § 340.83 (1961).
20. In previous cases the Court has appeared to require that the element
of proximate causation exist. Ritter v. Village of Appleton, 254 Mfinn. 30,
93 N.W.2d 683 (1958); Hartwig v. Loyal Order of Moose, 253 Minn. 347,
356, 91 N.W.2d 794, 801 (1958). However, it is unclear whether the proximate cause requirement relates to the causation between the illegal sale and
the intoxication or to the causation between the intoxication and the subsequent injury or to both. See Note, 46 Mmnw. L. REv. 169,193-98 (1961).
21. Such a test has been adopted by other courts in similar cases. See
Johnson v. Gram, 72 Ill. App. 676 (1897); Sullivan v. Conrad, 79 Neb. 303,
112 N.W. 660 (1907); Fladeland v. Mayer, 10- N.W.2d 121 (N.D. 1960); SiL. lRv. 72
bila v. Bahney, 4 Ohio St. 399 (1878). See also Note, 11 DRA
(1961).
22. See Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dept. Store, 269 F-d 322 (7th Cir.
1959); Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 NJ. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959); Schelin v.
Goldberg, 188 Pa. Super. 341, 146 A.2d 648 (1958), where recovery against
the dram shop operator was allowed on common-law principles of negligence.
See also Comment, 3 Anx. L. Rnv. 98 (1961).
23. Schelin v. Goldberg, 188 Pa. Super. 341, 146 A.2d 648 (1958).
24. 31 NJ. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
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a New Jersey court, after noting statistics on the relationship of
intoxication to accidents, concluded that the unreasonable risk
of harm resulting from a sale of alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated person or a minor "may be readily recognized and foreseen ... ."25
By taking judicial notice of the obvious dangers of intoxicating
liquors, 26 the Court could impose liability under the act in those
circumstances where a degree of culpability may be attached to
the person dealing illegally in intoxicating liquors without departing from traditional notions of proximate cause and without undermining the regulatory objectives of the Civil Damage Act.
B.

SURvIvAL oF ACTION ATE

OPERATOR's DEATH

The Minnesota Court, in Dahl v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank,27
considered the question of whether a cause of action created by
the Civil Damage Act survives the death of the person against
whom it arose. The plaintiff sought to recover from the representatives of the deceased dram shop operator under the provisions of both the license bonding statute"' and the Civil Damage
Act. 29 The Minnesota survival-of-action statute provides that a
cause of action arising out of personal injuries or death that is
based on the negligence of a decedent survives against his personal representatives; other actions based on injury or death die
with the person against whom they existed. The statute also permits the survival of actions arising out of contract. The Court
held that the action under the bonding statute survives the death
of the operator because it is based on a breach of an implied
contract, but that a civil damage action is premised on a strict
liability concept rather than on either contract or negligence and
therefore does not survive.
A comparison of the legislative and judicial histories of the
Civil Damage Act and the license bonding statute as well as the
at 202, 156 A.2d at 8.
26. See generally NATIONAL SAFETY CouNcIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 49 (1959);
MINNESOTA DEPT. OF HIGHWAYS, STUDY No. 885.A13: THm RELATIONSHIP OF
25. Id.

(1959); McCoid, Intoxication and Its Effect Upon Civil Responsibility, 42 IOWA L. REV. 38 (1950).
27. 121 N.W.2d 321 (Minn. 1963).
DRINKING AND SPEEDING TO ACCIDENT SEVERITY 5

28. MINN. STAT. § 340.12 (1961) provides in part:
(d) That the licensee, will pay to the extent of the principal
amount of such bond or policy, and damages for death or injury caused
by or resulting from the violation of any provisions of law relating
thereto, and in such cases recovery under this paragraph may be had
from the surety on this bond or policy.
29. MINN. STAT. § 573.01 (1961). See text accompanying note 0 supra.
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language of the two acts convincingly demonstrates that the Civil
Damage Act is not based on contract?' The first session of the Minnesota state legislature enacted a statute requiring that every
applicant for a liquor license file a bond.1 If the licensee violated
any provision of the bond, any person injured thereby could recover damages not to exceed the face value of the bond; this cause
of action was early construed to be in contract.' The present licensing law is a direct descendent of the earlier provision.' The
Civil Damage Act was passed subsequent to the licensing statute,34 and if the legislature had intended merely to enlarge upon
the contractual liability of the earlier statute, it could easily have
done so instead of creating an entirely new cause of action.
The language of the licensing statute is indicative of its contractual nature, for it specifies the covenants that the licensee
must make, it stipulates the exact conditions that every bond
must fulfill,"a and it expressly states that the bond is "for the benefit of . . . all persons suffering damages by reason of the breach
of the conditions thereof." 30 In contrast, the Civil Damage Act is
addressed to the public generally rather than to the licensee and
does not impose any conditions that the licensee must fulfill.
Instead, it creates a cause of action for any person injured as a
result of the illegal sale of liquor.
In distinguishing the licensing statute from the Civil Damage
Act, the Court relied on an additional argument that only generates confusion. The Court stated that the penal characteristic of
the licensing provision is consistent with its contractual nature,
whereas the compensatory objective of the Civil Damage Act is
30. Other courts have reached the same conclusion. See Staples v. Lucas,
142 Conn.452, 115 A.2d 337 (1955).
31. Win. Gen. Laws 1858, ch. 74, §§ 1-4.
32. Koski v. Pakkala, 121 Minn. 450, 141 N.W. 793 (1913); State v. Larson, 83 Minn.124, 86 N.W. 3 (1901).
33. MinN. STAT. § 340.12 (1961).
34. Mnn. Laws 1911, ch. 175.
35. All such bonds shall be conditioned as follows:
As to "off sale" and "on sale" dealers:
(a) That the licensee will obey the law relating to such licensed
business;
(b) That the licensee will pay ... all taxes, license fees, penalties
and other charges ...
(c) That in the event of any violation ... of any law . ..such
bond or policy shall be forfeited ...

(d) That the licensee will pay to the extent of the principal amount
of such bond or policy. ..
Mnw. STAT. § 340.12 (1961).

36. Mm-. STAT. § 340.12 (1961).
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indicative that it sounds in tort. This distinction is not helpful,
for the characterization of an act as "compensatory" is not a rea-

son for concluding that it is not founded upon contract -

indeed,

contract actions are almost wholly compensatory. Second, even
if a "compensatory" action were based on tort rather than contract, it must first be established that the Civil Damage Act is

compensatory, proving this by reference to the tortious nature of
the act is circular reasoning. Finally, the Court has not consistently
interpreted the act to be compensatory. It has at times declared
the statute to be remedial or compensatory in nature and thus to
be liberally applied,87 and on other occasions it has characterized
the act as penal or admonitory and therefore to be strictly construed." After an exhaustive review of the language of the Court

in many of its decisions involving the act, the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit concluded that
These differing descriptions [of the nature of the act] naturally present some element of confusion as to the Minnesota court's basic attitude toward the Act. We suspect, however, that the inconsistency of
characterization is more apparent than real and that the ostensible difference in expression has been due to the nature of the issue before the
court . . .in the particular case. 89

Perhaps the only useful conclusions that can be drawn from a
study of the cases are that the act may be construed either strictly
or liberally and that the ultimate purpose of the act is a dual one:
"to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.

'4 0

Although the history and language of the Civil Damage Act
support the conclusion that it sounds in tort, 41 whether the act
creates a cause of action sufficiently like a common-law action
87. See, e.g., Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 70 N.W.2d 886 (1955); Mayes
v. Byers, 214 Minn. 54, 7 N.W.2d 403 (1948).
88. See cases cited note 10 supra.
39. Village of Brooten v. Cudahy Packing Co., 291 F.2d 284, 2092-93 (8th
Cir. 1961).
40. Id. at 293; Note, 46 MiNN.L. R.v. 169, 170-74 (1961).
41. The only basis for contending that an action arising under the act is
contractual is the legislative amendment to the licensing statute in 1945,
which provided that a licensee could, at the option of the municipality, file
a liability insurance policy in lieu of a bond. Minn. Laws 1945, ch. 313, § 1.
This policy was for the benefit of any person possessing a cause of action
under either the Civil Damage Act or the licensing provision. It is not totally
unreasonable to argue that this amendment gave some contractual flavor
to the act by making a claimant under that act a third-party beneficiary of
the insurance contract. In view of the differing legislative and judicial histories and the divergence in language of the two acts, however, this amendment can reasonably be dismissed as an insufficient basis for concluding that
the Civil Damage Act is contractual in nature.
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based on negligence to allow it to survive the death of the dram
shop operator is a closer question. At common law no tort action
survived the death of the tort-feasor.- Survival-of-action statutes,
like the one in Minnesota, were adopted to alleviate the hardships
resulting from the common-law doctrine. 3 Most courts have required that all statutes in derogation of the common law be
strictly construed, and therefore, one who seeks to maintain an
action that is within the common-law prohibition must have the
plain and express authorization of the statute. Thus, since the
survival-of-action statute allows only those tort actions based on
negligence to survive, the Minnesota Court has held that statutory actions based on liability without fault do not survive. 5 The
fundamental issue, however, is whether the act is wholly based on
liability without fault or is in reality founded on a negligence concept.4" The "penal-compensatory" distinction is no more useful in
resolving this question than in determining whether a cause of
action is based on contract or tort.47 Even if the distinction were
meaningful, the Court's inconsist interpretations render it valueless in attempting to characterize the Civil Damage Act.
42. See Annot., 171 ALR. 1392 (1947), supplementing Annot., 61 A.CR.

880 (1929).

43. The statutory changes of the common-law doctrine perhaps reflect a
shift in emphasis from revenge to compensation. See Grant v. McAuliffe, 41
Cal. 2d 859, 867, 264 P.d 944, 949 (1953). Courts had made exceptions to
the doctrine "actio personali noritur cum persond' even before the statutory
changes. Barnes Coal Corp. v. Retail Coal Merchants Ass'n, 128 F.2d 645
(4th Cir. 1942); Tuttle v. Short, 42 Wyo. 1, 288 Pac. 524 (1930). The common-law doctrine was never favored by the courts. Sullivan v. Associated
Billposters &Distribs., 6 Fad 1000 (2d Cir. 1925).
44. See McTellan v. Automobile Ins. Co., 80 Fad 344 (9th Cir. 1935);
In re Statler, S1 F2d 767 (SID.N.Y. 1929); Green v. Thompson, 26 Minn.
500, 5 N.W. 376 (1880); Hegerich v. Keddie, 99 N.Y. n8, 1 N.. 787 (1885).
45. In Lavalle v. Kaupp, A0 Minn. 360, 61 N.W.2d 228 (1958), the
plaintiff was bitten by defendant's dog. Mhw. ST.A. § 347.22 (1901) provides that "if a dog... attacks or injures any person ... the owner of the
dog is liable in damages to the person so attacked or injured ..... The defend-

ant died before trial, and the Court faced the question whether a cause of action arising under this statute survived the death of the dog owner. The Court
concluded that, since the statute created a strict liability, the cause of action
did not survive unless the injuries were caused by decedent's negligence. See
also Green v. Thompson, 26 Minn. 500, 5 N.W. 376 (1880).
46. What the legislature meant by using the word "negligence" in the
survival statute is not certain. Possibly, the legislature failed to consider the
question of whether actions based on strict liability statutes should survivo
and intended by the word "negligence" only to distinguish between those
actions founded on fault -intentional torts and negligent torts.
47. See notes S7-40 mpra and accompanying text.
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While the cases offer little assistance in pinpointing the exact
nature of the act, several factors suggest that negligence is at least
one evil at which the statute is directed. Although the Court has
caused some confusion by referring to the act's compensatory,
remedial, and penal objectives, it has consistently spoken of its
regulatory nature. 4 Such a characterization is not determinative
that the act is based solely on negligence, but it is indicative of a
belief that dram shop operators are capable of preventing injury
by exercising care in selling intoxicants and that the imposition of
liability will encourage a higher standard of care.49 Also, the requirement that the person be "obviously intoxicated" as an element of one type of illegal sale is evidence of a "fault" concept.50
Actual intoxication is not sufficient for liability; the person must
be visibly intoxicated before the operator is liable for having unlawfully sold or furnished intoxicating liquor21
Some additional considerations might weigh in favor of treating the act as a negligence statute for the purpose of allowing the
action to survive. The act provides a method of shifting losses to
the business activity that is in part responsible for those losses and
that can best bear the cost of them. 2 Also, the compensatory objective 8 of the act requires that the action be permitted to survive. Although these considerations might not be proper where an
action is obviously beyond the protection of the survival provision, they ought to be relevant where,
as here, the action is not
4
clearly excluded from the statute.
Even if the Court were unwilling to accept the conclusion that
all civil damage actions should survive as negligence actions, two
48. See, e.g., Adamson v. Dougherty, 248 Minn. 535, 542, 81 N.W.2d 110,
115 (1957); Hahn v. City of Ortonville, 288 Minn. 428, 437, 57 N.W.2d 254,
261 (1953).
49. This is not to suggest that all regulatory legislation is founded on a
fault concept. Much of such legislation (e.g., pure food and drug laws) may
represent no more than a legislative judgment that enterprise liability is
economically feasible and desirable with regard to particular injuries. Other
so-called "strict liability" statutes, however, appear concerned as well with
preventing injury by coercing, through the strict liability mechanism, higher
standards of care.
50. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
51. Strand v. Village of Watson, 245 Minn. 414, 72 N.W.2d 609 (1955).
52. The Court recognized this factor in its opinion in Dahl. See also Bliss,
Enforcement of Judgments, 1958 U. I.LL. L.F. 273, 279-84.
53. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
54. The uncertainty of the question is further evidenced by the fact that
Mr. Justice Murphy dissented in Dahl:
The fact that the Civil Damage Act removes an unwarranted immunity which the defendant enjoyed under the common law and that
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other reasonable alternatives were available. First, it could have
distinguished between those actions under the act that are based
purely on a strict liability concept and those actions in which
negligence may also in fact exist. To say that the act does not
require negligence on the part of the dram shop operator in order
to support the cause of action should not mean that negligence,
where it does occur, is irrelevant. The existence of negligence depends, of course, on the circumstances of each case. A dram shop
operator may in fact be negligent in serving liquor to a visibly
intoxicated person; conversely, there may be no real fault where
the operator, after a reasonable inquiry, sells intoxicants to a
minor. Certainly it does not pervert the intent of the survival
statute to allow an action at least where the operator was negligent.55 Second, the Court might have allowed the survival of the
action based on common-law principles of negligence rather than
on the act. There is no reason why an action under the act should
be the exclusive remedy where negligence can be established, and
there is recent authority in support of the allowance of a commonlaw negligence action, 5 even in states with dram shop legislation.S
C.

COAUEP
"M-EANS

SAB4nIN Iu=S TO THE 'PtRSioN" AND THE
OF SUPPORT"

The task of determining what kinds of damages are recoverable
under dram shop acts is a recurring problem in most jurisdictions5 s The Minnesota Civil Damage Act69 allows recovery to
it imposes strict liability should not compel us to view it as entirely
unique or alien in nature. It may be true, as the majority opinion suggests, that it provides a form of social insurance, but it is also true
that it finds justification in fundamental negligence principles which
recognize that the violation of legal standards imposed by law may
create foreseeable hazards which involve unreasonable risk to others.
There is so much of the idea of fault, both in the substance of the action and in the procedures for enforcement of liability, that I feel a
reasonable interpretation requires that it be considered as one "caused
by the negligence of a decedent" within the purview of § 573.01.
121 N.W.2d at 324--25.
55. See text accompanying notes 20-05 supra.
56. See note 22 supra, for those cases that have upheld the existence of
a cause of action based on the operator's negligence.
57. See Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dept. Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir.
1959).
58. See, e.g., Iszler v. Jorda, 80 N.W.2d 665 (N.D. 1957); Annot., 6A.LR.2d 705 (1959) (right to recover under dram shop acts for death of
intoxicated person); Annot., 6 A.LR.2d 798 (1949) (what constitutes "injury to person or property" within dram shop acts).
59. MN. STAT. § 340.95 (1961).
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specified persons who are "injured in person or property, or means
of support." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Village of Isle0
and Bundy v. City of Fridley0' posed questions concerning the
meaning of the terms "injured in person" and "means of support."
In State Farm the plaintiff sued the dram shop operator whose
illegal sale induced her husband's intoxication, which was the
proximate cause of an accident where he sustained injuries. Plaintiff alleged that as a result of the accident she suffered a loss of
consortium and mental anguish and that the damages resulting
from her injuries were recoverable under the act. The trial court
instructed the jury that "injury to the person" is limited to the
mental anguish proximately resulting from the accident in question that the plaintiff has suffered and will suffer in the future.
On appeal, the Court held that neither loss of consortium nor
mental suffering gave rise to recoverable damages under the Civil
Damage Act.
In holding that loss of consortium suffered by a wife is not
compensable under the act, the Court reasoned that such a loss
is not really an "injury to the person," but is merely a consequential item of damage and, further, that under longstanding
common-law principles only the husband has a right to recover
for loss of consortium. The Court was in agreement with the great
majority of jurisdictions that deny recovery for the wife's loss of
consortium on the basis of common-law doctrine. 2 A variety of
reasons are given for this result: that the damage is too remote;08
that while the husband has a right to the wife's services, the wife
has no corresponding right; 4 and that no new rights were created
60. 122 N.W.2d 36 (Mln. 1963).
61. 122 N.W.2d 585 (Minn. 1963).
62. See, e.g., Patelski v. Snyder, 179 Ill. App. 24 (1913); Gearing v. Berkson, 223 Mass. 257, 111 N.E. 785 (1916); Eschenbach v. Benjamin, 195 Minn.
378, 263 N.W. 154 (1935); Lurie v. Mannone, 200 Misc. 320, 107 N.Y.S.2d 182
(Sup. Ct. 1951); Annot., 23 A.Lt.2d 1878 (1952).
In Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950), the court
permitted a wife's cause of action for loss of consortium. Although this decision caused a re-examination of the old common-law doctrine, most courts
refused to follow the Hitaffer result. See, e.g., Baird v. Cincinnati, N.O. &
Tex. Ry., 368 S.W2d 172 (Ky. 1963); Bums v. Van Laan, 367 Mich. 485,
116 N.W.2d 873 (1962); Hartman v. Cold Spring Granite Co., 247 Minn.
515, 77 N.W.2d 651 (1956); Kronenbitter v. Washburn Wire Co., 4 N.Y.2d
524, 151 NXE.2d 898, 176 N.Y.S.2d 354 (1958). But see Duffy v. IUpsmanFulkerson &Co., 200 F. Supp. 71 (D. Mont. 1961).
63. See, e.g., Brown v. Kistleman, 177 Ind. 692, 98 N.E. 631 (1012);
Feneff v. New York Cent. &H.RR., 203 Mass. 278, 89 N.E. 436 (1909).
64. See, e.g., Smith v. Nicholas Bldg. Co., 93 Ohio St. 101, 112 N.E. 204

(1915).
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by the Married Women's Acts 5 While the denial of recovery for
the wife's loss of consortium may be both illogical and antiquated, 8
the well-settled law makes the Court's holding on this issue not
unreasonable 7
In determining whether the plaintiff sustained any "injury to
person," the Court also considered her claim of damages for mental suffering and held that there was insufficient evidence to support an award for such damages. The decision indicates that recovery under the act would be denied, absent a physical injury,
even though a woman whose husband has been seriously injured
might be required "to expend both her physical and nervous resources to meet a new responsibility" 68 This result is in accord
with the Minnesota rule that mental suffering may be compensated only when accompanied by a physical injury to the plaintiff69 - the mental anguish must be evidenced by some physical
ailment. Although this limitation has often been questioned,78 it
has been consistently followed and there is therefore little possibility of an exception under the Civil Damage Act.
Thus, in State Farm the plaintiff was denied compensation
both for loss of consortium and for mental suffering because of
the Court's strict adherence to doctrine. Although both rules are
subject to valid criticism, perhaps an action that frequently is
based on liability without fault provides an unsympathetic setting for their being overruled.
Both State Farmand Bundy involved the interpretation of the
65. See, e.g., Cravens v. Louisville & NJLR., 195 Ky. 257, 242 S.W. 628
(1922); Nash v. Mobile &0. Ry., 149 Miss. 82S, 116 So. 100 (1928).
66. In support of this position, see Holbrook, The Change in the Meaning
of Consortium, 22 MicH. L. RPuv. 1 (19-3); Lippman, The Breakdown of
Consortium,SO COLTM. L. Rlv. 651 (1930).
67. Even if the damages for a wife's loss of consortium were nonnally
recoverable, the injury would not be compensable under the Civil Damage
Act because the act creates actions only for injuries "to person or property,
or means of support." Mmmr. STAT. § 840.95 (1961). As the court correctly
noted in State Farm, loss of consortium is a consequential intangible in-

jury-there appears to be no authority for the proposition that injury to
the person is anything more than injury to the body.

68. 122 N.W.2d at 43.
69. Smith v. Carlson, 209 inn. 268, 296 N.W. 132 (1941); Sanderson
v. Northern Pac. Ry., 88 Minn. 162, 92 N.W. 542 (1902); Purcell v. St. Paul
City Ry., 48 Mum. 134, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892).

The same rule prevails in the majority of jurisdictions. See generally
Annot., 64 ALR.2d 100, 126 (1959).
70. See, e.g., Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of
Torts, 49 HEAv. L. 1Ev. 1083 (1936); Note, 7 Da=n L. PEv. 53 (1957); Note,

19 M Nw. L. RLLv. 806 (1935); Note, 81 TMEp. L.Q. 221 (1958).
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"means of support" phrase in the act. In State Farm the plaintiff
claimed damages for having been forced to sell a jointly owned

homestead in order to pay her husband's medical expenses. The
Court sustained the award of such damages: Because the medical
expenses were paid from jointly owned funds that would otherwise have been available for plaintiff's support, the depletion of
those funds could logically be designated an injury to plaintiff's
"means of support." While this result 71 conforms with the compensatory objective 2 of the act, it also permits the intoxicated
person in effect to recover for his injuries. The Court had previously held that the intoxicated person may not sue under the
act,73 for to allow recovery would not discourage intoxication and
carelessness. Yet by simply allowing his spouse to pay medical
bills, the intoxicated person may in effect obtain the benefits of
the civil damage action. Of course, it is obvious that the intoxicated person profits indirectly whenever his wife or children recover for loss of means of support. Thus, if recovery to the spouse
is to be allowed, as in State Farm, there may no longer be any
real basis for denying recovery in a direct action by the intoxi71. Other courts have also reached the conclusion that the payment of
medical expenses is recoverable under dram shop acts. See Kelly v. Hughes,
83 Ill. App. 2d 814, 179 N.E.2d 273 (1962); Coleman v. People, 78 Ill. App.
210 (1898); Spencer v. Johnson, 185 Mich. 85, 151 N.W. 684 (1915).
72. See note 37 s-zqra and accompanying text.
78. Randall v. Village of Excelsior, 258 Minn. 81, 103 N.W.2d 181 (1960).
The Court also held in State Farm that an insurer of an injured intoxicated
person has no greater rights against the dram shop operator than does the
insured. State Farm was a consolidated action: State Farm Mut. Auto
Ins. Co. attempted to obtain reimbursement from the liquor vendor for
the amount that the insurer paid to its intoxicated insured in settlement for
his injuries, and the wife of the intoxicated insured attempted to recover
from the vendor for loss of support, mental suffering, and loss of consortium.
In denying reimbursement to the insurer, the Court relied on Empire Fire
& Marine Ins. Co. v. Williams, 121 N.W.2d 580 (Minn. 1968), decided the
same day. The insurer in Empire was denied reimbursement on the theory
that an insurer has only the rights of a subrogee, and since the intoxicated
person has no rights under the Civil Damage Act, his insurer may not recover. The Court distinguished the situation in Empire from that in Village of Brooten v. Cudahy Packing Co., 291 F.2d 284 (8th Cir. 1961), in
which the insurer of the employer of the injured intoxicated person was allowed to recover from the dram shop operator for its payments to the employer for the losses that he incurred as a consequence of the injury to his
employee. The Court concluded that the insurer in the latter case was
subrogated to its insured, the employer, who was "injured in person" and
who could thus have recovered directly from the liquor vendor; whereas in
Empire and State Farm the insurer was subrogated to a person, the injured
intoxicated insured, not protected by the act.
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cated person for loss of means of support.
In State Farm the jury was instructed that "means of support"
includes all such means of living as would enable one to live in the
degree of comfort suitable and becoming to his station in life. It is said
to include anything requisite to housing, feeding, clothing, health, proper recreation, vacation, traveling expense or other proper cognate purposes 4

The defendant contended that the term "means of support" does
not contemplate evaluation of all the factors enumerated by the
court and that the instruction should be limited to "actual support in terms of money contributions referrable to those things
necessary for livelihood. ' 75 In affirming the jury's award, the
Court approved the trial court's charge as encompassing the relevant factors in ascertaining damage under the support provision.
Moreover, the Court found that the injured party's income, his
ability to do physical labor, his habits and health prior to his
injury, and his life expectancy were additional facts to be considered. Use of these factors in evaluating injury to means of
support appears to be consistent with the tests applied in other
jurisdictions under similar dram shop acts7" and accords with the
Court's decision in Ritter v. Village of Appleton. 7 There the
Court, in evaluating the amount of plaintiff's loss of means of
support, accepted evidence establishing the deceased's age, his
exact life expectancy, and the precise nature of the business assets that had contributed to plaintiff's support and maintenance
of her station in life. Further, the Court has often allowed in evidence these same factors in determining the propriety of awards
of support money in separation and divorce proceedingsl 8 Thus,
the Court's approval of the trial instruction is in accordance with
both its past decisions and those of other jurisdictions and appears well calculated to aid a jury in making an intelligent award
under the support provision of the act.
In Bundy v. City of Fridley the plaintiffs, whose ten year-old
74. 122 N.W.2d at 88.
75. 122 N.W.2d at 89.
76. See, e.g., Mckahon v. Sankey, 133 11. 636, 24 N.E. 10-07 (1890); Brockway v. Patterson, 72 Mich. 122, 40 N.W. 192 (1888); Whipple v. Rosenstock, 99 Neb. 153, 155 N.W. 898 (1913); Schneider v. Hosier, 21 Ohio SL
98 (1871); Garrigan v. Kennedy, 19 S.D. 11, 101 N.W. 1081 (1904).
77. 254 :An s0, 93 N.Wad 683 (1958).
78. See, e.g., Eck v. Eck, 252 Alinn. 290, 90 N.W.2d 211 (1958); Krusemark v. Krusemark, 32 Mnn 416, 46 N.W.2d 647 (1951); McKey v. 31cKey, 228 Minn 28, 36 N.W.2d 17 (1949); Hempel v. Hempel, 225 Mlinn.
287, 80 N.W.2d 594 (1948).
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son was struck and killed by an intoxicated driver, brought a
civil damage action against the dram shop operator for damages
to "means of support." Although the plaintiffs stipulated that
their son did not contribute financially to the family support,
they did allege that he performed small household services and
that he contributed to the enjoyment of family life. The Court
affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the action:
to recover in an action for injury in "means of support" the plaintiff
must show that in consequence of the wrongful acts . . . the plaintiff's

standard of living or accustomed means of maintenance has been lost
or curtailed so that he has been reduced to a state of dependence by be0
ing deprived of the support which he had theretofore enjoyed3

Damages for loss of future support are clearly recoverable as "loss
of means of support."' ° The cases establishing that rule, however,
have dealt with the possible future incapacity of the present wageearner as a result of an injury caused by an intoxicated person.
No court appears to have concluded that the speculative loss of
future earnings of a child who has not been the family wageearner is within the meaning of "means of support." Such a result would considerably broaden the more restricted recovery judicially contemplated by that term. However, it would appear
no more difficult for the Court to allow recovery under the Civil
Damage Act for the loss of the child's anticipated future earnings
8l
than it would be to allow compensation, as the Court has done, 82
for the same loss in an action under the Wrongful Death Act.
That statute allows recovery to a surviving spouse or next of kin
for all "pecuniary loss" resulting from the wrongful death of any
person. The Court has held that the "pecuniary loss" language
supports an award for anticipated earnings of a child. Thus, the
"loss of means of support" provision of the Civil Damage Act
would appear to be an even stronger basis for such damages. Unfortunately, although the plaintiffs did rely on the Wrongful
Death Act, they did not advance this argument.
79. 122 N.W.2d at 588-89.
80. See notes 76-78 supra and accompanying text.
81. See Schroht v. Vol], 245 Minn. 114, 71 N.W.2d 843 (1055). See also
Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1900).
82.
When death is caused by the wrongful act or omission of any person or corporation, the trustee appointed .. . may maintain an action
therefor if the decedent might have maintained an action, had he lived,
for an injury caused by such wrongful act or omission. The recovery
... shall not exceed $25,000, and shall be for the exclusive benefit of
the surviving spouse and next of kin . ...
Mn~x. STAT. § 578.02 (Supp. 1962).
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The plaintiffs contended that the "means of support" provision of the Civil Damage Act is coextensive in coverage with the
"pecuniary loss" phrase in the Wrongful Death Act with respect
to loss of aid, comfort, and companionship. Recently, in Fussner
v. Andert,8 the Court, in assessing damages under the "pecuniary
loss" provision, held that the jury could consider not only the financial contribution, but also the aid, comfort, and companion-ship furnished by the deceased child to the family. In Bundy,
however, the Court reasoned that since the legislature "expressly
enumerated the distinct types of injuries for which recovery [under the Civil Damage Act] could be had, without employing the
general phrase"" of the Wrongful Death Act, it did not intend
to equate the terms -if the legislature had so intended, it could
easily have allowed recovery for "pecuniary loss" by using the
appropriate language. The reasoning is not persuasive, for the
Court could have broadly construed the "loss of support" provision as readily as it did the "pecuniary loss" limitation in Fussner. Certainly loss of comfort, aid and companionship can as
easily be read into "loss of means of support" as into "pecuniary
loss."
Thus, the Court's conclusion that the "loss of means of support" provision of the Civil Damage Act does not include the
loss of either a child's anticipated future earnings or his comfort,
aid and companionship appears to be inconsistent with the more
liberal interpretation of similar language in the Wrongful Death
Act. There are, however, reasons for interpreting the language of
the Civil Damage Act more restrictively than that of the Wrongful Death Act. Wrongful conduct on the part of the defendant
must be established to recover under the latter act,a and contributory negligence is a defense;"8 neither is relevant under the
Civil Damage Act. The maximum amount of damage under the
Wrongful Death Act is $25,000;87 the Civil Damage Act has no
limitation. Therefore, the Court is probably wise in providing
some limitations on the liability of a Civil Damage Act defendant,
because such a defendant cannot avail himself of the defenses
and limitations of liability that protect the Wrongful Death Act
defendant.
83. 261 M nm 347, 113 N.W.2d S55 (1961), 47 Mnw. L. REv. 323.
84. 122 N.W.2d at 588.

85. See note 82 supra; cf. Foley v. Western Alloyed Steel Casting Co,
919 Afmi 571, 18 N.W.2d 541 (1945).
86. See, e.g., Beery v. Northern States Power Co., 239
nn- 48, 57 N.W.
2d 838 (1953); Geldert v. Boetiland, 200 MAlnn 332, 274 N.W. 245 (1937).
87. See note 82 sumpra.
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CRIMINAL LAW

AVAILABILITY OF CoRAVI

NOBIS

AS A POST-CONVICTION

REMEDY

In State v. Tellook' the Minnesota Court reviewed the requirements for the criminal writ of error coram nobis. After pleading
not guilty to a charge of rape, petitioner pled guilty on the advice
of counsel to the lesser crime of carnal knowledge and was sentenced to seven years in the state prison. Six months later he petitioned pro se for a writ of error coram nobis, basically alleging a
denial of due process of law. In unanimously affirming the denial
of the petition, the Court held that coram nobis was unavailable
in the absence of newly discovered facts that would have changed
the result at trial.
The writ was originally used to correct trial judgments where
unknown facts that would have altered the judgment were subsequently discovered. Once available in all suits, it has now been
expressly abolished in civil actions at both federal' and state4 levels. In criminal cases, however, coram nobis has recently been revived and expanded," probably to provide a procedure for making
constitutional claims that cannot be raised by habeas corpus.
The post-conviction remedy of habeas corpus is only available
where a prisoner is attacking his present detention as a violation
1. 118 N.W.2d 347 (Minn. 1962).
2. See 2 TiDD, PRACTICE OF COURT OF KINa's BENCu IN PERSONAL ACTIONS
1083-84 (1799), in which it was stated that "if a judgment in the King'sBench be erroneous in matter of fact only, and not in point of law, it may be
reversed in the same court by writ of error coram nobis .

. . ."

See also Don-

oghue & Jacobson, Coram Nobis and the Hoffner Case, 28 ST. JOHN's L. Rrv.
234, 235--37 (1954).
3. FED. R. Cry. P. 60(b). MINN. R. Civ. P. 60.02 is identical to federal rule
60(b).
4. See Orfield, The Writ of Error Coram Nobis in Civil Practice,20 VA. L.
REV. 423 (1934).
Mnw. R. Civ. P. 60.02 provides:
Writs of coram nobis, coram vobis, aduita querela, and bills of review
and bills in the nature of a bill of review are abolished ....
See 3 YOUNGQUIST & BLcrK, MuImNSOTA RULES PRACTICE 359 (1953), in
which the authors commented that "the last sentence [of Rule 60.02] abolishes the procedures of the old ancillary or independent remedies available at
common law and equity." Cf. Sheffield v. Mullin, 28 Minn. 251, 9 N.W. 756
(1881); Grant v. Schmidt, 22 Minn. 1 (1875).
5. See Donnelly, Unconvicting the Innocent, 6 VA". L. REv. 20, 24-28
(1952); Note, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 467, 473-74 (1962).
6. See Note, Postrelease Remedies for Wrongful Conviction, 74 HARv. L.
REv. 1615, 1623-25 (1961); cf. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954).
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of his constitutional rights; 7 it is not available where the offender
has been paroled or has served his sentence s Habeas corpus plainly fails to provide a method for vindicating the interests of the released offender.
The Jnited States Supreme Court has asserted that the states
are constitutionally obligated to provide adequate post-conviction
remedies for state prisoners alleging that their conviction was in
violation of due process of law.9 The Supreme Court, nonetheless,
has never compelled post-conviction remedies, assuming instead
that the proper procedure is federal habeas corpus.' Of course, if
the state offender is no longer in custody, federal habeas corpus
is not available and the Supreme Court's stated reason for failing
to compel state post-conviction remedies seems less cogent. Also,
in United States v. Morgan" the Supreme Court recognized coram
nobis as a federal post-release remedy. To guarantee the adequate
post-conviction remedies required by the Constitution, then, a
state perhaps should provide coram nobis at least in post-release
cases.
In Minnesota the status of coram nobis is unclear. The Court's
detailed description of coram nobis in Teliock coupled with the
sheer number of writs presented to the Court' suggest that this
remedy may exist in MVinnesota. The Court, however, has never
granted a writ of error coram nobis in a criminal case. In addition, all of the petitions before the Court have been brought by
7. MWN. STAT. § 589.01 (1961).
8. See AEw. STAT. § 589.01 (1961), which allows a writ of habeas corpus
only if the person is "imprisoned or otherwise restrained of his liberty." Of.

State v. Konshak, 1m6 Aimn. S3,

162 N.W. 358 (1917). See also Note, The

Sation Between Habeas Corpus and Coram Nobis in New York, 34 Conrm
L.Q. 596 (1949).
9. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 113 (1935), 35 CoLu. L. REv. 282,

48 HARv. L. lRav. 1024.
10. See Jennings v. Illinois, 342 U.S. 104, 116 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235, 238-39 (1949).

11. 346 us.502 (1954).
12. Before the Tellock case was decided, the Minnesota Court had considered a writ of error coram nobis in the following criminal cases: State v.
Alm, 263 Minn. 259, 116 N.W.2d 656 (1962); State v. Becker, 263 M
Mnn.
168, 115 N.W.2d 920 (1962); State v. Pederson, 262 MiAn. 568, 115 N.W.2d
466 (1962); State v. Soward, 262 Minn. 265, 114 N.W.2d 276 (1962); State
v. Castle, 260 Mmin. 293, 109 N.W.2d 593 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 978
(1962); State ez rel. Thomas v. County of Ramsey, 259 Minn. 410, 107
N.W.2d 520 (1961) (per curiam); State ex rel. Gaulke v. County of Winona,
259 Min. 183, 106 N.W.2d 560 (1960), cert. denied, 365 US. 8-8 (1901);
State ex rel. Elkins v. County of Ramsey, 257 Minn. 21, 99 N.W.2d 895
(1959); State ex rel. Hammond v. County of Hennepin, 256 Minn. 539, 99
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the petitioner pro se;' 3 the Court has always considered these petitions on the merits, but whether coram nobis is available to a
Minnesota offender represented by an attorney remains questionable.
The Minnesota Court has at least assumed that coram nobis
was available in criminal cases to provide a remedy where a newly
discovered fact proves the defendant's innocence. In denying the
writ in recent years, the Court has negatively developed certain
14
requirements that must be satisfied before the writ is available.
The writ is not to substitute for an appeal based on issues of law
contained in the record, and therefore the basic requirement is

that the petition must raise an issue of fact rather than an issue
of law;' 5 however, the Court has denied coram nobis petitions only
twice because they raised legal rather than factual issues. 10 Secondly, the newly discovered fact must be one that was unknown
by the petitioner and the court when the offender was convicted.
N.W.2d 452 (1959); State ex rel. Soward v. County of Hennepin, 252 Minn.
378, 90 N.W.2d 307 (1958); State ex rel. Barness v. County of Hennepin,
252 Minn. 174, 89 N.W.2d 166 (1958); State v. Kubus, 243 Minn. 379, 68
N.W.2d 217 (1955).
Since the Tellock case, the Minnesota Court has considered four more
petitions: State v. Osgood, Dec. No. 38572, Minn., August 23, 1903; State
v. Roy, 122 N.W.2d 615 (Minn. 1963); State v. Olson, 120 N.W.2d 311 (Minn.
1963); State v. Cage, 117 N.W.2d 919 (Minn. 1962). In these latter four
cases, the Court did not deny the petition "assuming it's available" as they
did in Tellock, but rather denied the petition because the cases did not fit
into the limitations expressed in Tel/ock.
13. See cases cited note 12 supra.
14. In New England Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Willcuts, 55 F.2d 983,
987 (D. Minn. 1931), the writ was described as follows:
In modem practice, the writ of error coram nobis may be defined as
a common-law writ issuing out of a court of record to review and
correct a judgment of its own relating to some error in fact as opposed to error in law, not appearing on the face of the record, unknown at the time without fault to the court and to the parties seeking relief, but for which the judgment would not have been entered.
Although this was a civil action, this quotation has been included in criminal
cases. State v. Tellock, 118 N.W.2d 347, 352 (Minn. 1968); State v. Kubus,
243 Minn. 379, 881, 68 N.W.2d 217, 218-19 (1955); cf. State ex rel. Barness
v. County of Hennepin, 252 Minn. 174, 176, 89 N.W.2d 166, 167 (1958). See
generally Note, State Pos8t-Conviction Remedies, 61 CoLum. L. REv. 081
(1961).
15. State ex rel. Hammond v. County of Hennepin, 256 Minn. 539, 99
N.W.2d 452 (1959); State ex rel. Barness v. County of Hennepin, 252 Minn.
174, 89 N.W.2d 166 (1958); accord, Lyons v. Goldstein, 290 N.Y. 19, 47
N.E.2d 425 (1943).
16. State v. Pederson, 262 Minn. 568, 115 N.W.2d 466 (1962); State v.
Osgood, Dec. No. 38572, Minn., August 28, 1963.
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The Minnesota Court has applied this requirement to deny coram
nobis petitions where the defendant alleged coercion by the prosecuting attorney, 7 a new alibi,' 8 or merely his innocence.' 9 In conjunction with this latter requisite, the Court has insisted that the
newly discovered fact could not have been uncovered by diligent
search at the time of trial;20 therefore, the Court has refused to
grant the writ where the petition alleged the discovery of a witness without indicating why the witness could not have been produced at the trial?'
The Court also has required that the petitioner pursue the
remedy within a reasonable time after discovering the new fact?2
Such a requirement is difficult to justify, however, for it is often
highly prejudicial to the released offender and severely restricts
coram nobis as a post-release remedy. For example, a released offender may have little motivation to attack his conviction at the
time a new fact is discovered, but if he were subsequently subjected to an increased sentence by an habitual offenders act, he
should still be able to test the conviction by coram nobis.
Finally, the Minnesota Court has vaguely indicated that the
newly discovered fact must be significant enough so that the defendant's innocence would likely be proven. This requirement has
a sound historical basis, but it is possibly inconsistent with a
post-release usage of coram nobis and, in fact, the Supreme Court
affirmed coram nobis in Morgan although this requirement was
not satisfied.
The expanding role of coram nobis as a post-release remedy,
17. State v. Becker, 263 Minmn 168, 115 N.W.2d 920 (1962). But ae,
People v. Picciotti, 4 N.Y.2d 340, 151 N.E.2d 191, 175 N.YS.d 32 (1958),
59 CoLum. L. R v. 806; cf. People v. Guariglia, 303 N.Y. 338, 102 NX.2d
580 (1951), 19 B13RoOLNL. Rnv. 137 (1952).

18. State ex rel. Barness v. County of Hennepin, 252 Minn. 174, 89
N.W.ed 166 (1958).
19. State ex rel. Elkins v. County of Ramsey, 257 Minn. 21, 99 N.W.2d

895 (1959).
20. State v. Becker, 263 Minn. 168, 115 N.W.2d 920 (1962); State v.
Pederson, 262 Minn- 568, 115 N.W.2d 466 (1962).
21. State v. Olson, 120 N.W.2d 811 (Minn. 1963), in which the writ was
denied because the defendant did not state why the new facts could not have
been produced at the original trial
22. In Teloca the Court stated that the petitioner must "pursue his
rights with reasonable diligence or they are barred." 118 N.W.2d at 352; see
Farnsworth v. United States, M2 F2d 59 (D.C. Cir. 1956), 45 Gw. LI. 127;
cf. State ex rel. Gaulke v. County of Winona, 259 Minn. 183, 106 N.W.2d
560 (1960), cert. denied, 865 U.S. 848 (1961). See generally Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d

432 (1958).
23. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 514 (1954).
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however, is where the petition alleges that the conviction was in
violation of the federal constitution and habeas corpus is unavailable. In Minnesota a violation of due process may be raised by
the remedy of habeas corpus, unless the petitioner is not then in
custody. The released offender, however, may still have valid interests in vacating his conviction: to eliminate the social stigma
aimed at a former "convict"; to practice medicine, law, or other
professions; 24 or to avoid an increased penalty under an habitual
offenders act. 5 Yet, the only remedy that might be available under these circumstances is the writ of error coram nobis. In Morgan, a similar fact situation, the Supreme Court recognized the
problem and approved the use of coram nobis for federal convictions.26 The Minnesota Court also is apparently cognizant of the
offender's right to a post-release remedy; the Court at least indicated in Tellock that if the petitioner's fundamental rights had
been violated, then some remedy would be available. 27 The requirements to issuance of this writ where a new fact is discovered,
however, have little utility where a violation of due process is alleged 28 - applying these historical requirements in such a case
fails to close the gap in the available post-conviction remedies.
24. The new Minnesota Criminal Code provides that when a convicted
defendant is discharged "such discharge shall restore him to all his civil rights
and to full citizenship, with full right to vote and hold office . . . ."; therefore the loss of civil liberties is not so important in Minnesota. Minn. Sess.
Laws 1963, ch. 753, § 609.165.
25. Minn. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 753, §§ 609.155-.16. See State v. Briton,
121 N.W.2d 577 (Minn. 1963), for a recent decision dealing with the habitual
offenders act in Minnesota. See also Pirsig, Proposed Revision of the Minnesota Criminal Code, 47 Mm. L. Ray. 417, 461-63 (1963).
26. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954), in which the Supreme
Court stated that "although the term has been served, the results of the
conviction may persist. Subsequent convictions may carry heavier penalties,
civil rights may be affected." 346 U.S. at 512-13.
27. See State v. Becker, 263 Minn. 168, 115 N.W.2d 920 (1962), where
the court felt that the claim of lack of due process should have been asserted by a writ of habeas corpus and not by coram nobis.
28. In Tellock the Court denied the petition where the petitioner alleged
that he was arraigned while handcuffed, that he was denied counsel for five
days, and that there was nonphysical coercion by the county attorney. Cf. State
v. Castle, 260 Minn. 293, 109 N.W.2d 593 (1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 978
(1962), in which the Minnesota Court denied a petition that alleged excessive
bail, inadequate counsel, and denial of right to speedy trial.
The New York courts appear more liberal in granting the writ for violations of due process or procedural irregularities. The writ was granted to an
offender who was deprived of the right to counsel in People v. Silverman,
3 N.Y.2d 200, 144 N.E.2d 10, 165 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1957); People v. Guariglia,
303 N.Y. 338, 109 N.E.2d 580 (1951); to an offender who was deprived of
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PnsENswcEa ExAm ATIoN RECORDS SuTcmNT
CoMP~LwcE WITH THE AmuRiRAmN STATUTE
The recurring problem of what is sufficient compliance with the

Minnesota arraignment statute29 was considered by the Court in
State v. Roy.5 At arraignment the petitioner, charged with second
degree forgery, was not represented by counsel; after the clerk

read the charge, the court entered a plea of not guilty and ap-

pointed a public defender as required by law3 When the petitioner reappeared with court-appointed counsel, he withdrew his plea

of not guilty and entered a plea of guilty. In a petition for a writ
of error coram nobis5 2 eight years later, the petitioner alleged that
at his original appearance the clerk failed to read fully the information so as to inform him of his crime as required by the Minnedue process because of insanity at the time of trial, People v. Hill, 9 App.
Div. 2d 451, 195 N.Y.S.2d 295 (1959), aff'd, 8 N.Y.2d 935, 168 NE.2d 841,
204 N.Y.S2d 172 (1960); to an offender who was deprived of due process
because of fraud, duress, or coercion of the court, prosecution or police officers, People v. Van Nostrand, 4 App. Div. 2d 913, 166 N.YS.2d 823 (1957);
to an offender who was induced to plead guilty to a lesser charge, People v.
Hughes, 8 App. Div. 2d 302, 187 N.Y.S2d 828 (1959); to an offender who
was convicted by the use of perjured testimony, People v. McElroy, 11 App.
Div. 2d 556, 200 N.Y.S.d 442 (1960); to an offender who was an infant,
People ex rel. Harrison v. Jackson, 298 N.Y. 219, 82 NXE2d 14 (1948); to
-an offender who was convicted on a defective information, People v. Harm,
9 N.Y.2d 5, 172 NYE.2d 275, 210 N.Y.S.2d 508 (1961). See generally Briggs,
"Coram Nobi."-Is It Either an Available or the Most Satisfactory PostConviction Remedy To Test Constitutionality in Criminal Proceedings?, 17
MoNr. L. REv. 160 (1956).
29. Mmr. STAT. § 63011 (1961) provides:
The arraignment shall be made by the court, or by the clerk or
county attorney under its direction, and shall consist in reading the
indictment to the defendant, and delivering to him a copy thereof and
of the endorsement thereon, including the list of witnesses endorsed on
it or appended thereto, and asking him whether he pleads guilty or
not guilty to the indictment; provided, if the defendant waives the
reading of the indictment, it need not be read to him.
30. 122 N.W.2d 615 (Mimn. 1963).
31. AMrw. STAT. § 630.10 (1961) provides that "if the defendant shall
appear for arraignment without counsel, he shall be informed by the court
that it is his right to have counsel before being arraigned, and shall be asked
if he desires the aid of counsel."
32. The petitioner requested a writ of error coram nobis alleging that the
judgment and the sentence he attacked had already been satisfied, which
precluded him from using the writ of habeas corpus. The court did not determine if the petitioner was serving this sentence or a subsequently imposed
sentence, stating that a writ of error coram nobis was not applicable in either
case because he was raising only errors of law as opposed to questions of fact,
see State v. Tellock, 118 N.W.2d 347 (Afmn. 1962), and because he had not
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sota statute. 3s The Court, however, affirmed the denial of the peti-

tion and held that substantial compliance with the arraignment
statute was sufficient where the record of the presentence examination revealed that the petitioner was fully aware of the crime
charged.
The purpose of the arraignment, historically, was to identify

the accused, inform him of the charge, and invoke his plea8 4 the defendant had no right to waive his arraignment.8 8 Technical

objections were often held sufficient to vitiate an arraignment because the accused was not entitled to many of the contemporary

"rights," such as being represented by counsel or being heard as
a witness, and because the courts often compensated for the disproportionate punishments imposed by the law for relatively in-

significant crimes.8 The purpose of arraignment now is still somepursued his rights with reasonable diligence, see State ex rel. Gaulke v. County
of Winona, 259 Minn. 183, 106 N.W.2d 560 (1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 8,18
(1961). However, the court did not dismiss the case because the writ petitioned for was unavailable but continued to the arraignment issue. See text
following note 1S supra, for a discussion of the writ of error coram nobis.
33. See note 29 supra, for the text of the statute. The Minnesota statute
apparently requires that the indictment be read unless the defendant affirmatively waives it. On the other hand, in New York the statute states that "if
the defendant demand it, the indictment must be read." N.Y. Cnw. CODE
§ 809; see People v. Moylan, 4 M~sc. 2d 747, 162 N.Y.S.2d 479 (Bronx County
Ct. 1956). A third type of statute is used in Illinois, where there is no provision
for reading the indictment, but a copy will be given to the defendant upon
his request. Here also, the defendant apparently must make a request for
the copy or the right is deemed waived. People v. Clark, 405 Ill. 488, 91
N.E.2d 409 (1950); Bartley v. People, 156 Ill. 234, 40 N.E. 831 (1895); 38
ILL. STAT. ANN.

§ 729 (1935).

34. 4 BLACKSTONE, CO¢NMD2TARMS *322. For two illustrations of early
arraignment procedure in the United States, see United States v. Gibert, 25
Fed. Cas. 1287, 1303-04 (1884); United States v. Curtis, 25 Fed. Cas. 726
(1826). See generally Comment, Some Aspects of Arraignment, 3 Da PAUx
L. REv. 105 (1953); Note, Necesity for .fearraignment,81 TuL. L. Rav. 682
(1957).
35. In early England a plea had to be invoked at the arraignment beforo
the trial could start, and therefore, the defendant could not waive the arraignment. If the defendant refused to plead, physical force was used until a plea
was obtained. Of course, this procedure had long been eliminated by modern
statutes which provide that if the defendant refuse to answer an indictment
by a plea of not guilty, the plea must be entered by the court. E.g., M xx.
STAT. § 630.34 (1961). See generally PuTTKAmmR, AnmnuETnATION OF CanmiNAL LAw 164-66 (1953).
36.
At a certain period of English history, when an accused person had no
right to be represented by counsel, and when the punishments for
crimes were so severe as to shock the sense of justice of many judges
who administered the criminal law, it was natural that technical ob-
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what similar, to notify the defendant of the charge;3 7 but courts
presently give little credence to technical objections,.8 for more
direct safeguards are now available to defendants.
In Garland,v. Washington3 9 the United States Supreme Court
adopted essentially a "fair trial" test as a constitutional standard
for arraignments. The Supreme Court held that the lack of a formal arraignment does not deprive the accused of due process of
law as long as he had "sufficient notice of the accusation and an
adequate opportunity to defend himself in the prosecution."' 0 By
this test, which is apparently applied in most jurisdictions requiring only substantial compliance with arraignment statutes," due
process is not violated unless the arraignment procedure results
in an "unfair trial: ' 42 Nevertheless, the due process requirements
jectives, which, perhaps, alone stood between the criminal and the
enforcement of a most severe, if not cruel penalty, should be accorded great weight ....

Crain v. United States, 162 US. 625, 646 (1896) (Peckham, J., dissanting).

37. See State ex rel. Adams v. Bigg, 252 Tli. 283, 89 N.W.2d 898
(1958). See also Rx !parte Jeffcoat, 109 Fla. 207, 146 So. 827 (1933); People
v. Xurant, 381 EL 470, 163 N.E. 411 (1928); People v. Di Biasi, 7 N.Y.2d
544, 166 NE.2d 825, 200 N.YS.2d 21 (1960); Rossman, Arraignment and
PreParation.for Trial, 5 FB..D. 68 (1946); Note, 36 N.Y.UL. ERv. 737 (1961).
38. See State v. Heffelfinger, 197 MWinn. 173, 266 N.W. 751 (1936); State
v. Comings, 54 Minn. 359, 56 N.W. 50 (1893).
89. 232 US. 642 (1914), 27 HAnv. L. 1Ev. 760; cf. Rogers v. Peck, 199

US. 425,485 (1905).

40. 22 US. at 645. In the Garland case, the first indictment was voided
when a new trial was awarded and there was no new arraignment or plea
upon the second indictment. According to the Supreme Court, this did not
deny the defendant a fair trial. Accord, Beaty v. United States, 203 F.Rd
652, 654 (4th Cir. 1953) (where the trial was held without an arraignment);
Merritt v. Hunter, 170 F2d 739, 741 (10th Cir. 1948) (where the defendant
did not enter a plea although his counsel entered a plea for him); see Crain
v. United States, 162 U.S. 625 (1896) (which was directly overruled by the
Court in Garland). One court has taken the apparent position that due
process is never violated by technically faulty arraignments. See People v.
Singleton, 21 Misc. Rd 950, 198 N.YS.2d 414 (Schenectady County Ct. 1960),
in which the court stated that "ignorance of the defendant as to the nature
of the charge and its consequences is of no moment." 21 Misc. 2d at 951,
198 N.Y.S2d at 415.
41. See, e.g., Arbuckle v. State, 80 Miss. 15, 31 So. 437 (1901); State v.
Frazier, 339 Mo. 966,98 S.W.2d 707 (1936).
42. Of. Adamson v. California, 332 US. 46 (1947); Hurtado v. California,
110 US. 516 (1884). The "fair trial" test is the same that had been used until
recently where dealing with the right to counsel. See Cicenia v. Lagay, 357
U.S. 504 (1958); Crooker v. California, 357 US. 433 (1958); Betts v. Brady,
816 US. 455 (1942), (overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US. 335 (1963)).
See generally Beaney, Right to Couel Before Arraignment, 45 31xw. L. Rlv.
771 (1961).
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laid down by the Supreme Court are merely "minimum protection," and they do not justify state decisions that ignore a statutory mandate. Clearly, where the legislature determines that more
than the minimum due process requirements are necessary, it
may expressly require a higher statutory standard.4 3
By avoiding a literal interpretation of the arraignment statute,
the Minnesota Court has apparently adopted the "fair trial" view
44 Although the Court
espoused by the Supreme Court in Garland.
recognized in Roy that it would be "better practice" to conform
strictly to the arraignment statute, it still approved a number of
cases holding that the failure to comply does not of itself require
a new trial.45 The Roy majority found that the record of the presentence examination showed that the defendant fully understood
the crime of which he was accused and that, therefore, the arraignment was adequate. As support, they relied on cases holding that
stipulations in the arraignment record that the defendant was
"duly arraigned" constitute sufficient proof of compliance with
the statute 46 and a case holding that a plea of guilty in open court
with the advice of counsel is sufficient proof that the defendant
43. See Scott, A Fair Trial for the Accused: Fairness in Accusation of
Crime, 41 MnN.. L. REv. 509, 511-12 (1957).
44. In Roy the majority stated that "arraignment, in this state, is not
from the standpoint of due process a critical stage of the proceedings . .. .
122 N.W.2d at 619. But see State ex rel. Becker v. Tahash, 122 N.W.2d 100
(Minn. 1963), in which the Court felt that the arraignment and plea were
the "critical period of the proceedings." 122 N.W.2d at 103-04. Whether the
arraignment is a "critical period" in Minnesota or not, minimal due process
requirements clearly may not be avoided and legislative standards should not
be sidestepped.
45. See, e.g., State ex rel. Welper v. Rigg, 254 Minn. 10, 17, 93 N.W.2d
198, 203 (1958) (the information joined two separate crimes); State ex rel.
Adams v. Rigg, 252 Minn. 283, 287, 89 N.W.2d 898, 902 (1958) (defendant
was not informed before he was arraigned that he had a right to counsel);
State ex rel. Schwanke v. Utecht, 233 Minn. 434, 436, 47 N.W.2d 99, 101
(1951) (defendant entered no formal plea of guilty).
46. State ex rel. Rajala v. Rigg, 257 Minn. 372, 101 N.W.2d 608 (1960);
State ex rel. May v. Swenson, 242 Minn. 570, 65 N.W.2d 657 (1954); State v.
Barnett, 193 Minn. 336, 258 N.W. 508 (1935). In these three cases, however,
the Court based its presumption of regularity on the arraignment transcript,
and it did not consider the record of the presentence examination, as it did in
the Roy case, to determine if the defendant had been "duly arraigned." This
distinction would seem to be important for the basic issue in Roy should be
whether the defendant had notice of the charged crime prior to his plea. 122
N.W.2d at 616. See Beaty v. United States, 203 F.2d 652 (4th Cir. 1953);
Smith v. Lawrence, 128 F.2d 822, cert. denied, 317 U.S. 633 (1942); People v.
Hall, 186 Misc. 62, 58 N.Y.S.2d 581 (Onandaga County Ct. 1945); 14 Ax.
Jun. Criminal Law § 252 (1938).
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understood the nature of the crime 7 On the basis of the defendant's admissions at the presentence examination, then, the Court
refused to grant a hearing, for to do so would be "exalting the
shadow of a meaningless technicality for substance."',
The dissenters favored a hearing to determine whether in fact
there had been compliance with the arraignment statute;49 reliance
on statements such as "the defendant was duly arraigned," which
are routinely entered by the clerk, was improper. Furthermore,
even if the words "duly arraigned" were of significance, the Court
failed to distinguish between reliance on the presentence examination and reliance on the arraignment proceedings to determine
whether the defendant was fully aware of the crime charged; "admissions made by the petitioner after the plea of guilty was entered ' 50 do not prove knowledge of the crime charged at the time
of the arraignment. In effect, the dissent implied that substantial
compliance with the statute would not be sufficient. A hearing,
therefore, should have been held to determine whether the arraignment was waived 51 or the information was in fact fully read
- the mere statement "you are charged with forgery in the second degree"52 was not sufficient compliance with the statute.
Proponents of the substantial compliance approach argue basically that the statutory arraignment formalities are not necessary
because there can be no harm if the defendant had a "fair trial."
But the legislature has clearly specified the applicable standard
47. State ex rel. Schwanke v. Utecht, 233 Minn. 434, 436, 47 N.W.2d 99,

101 (1951).
48. 122 N.W.ad at 618, quoting from State en rel. Schwanke v. Utecht, 233
Mimi. 434,436,47 N.W.2d 99, 101 (1951).
49. 122 N.W.2d 615, 621 (Otis, J., dissenting). Justices Murphy and Rlogosheske concurred in the dissenting opinion of justice Otis.
50. 122 N.W.2d at 620 (dissenting opinion).
51. For examples of situations where the defendant waived the formalities,
see, e.g., State v. Gage, 264 Amlnn. 196, 177 N.W.2d 919 (1962) (plea of guilty
on advice of counsel admits all facts well pleaded); State cx rel. Williams v.
Rigg, 256 Mlnn. 568,99 N.W.2d 450 (1959) (defendant waives right to plead by
appearing at the trial on the merits); State en rel. Savage v. Rigg, 50 Minn.
370, 84 N.W.2d 640 (1947), cert. denied sub noa. Savage v. Minnesota, 355
U.S. 918 (1958) (plea of guilty on advice of counsel waives right to have indictment read). See also Beaty v. United States, 203 FYd 652 (4th Cir. 1953)
(right to -bearraigned and to make a plea is waived by going to trial); People v.
Jacoby, 304 N.Y. 33, 105 N.E2d 613, 118 N.Y.2d 17, cert. denied sub nom.
Jacoby v. New York, 344 U.S. 864 (1952), 37 Mlum. L. REv.392 (1953) (defendant's affidavit, prepared by his father and minister, was a sufficient information). See generally Orfield, The Constitutionalityof Waiver of Indictment
in Federal Criminal Cases, 21 RocxK MT. L. Ruv.76 (1949).
52. 122 N.W.2d at 620 (dissenting opinion).
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of fairness. In addition, Minnesota procedure differs from the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, for the latter require the
trial judge to determine whether the defendant understood the
charge."3 Such a safeguard may protect the defendant if the "reading" requirement were relaxed, yet until Minnesota adopts the
federal procedure the courts should require in every case that the
indictment be either fully read or intelligently waived.14 If the

courts continue to allow merely substantial compliance with the
arraignment statute, however, they should at least require that
such compliance be shown by the arraignment record rather than
the presentence examination record.
C.

FomIGN FELoNY CoNVIcTIoNs AND THE IiBITUAL

O

EDIM PROVISIONS

5 the Court narrowly
In State v. Britonl
construed the Minnesota habitual offender provisions"0 as applied to persons who had
committed prior felonies in another state. Defendant had been
convicted under an Iowa statute57 that defined larceny of property valued at more than 20 dollars to be a felony; the corresponding Minnesota statute defined the stealing of property to
be a felony only if the property was valued at more than 25 dollars.5" At trial for a subsequent alleged Minnesota felony, the trial
court determined, on the basis of a finding as to the actual value
of the property taken, that the prior Iowa conviction constituted
a Minnesota felony. On appeal the Court reversed,5 9 holding that

53. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
54. Scott, supra note 43, at 511-12.
55. 121 N.W.2d 577 (Minn. 1968).
56. See Minn. Sess. Laws 1927, ch. 286, which applied to
every person who, after having been convicted in this state of a felony
or an attempt to commit a felony, or, under the laws of any other
state or country, of a crime which, if committed in this state, would
be a felony [italics added], commits any felony or attempts to commit
any felony, in this state ....
The new Minnesota criminal code made extensive changes in the former
provisions. Minn. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 753, §§ 609.155-.16; see text accompanying notes 69-73 infra.
57. IowA CODE §§ 709.1-.2 (1962).
58. Minn. Rev. Laws § 5082 (Dunnell 1905) defined grand larceny in the
second degree as stealing "property of the value of more than $25.00, but not
exceeding $500, in any manner whatever," and provided for punishment by
imprisonment in the penitentiary, making it a felony under Minn. Rev. Laws
§ 4747 (Dunnell 1905).
59. A second issue dealt with in the Briton case concerned a defect in the
information. Although the information alleged "uttering" a forged instrument,
violative of MINN. STAT. § 620.19 (1961), it referred to a statute dealing with
forgery itself, violative of MiNN. STAT. § 620.10 (1961). The Minnesota Court
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if by definition the relevant foreign statute governing the defendant's offense might have included an act that was not a Minnesota felony, the Minnesota habitual offender provisions could not
be applied. Habitual offender acts commonly impose an increased sentence
for a second felony conviction. 0 Some states have increased a
felon's Sentence on the basis of a prior, foreign felony conviction
even though the prior crime would not have been a felony in
0 In
the sentencing state.1
other states, including Minnesota, the
habitual offender act applies only where the crime committed in
the foreign jurisdiction is a felony in the sentencing state 2 If the
prior foreign crime is by definition less than the corresponding
felony in the sentencing state, most of these latter states examine
the fact allegations in the indictment or the information to determine whether the act committed was in fact a felony in their
state. In Briton,however, the Minnesota Court determined that
lield that the defendant's demurrer should have been sustained because two

separate and distinct offenses were alleged, and the defendant could not properly 'prepare his defense. See State v. Suess, 236 Ainn. 174, 52 N.W.2d 409
(1952); State v. Hedstrom, 233 Mlinn. 17, 45 N.W.2d 715 (1951); Chute v.
State,, 19 Minn. 230 (1873).
In a subsequent case, State ex rel. Masters v. Tahash, Doc. No. 39129,
Mlinn. Aug. 23, 1963, a petitioner for a writ of habeas corpus alleged that a
similar defect in his indictment deprived the court of jurisdiction. The Court
distinguished the Briton case on the basis that the defendant had demurred to
the information and had alleged at that time that he was prejudiced in developing his defense; while in the Master, case the petitioner had not been prejudiced, had not demurred, and did in fact realize with which crime he had been
charged. Accord, State v. Snyder, 113 Mlnn. 244, 1209 N.W. 375 (1911).
60. E.g., CAL,. PEN. CoD § 668. See generally Note, Court Treatment of
GeneralRecidivist Statutes, 48 CoLmL.L. E v. 238 (1948).
61. See State v. Prince, 64 Idaho 343, 132 P.2d 146 (1942), in which a conviction of a felony- in Oregon was sufficient to satisfy the act and the prosecution'did not need to show that the crime would have been a felony in Idaho.
Accord, Hahn v. People, 126 Colo. 451, 456, 251 P.2d 316, 318 (1952); Kelley
v. State, 204 Ind. 612, 624, 185 N.E. 453, 458 (1933); State v. Stiff, 148 Kan.
224, 228, 80 Pad 1089, 109i (1938), rehearing denied, 148 Kan. 457, 83 P.2d
424 (1938); Fennen v. Commonwealth, -40 Ky. 530, 42 S.W.2d 744 (1931)
(by implication); Waxier v. State, 67 Wyo. 396, 418, 224 P.2d 514, 522 (1950).
However, these states did not have a statute such as linnesota's, which requires that the act "if committed in this state, -would be a felony ....
" See
note 55 supra.
62. E.g., CM. PEN. CODE § 668; 'mnn. Sess. Laws 1963, cl. 753, § 609.155;
N.Y. PEN, Lw § 1941. See also In re Bramble, 31 Cal. 2d 43, 187 P.2d 411
(1947), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 960 (1949); State ex 7el. Grandstaff v. Gore, 182
Tenn. 94, 184 S.W.2d 366 (1945).
63. See, e.g., In e Hanicar, 29 Cal. 2d 403, 176 P.d 58 (1946); In re Taylor, 64 Cal. App. 2d 47, 148 P.2d 143 (1944); People v. Casey, 399 Ill. 374, 77
N.E.2d 812 (1948); People ex 7el. Warner v. Jackson, 284 App. Div. 923,
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extrinsic evidence, such as the foreign indictment, may not be
considered by the sentencing court.0 4 According to the Court, any
other approach might often require a difficult retrial of the actual value of property in issue during the previous trial. Furthermore, in the initial trial the offender would not have contested
the value of the property involved if the value of the property
allegedly stolen and the value admittedly stolen constituted the
same degree of the offense in that state.
The Court indicated that a similar New York decision, People
v. Olah,65 supported its conclusion. Olah was the only case to
clearly prohibit an out-of-state conviction in a prior felony information if the foreign statutory definition of the offense was less
than the corresponding definition of the sentencing state. The
New York court interpreted the language of the habitual offenders
act to require that the foreign definition of the crime, rather than
the act itself, invariably constitutes a New York felony. Although
134 N.Y.S.2d 482 (1954); People v. Daiboch, 265 N.Y. 125, 191 N.E. 859
(1934); People v. Wicklem, 183 Misc. 639, 53 N.Y.S.2d 88 (Onandaga County
Ct. 1944); Landreth v. Gladden, 213 Ore. 205, 824 P.2d 475 (1958). The sentencing court, however, generally may not look to evidence introduced in the
foreign trial for information about the nature of the prior offense. E.g., Matter
of Emert v. Thorn, 249 App. Div. 301, 292 N.Y. Supp. 58 (19036). But of. People ex rel. Marlowe v. Martin, 192 Misc. 192, 83 N.Y.S.2d 201 (Wyoming
County Ct. 1948).
64. In many cases the value alleged in the first indictment would become
important only in a subsequent prosecution in a sister state that had a higher
dividing line between felonies and misdemeanors. When facing a substantial
prison sentence, the defendant should not be required to consider that the
prosecutor's unproven and presently irrelevant allegations might increase a
subsequent penalty imposed by a foreign jurisdiction, Such an omniscient
standard is too high for any defendant. See 50 COLUM. L. REv. 247 (1950).
65. 300 N.Y. 96, 89 N.E.2d 329 (1949). The Olah decision has been extensively discusssed. See, e.g., 16 BROOKLYN L. REv. 273 (1940); 50 COLUM. L.
REV. 247 (1950); 63 HARv. L. REv. 1448 (1950); 2 MnRcun L. REv. 279 (1950);
25 N.Y.U.L. REV. 653 (1950); 36 VA. L. REv. 540 (1950). See also Annot., 10
A.L.R.2d 219 (1951). It has been followed subsequently in New York. See, e.g.,
People ex rel. Gold v. Jackson, 5 N.Y.2d 243, 157 N.E.2d 169, 183 N.Y.S.2d
799 (1959); People ez rel. Marsh v. Martin, 284 App. Div. 156, 130 N.Y.S.2d
718 (1954), motion to dismiss appeal denied, 307 N.Y. 812, 121 NXE.2d 034,
aff'd mem., 308 N.Y. 823, 125 N.E.2d 873 (1955); People v. Gailhard, 278 App.
Div. 712, 103 N.Y.S.2d 208 (1951); cf. People ez rel. Addisone v. Foster, 272
App. Div. 1035, 74 N.Y.S.2d 767 (1947) (per curiam). Other jurisdictions, however, have not followed the Olah decision, but have distinguished it, e.g., Waxler v. State, 67 Wyo. 396, 224 P.2d 514 (1950), misinterpreted it, e.g., State v.
Grinolds, 223 Ore. 68, 353 P.2d 851 (1960), or ignored it, e.g., Tice v. State,
283 P.2d 872 (Okla. Crim. 1955). But see State v. Roberts, 151 Wash. 61, 275
Pac. 60 (1929), which at least implies the same result as was reached in Olah.
See generally Note, 32 ORE. L. REV. 52 (1952).
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the Minnesota statute contained similar language,"" the cogent
dissent in Ola10 67 addressed to the statutory interpretation argument may have persuaded the Minnesota Court to base its result

on the sound policy considerations implicit in the New York
decision.
Recidivist acts have often been criticised for their mechanical
application to all persons whether or not the offender deserves increased punishment. 8 The revised habitual offender provisions

of the new Minnesota Criminal Code partially resolve this criticism. The code provides, for example, that an offender may not

be sentenced to an "extended term of imprisonment" 0 if his previous convictions had not occurred within ten years of his latest

crime.' Further, on the basis of a required presentence investigation, the court must be satisfied before sentencing that the defendant is disposed to violence7' and that an extended term of imprisonment is necessary for his rehabilitation or for the public

safety. 2 The code has also redefined the term "felony" to be a
crime for which a "sentence of imprisonment for more than one

year may be imposed"; 73 however, the possibility still remains that
a prior foreign felony conviction in which the value of the goods
66. N.Y. PEN. L.w § 1941 provides as follows:
A person, who, after having been once or twice convicted within this
state, of a felony, of an attempt to commit a felony, or, under the laws
of any other state, government, or county, of a crime which, if committed within this state, would be a felony, commits any felony, within this
state, is punishable upon conviction of such second or third offense ....
Compare this with the Minnesota Habitual Offenders Act. Minn. Sess. Laws
1963, ch. 753, §§ 609.155-.16.
67. In the Ola case the court was split four to three with justices Conway, Lewis and Dye dissenting. People v. Olah, 300 N.Y. 96,103,107,89 N.E-d
829, 332, 335 (1949).
68. See PRoPosED Mm;NEsoTA CRamrnL CODE § 609.155, comment (1963);
Pirsig, Proposed Revisi of the Minnesota Criminal Code, 47 AMn. L. Rev.
417, 462 (1963). For a study of recidivism in general, see Hall, Recidivism,
1955 Cmm. L. REv. (Eng.) 686; Monachesi, American Studies in tite Prediction
of Recidivism, 41 J.Cam. L., & C. P.S. 268 (1950).
69. Mfinn. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 753, § 609.155(1). The "extended term" is
determined by taking the maximum term authorized for the crime committed
and multiplying this by the number of prior felonies, but it cannot exceed 40
years.
70. Mlinn. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 753, § 609.155(4)(1).
71. Mi.nn. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 753, § 609.155(2)(1).
72. Mlnn. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 753, § 609.16(3)(b). See generally Pirsig,
supranote 68, at 461-63. If the prior conviction was for a federal violation the
crime apparently need not be a felony in Minnesota as is required for a foreign
crime. See lnn. Sess. Laws 1963, ch.753, § 609.155(4)(2)(c).
73. Minn. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 753, § 609.02(2).
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was not contested by the defendant might not have been a Minnesota felony.
As a result of the Briton decision, the new Minnesota habitual
offender provisions probably may not be enforced on the basis of
foreign felony convictions in states where the relevant crime is
defined as a felony more strictly than in Minnesota. Although
such an interpretation might be characterized as bringing about
lighter treatment in Minnesota because the law is more severe in
another state, 74 it conforms to the recently expressed legislative
policy of removing unreasonable harshness from the habitual offender provisions. Either a retrial of the value of goods stolen long
ago or a dependence on an often inaccurate indictment would result in inequitable application of the habitual offender penalties.
Furthermore, even if it may be assumed that a large number of
habitual offender informations are presently based on foreign
crimes that fail to satisfy the Briton standard, sentencing courts
may still use their discretion to increase the sentence by imposing
the maximum possible term if the presentence investigation indicates such a necessity.
III. EMINENT DOMAIN
A.

APPORTIONMENT OF CONDEMNATION DAMAGES

To

INCLUDE REVERSIONER

In State v. Independent School Dist.' the Court held that a
possibility of reverter is a property interest protected by the constitutional provision against a "taking" without just compensation and measured by the difference between the value of the land
as restricted in its use and as applied to its best practicable use.2
The defendants owned land that was to revert to the grantor if
the grantee or its assigns ever ceased using it as an athletic field
and playground for the children of the school district. The plaintiffs claimed that their reversionary interest became possessory
upon condemnation because the land was no longer to be used for
the restricted purpose.
Courts have generally held that the condemnation of a defeasible fee for a use inconsistent with the condition of the fee does not
74. See People v. Olah, 300 N.Y. 96, 104, 89 N.E.2d 329, 383-34 (1949)
(dissenting opinion).
1. 123 N.W.2d 121 (Minn. 1963).
2. This would be the measure in fact only if a single jury determined both
the value of the property taken and the value of the two interests. If two
juries, or a board of appraisers and a jury, respectively determine the value of
the property and the value of the two respective interests, the division of the
condemnation award determined by the one would be in proportion to the interests as determined by the other. For example, if the appraisers awarded
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cause a reversion of the estate? Perhaps this result is explained
simply by the courts' "general impatience ... with these particular devices and their disposition to restrict what they call 'forfeiture' whenever possible," 4 but the result is otherwise justifiable.
The primary purpose of a use restriction is to coerce the grantee
and his assigns to use the land in a given manner 5 - reversion is
arguably a penalty for the wilful failure to do so. When the state
appropriates property for public use, however, the alteration in
use is not due-to an act of the grantee. To consider condemnation
as terminating the defeasible interest would be to penalize the
holder for an occurrence over which he had no control;" whatever
interest the grantee had in the land is "taken" by the state and he
should be compensated for it.
The general rule is that the entire condemnation award goes to
the holder of the defeasible fee The various bases given in justification of the rule are that a future interest such as a reversion is
$100,000 and a jury determined that the fee simple determinable was worth
$90,000 and the possibility of reverter worth $30,000,
90,00the owner of the fee
simple determinable interest would be entitled to 1
or 3/1 of the 8100,000-ad the owner of the possibility of reverter would be entitled to 1/1 of the
$100,000. See 123 N.W.2d at 129-30.
3. See, e.g., Beard's Brie Basin, Inc. v. New York, 142 F.2d 487 (2d Cir.
1944); Puerto Rico v. United States, 132 Fad 220 (1st Cir. 1942), cert. denied,
319 U.S. 752 (1943); People v. City of Los Angeles, 179 Cal. App. 2d 558, 4
Cal. Rep. 531 (Dist. Ct. App.), appeal dismissed sub nor. Griffith v. California, 364 U.. 476 (1960); City of Santa Monica v. Jones, 104 Cal. App. 2d
463, 232 Pad 55 (Dist. Ct. App. 1951); First Reformed Dutch Church v. Croswell, 210 App. Div. 294, 206 N.Y. Supp. 132 (1924). Contra, Lancaster School
Dist. v.Lancaster County, 295 Pa- 112, 144 AUt. 901 (1929).
4. Browder, The Condemnation of Future Interests, 48' VA. L. Thlv. 461,

472 (1962).
5. The conveyance in State v. Independent School Dist. states the following:
Provided, however, that this conveyance is made upon the express
condition that said premises forever shall be used by the grantee or its
assigns as an athletic field and playground for the school children of
said .. .[school district] and that if said premises ever cease to be so
used, or if said premises'. .. are ever used by the grantee ... for any
other purpose, then the estate . .. shall revert....
123 N.W.2d at 123.
6. 43 CoLum. L. Rnv. 137, 138 (1943).
7. B.g., Woodville v. United States, 152 F.ad 735 (10th Cir. 1946), cert.
denied, 328 U.S. 842 (1946); Beard's Erie Basin, Inc. v. New York, 142 Fad
487 (2d Cir. 1944); Puerto Rico v. United States, 132 Fad 220 (1st Cir. 19.42),
cert. denied, 319 U.S. 752 (1943); United States v. 1846.77 Acres of Land, 48
F. Supp. 721 (Wi). Ky. 1942); Chandler v. Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Corp.,
125 lss. 544 (1878); First Reformed Dutch Church v. Croswell, 210 App.
Div. 694, 206 N.Y. Supp. 132 (1924). See Browder, supra note 4, at 472 & n.35;
Note, 46 CoNmxrLL.Q. 631, 632 (1961).
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not a true property interest, s that the condemnation makes the
performance of the condition impossible,' or that the interest is
so contingent and speculative that an ascertainment of its value
is impracticable. 0
The Restatement of the Law of Property, however, recognized
the possibility of reverter as a property interest and proposed a
more equitable measure of damages: If the occurrence of the terminating event is imminent," the holder of the possibility of reverter shares in the condemnation award; if such occurrence is improbable, the reversioner receives nothing, for his interest is
deemed valueless.' 2 The Restatement rule at least provides a
means of giving damages to the reversioner if the termination is
imminent, but it fails to designate how his interest should be valued. In fact, the rule has been criticized for leaving "a puzzling
challenge to court and jury."'" Moreover, when the termination is
improbable, the Restatement analysis would result in the holder
of the defeasible interest receiving a windfall: The measure of
damages for a fee simple absolute upon condemnation is the "fair
market value of the land for its highest and best available use
.. " and the defeasible interest holder would receive the full
recovery although his damages were merely the value of the land
as restricted in its use.
8. Woodville v. United States, 152 F.2d 735 (10th Cir. 1946); Fifer v. Allen,
228 Ill.
507, 81 N.E. 1105 (1907); Chandler v. Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Corp.,
125 Mass. 544 (1878); Browder, supranote 4, at 473.
9. Woodville v. United States, 152 F.2d 735, 738 (10th Cir. 1946); Browder,
supra note 4, at 473.
10. Beard's Erie Basin, Inc. v. New York, 142 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1944);
Puerto Rico v. United States, 132 F2d 220 (1st Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319
U.S. 752 (1943); Browder, supra note 4, at 473; Note, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 631,
632 (1961); Cf. RESTATEDENT, PROPERTY § 53, comment b (1936).
11. One court found the filing of a petition to discontinue service with the
public utilities commission to be an indication that reversion was imminent.
Chew v. Commonwealth, 400 Pa. 307, 161 A.2d 621 (1960). But see City of
Santa Monica v. Jones, 104 Cal. App. 2d 463, 232 P.2d 55 (Dist. Ct. App.
1951). Another court found that reversion was probable from the fact that the
school district was seeking dissolution. United States v. 2184.81 Acres of Land.
45 F. Supp. 681 (W.D. Ark. 1942).
12. RESTATEmE T, PROPERTY § 58, comments b & c and accompanying examples (1936). Several cases have adopted this rule. See, e.g., United States v.
16 Acres of Land, 47 F. Supp. 608 (D. Mass. 1942); United States v. 2086
Acres of Land, 46 F. Supp. 411 (WLD.S.C. 1942); United States v. 2184.81
Acres of Land, 45 F. Supp. 681 (W.D. Ark. 1942); United States v. 1119.15
1942); Chew v. Commonwealth, 400
Acres of Land, 44 F. Supp. 449 (E.D. Ill.
Pa. 307, 161 A.2d 621 (1960). See Browder, supra note 4, at 474-76; Note, 46
CoRmraa L.Q. 631 (1961).
13. Browder, supra note 4, at 475. Some suggested rules for such a division
are set forth in Note, 46 CORNmL L.Q. 631, 636-37 (1961).
14. McCormick, The Measure of Compenation in Eminent Domain, 17
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The Minnesota Court, in State v. Independent School Dist.,
opined that the Restatement rule did not adequately protect the
rights of the reversioner. The Court recognized the possibility of reverter as a property interest1 5 that possessed the same qualities as
other property in every respect -it
was "descendible, devisable,
and alienable in the same manner as estates in possession"18 and therefore reasoned that it should be protected by the constitutional prohibition against "taking" without just compensation.17
As a result the defeasible fee holder ought to receive only the value
of the land as used for its restricted purpose while the holder of
the reversion should get the difference between that value and the
value of the estate used for its best purpose. This would clearly
avoid giving a windfall to the holder of the present estate, but it
perhaps gives too much recognition to the value of the future estate. The Court's analysis simply assumes that any difference between the value of the restricted estate and the fee simple absolute should go to the holder of the future estate.
The difficulty with this analysis is, however, that "value" in
a condemnation proceeding is measured by market price. Since the
future estate would have a measurable market price only if the defeasible fee holder were likely to violate the use restriction, the future estate has no significant "condemnation" value unless reversion is predictable. By granting the reversioner the difference in
market value between the restricted and unrestricted estate, the
Court would be giving the reversioner a windfall -an approach
that would certainly encourage speculation in future estates. Perhaps, then, the best result would be obtained by using a combination of the Restatement rule and the rule developed by the Court:
The holder of the defeasible interest would always receive only
the value of the land put to its restricted use, while the holder of
the future estate would also receive compensation, but only if reversion were predictable. Thus, any windfall would accrue to the

state.
Even the rule suggested by the Minnesota Court was qualified
to include a greater award to the holder of the future estate when
the present estate was about to be abandoned.' 8 All three alternatives are therefore subject to the same criticism levied at the Restatement rule - measurement of the value of the possibility of
MINN. L. RLv. 461 (1933); see nlinois Light & Power Co. v. Bedard, 343 Ill.
618, 175 N.E. 851 (1931); In re Appropriation of Easement for Highway Purposes, 169 Ohio St. 291,159 N.E.2d 612 (1959).
15. See Consolidated School Dist. v. Walter, 243 Mflnn. 159, 66 N.W.2d,

881 (1954).
16. MAnhn.

STAT.

§ 500.16 (1961).

17. See Mumr.CoiqsT. art. I, § 13.

18. 123 N.W.2d at 129-30.
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reverter is left a "puzzling" question. Yet the valuation standard
suggested by the Minnesota Court does appear to provide a workable answer. If the land were capable of being used more profitably unrestricted than restricted, then as reversion becomes more
imminent the future estate acquires value which reflects the opportunity to use the land in a more profitable manner. Although
the standard requires two determinations of value rather than
only one, the value of the future interest can be ascertained by
looking to the difference between the two values. 19
There being no constitutional objection to giving either the
holder of the future estate nothing20 or the holder of the present
estate less than the full value of the land put to its most profitable use, 2' the reasonable conclusion seems to be that the holders
of the various interests should be compensated for any "values"
taken and that the state, if anyone, ought to receive the benefit of
any windfall.
IV.
A.

EVIDENCE

CONFESSION'S "VOLUNTARINESS"

VITIATED BY

MISLEADING POLIcE REPRESENTATIONS

In State v. Biron' the Minnesota Court ruled that the "voluntary" character of a confession was vitiated because the police
interrogators had misleadingly offered the defendant leniency. The
interrogators, for example, impressed on the defendant that if he
confessed the charge might be reduced from murder to manslaughter -"it could be as serious as murder or it could be as easy as
manslaughter" 2 - or he might be tried as a juvenile.8
19. Basically, three other approaches have been suggested. One rule, prem-

ised on the holder of the present estate reinvesting the condemnation award in
other property for the same restricted use, would merely give the holder of the

future estate the same interest in the new property as he had in the old property. Browder, supra note 4, at 472. See also note 13 supra. A second rule
would give the grantee that proportion of the award that his purchase price
bore to the value of the land at the time he acquired his possessory interest.

See note 13 upra. One court in administering what might be denominated
"barnyard equity" gave the reversioner the value of the land and gave the
holder of the present estate the value of the building on the land. United
States v. 2184.81 Acres of Land, 45 F. Supp. 681 (W.D. Ark. 1942).

20. See cases cited note 7 supra and accompanying text.
21. See text accompanying note 11 mspra.
1. Doe. No. 38808, Minn., August 16, 1968. At latest report defendant's

counsel has moved to quash the indictment under Mnx.

STAT.

§ 628. 0 (1061)

on the ground that illegal evidence was placed before the grand jury. This mo-

tion was denied.
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The defendant- who was eighteen years old, had a ninth
grade education, and was under parole supervision as a juvenile
offender- was arrested for the robbery-beating of an elderly
woman, who later died. At police headquarters the defendant was
questioned immediately. He denied his guilt and asked to communicate with an attorney, and although a telephone was available, he made no call. Later that evening defendant was questioned again, and confronted with a recorded confession of one of
his alleged companions that named defendant as an accomplice.
The following day, the police took a sample of the defendant's
hair and then indicated that hair comparisons had implicated him,
saying that "we can throw the key away because you're not smart
enough to try. and help yourself."4 That evening, after being informed that his statement would be used against him in court,
defendant confessed. An hour later, however, the confession was
repudiated. ,
The due process clause of the Constitution requires state criminal procedures to conform with certain fundamental principles of
justice that are, requisite to a fair trial. " One such fundamental
principle is that a person shall not be convicted on the basis of a
coerced confession. The policy underlying this principle is not
2. Doe: No. 38808, at 6.
3.
.,. . Judge Arthur will look over the whole thing, and he will say,

"Well, 'here this boy is 18 but he's just not very much older than the
other two. I will handle all three of them." You get the drift? But, this
we can't do if you don't tell us. We can't go there and do that for you.
You've got to tell us what went on.
Id. iat6-7.
4. Id. at 5.
5. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 872 U.S. 885 (163); Irvin v. Dowd,
366'U.S. 717 (1961); In re Oliver, 333 US. 257 (1948); Brown v. Mississippi,
297 U.S. 278 (1936).
6. See Rogers v. Richmond, s65 U.S. 534 (1961); Spano v. New York, 360
U.S. -315 (1959); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
The Supreme Court applies the "rule of automatic reversal" if it finds a
criminal confession to be "involuntary." The conviction will be reversed even
though it is convindngly supported by other evidence," Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 621 (1961), because "where, as here a coerced confession
constitutes a part of the evidence before the jury and a general verdict is
returned, no one can say what credit and weight the jury gave to the confession." Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 567-68 (1958). It has been suggested
that the rule is also designed to deter prosecutors from introducing conessipns of questionable validity in order to guarantee a conviction. See Kamisar,
Betts v. Brady Twenty Years Later: The Right to Counsel and Due Process
Values, 61 McuIc. L. REv. 219, 239-42 (1962); AMeltzer, Involuntary Confessions: The Allocation of Responsibility Between Judge and Jury, 21 U. Cm.
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merely that an "involuntary" confession is untrustworthy,7 but
primarily that the exclusion of such confessions deters police from
employing techniques that are inconsistent with the civilized
standards of conduct required by the due process clause.' A confession is "involuntary" if the totality of circumstances indicates
that the confessor's will was "overborne." 9 In applying this test,
courts are not bound by the factual determinations of the trial
L. REv. 317, 339-54 (1954). That prosecutors have not infrequently yielded
to the temptation may be seen from the fact that of the 22 state convictions
reversed by the Supreme Court on "coerced confession" grounds, the defendants in exactly half of these cases were again convicted of the same (seven)
or of a lesser included offense (four). See Ritz, State Criminal Confession
Cases: Subsequent Developments in Cases Reversed by U.S. Supreme Court
and Some Current Problems, 19 WASH. & LEE L. Ray. 902, 208-09 (1962).
In Biron the Court reversed without considering whether the rest of the
evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction, reasoning that "the principle
at stake is more important than the expense and inconvenience which will be
involved in a new trial." Doec. No. 38808, at 12. See Haynes v. Washington,
373 U.S. 503 (1963); Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963); Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
7. See State v. Schabert, 218 Minn. 1, 15 N.W.2d 585 (1944).
8. See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 US. 534 (1961); Asheraft v. Tennessee,
322 U.S. 143 (1944); Paulsen, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Third Degree, 6 SrA. L. Rav. 411 (1954); The Supreme Court, 1961 Term, 70 HARV.
L. REv. 54, 110 (1962). In Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962), the Supreme Court stated that the fifth amendment privilege against self incrimination was also a policy factor. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
Recently, the Supreme Court discussed the use of improper methods as
follows:
This case illustrates a particular facet of police utilization of improper methods. While history amply shows that confessions have often
been extorted to save law enforcement officials the trouble and effort
of obtaining valid and independent evidence, the coercive devices used
here were designed to obtain admissions which would incontrovertibly
complete a case in which there had already been obtained, by proper
investigative efforts, competent evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction. The procedures here are no less constitutionally impermissible,
and perhaps more unwarranted because so unnecessary. There is no reasonable or rational basis for claiming that the oppressive and unfair
methods utilized were in any case essential to the detection or solution
of the crime or to the protection of the public.
Haynes v. Washington, 378 U.S.-503, 519 (1963).
9. See Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 576, 584, 602, 622, 634 (1961); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 550,
558 (1954). For an analysis and criticism of such terminology as "involuntariness," "overbearing" or "breaking the will," see Kamisar, What is an "Involuntary" Confession.? Some Comments on Inbau and Reid's "Criminal Interrogation and Confessions," 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 728, 745-59 (1963).
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court or jury 0 and, thus, appellate courts conduct an independent
examination of the record to determine whether the circumstances
show as a matter of law that the confession was "involuntary.""
The United States Supreme Court has considered several factors
relevant to this inquiry: whether the police were guilty of physicap2 or psychological coercion; 13 whether the defendant was denied
access to counsel or friends; 14 whether the defendant was held for
an unreasonable period before arraignment;' 5 whether defendant
10. See Haynes v. Washington, 373 US. 503, 515 (1963); Stein v. New
York, 346 U.S. 156, 181 (1953) (federal law could be frustrated by distorted

fact finding).
In state courts the general practice is to submit disputed fact issues as to
the voluntariness of a confession to the jury. Paulsen, supra note 8, at 423.
Paulsen questions whether such a practice is itself a denial of due process because if the jury rejects the confession as involuntary, the effect of the confession nevertheless remains in their minds. See Tooisgah v. United States, 137
Fad 713 (10th-Cir. 1943); Wagner v. United States, 110 Fad 595 (5th Cir.),

cert. denied, 310 US.643 (1940).
11. See authorities cited note 10 supra.
12. Brown v. Mfississippi, 997 US. 278 (1936).
13. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556
(1954).

14. See Payne v. Arkansas, 356 US. 560, 567 (1958). In Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958), the Supreme Court held that it was not a denial
of due process of itself to refuse access to counsel during the period intervening
between arrest and arraignment, unless the defendant shows that substantial
prejudice resulted from such a denial. A different rule may apply to post-indictment denial of counsel. See 61 COLmi. L. REv.744 (1961). For a discussion of when the right to counsel "begins" and related interrogation-confession problems, see Kamisar & Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota.
Some Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 MmN. L. REv. 1,

S3-61 (1963).

15. See Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
"Prompt arraignment" has a fourfold purpose: (1) to inform defendant
of the charges against him; (2) to advise him of his right to retain
counsel; (3) to require the state to show probable cause for defendant's
detention; and (4) to allow defendant's release on bail.
Rothblatt & Rothblatt, Police Interrogation The Right to Counsel and to
Prompt Arraignment, 27 Baooxxmzx L. Rav. 24, 34 (1960).
The McNabb-Mallory rule requires that confessions obtained in violation
of the prompt arraignment rule be excluded from evidence in federal prosecusions. See 68 YAz. LJ. 1003 (1959). However, the exclusionary rule applied in the federal courts is not imposed on state courts by the due process
clause. Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951). Minnesota rejected the
McNabb-Mallory rule in State v. Schabert, 218 Mlnn. 1, 15 N.W.2d 585
(1944); 222 Amin. 261, 24 N.W.2d 846 (1946). The Schabert case stated that
arraignment must be prompt, but that failure to observe the rule was only
a factor in determining voluntariness.
Opponents of the McNabb-Mallory rule argue that it is essential to
criminal detection that the police be allowed to interrogate suspects in pri-
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was informed of his right to retain counsel and remain silent; 0
age, intelligence, and experience were
and whether defendant's
7
normal.1
than
less
In Biron the Court independently examined the facts, expressly
following the standards for review recently set forth by the Supreme Court in Haynes 'v. Washington.' The Minnesota Court
relied on the record as a whole in reaching its decision, but emphasized the persuasive nature of the false statements made by the
police. In the Court's analysis, police representations "calculated
to sell the defendant on the idea that he ought to sign a confession"' 9 caused it to be "involuntary." The Court's approach is
supported by another recent decision of the Supreme Court, Lynumn v. Illinois.0 In that case, defendant, a widow with two small
children, confessed after arresting officers had promised leniency
if she would co-operate, but had threatened to take away her children and imprison her for ten years if she refused. The Court reversed her conviction, reasoning that without the aid of counsel
the defendant could not know that the police lacked authority to
fulfill either their promises or their threats.
The police methods used in Biron quite likely caused the defendant to believe that their promises of leniency would be honored, especially in light of the defendant's age, lack of education,
and inexperience. The Supreme Court apparently has placed great
weight on such factors as an element in determining the "voluntariness" of a confession. 2' In a notable example, Gallegos v. Colorado,22 the defendant, fourteen years old, was arrested for assault
and robbery and was kept in custody for one week without the
aid of counsel. He immediately confessed orally and later, after
being advised of his constitutional rights, signed a written confession. The robbery victim subsequently died, and the defendant
was convicted of first degree murder. The Supreme Court, howvate. Inbau, Police Interrogation-A PracticalNecessity, 52 J. CaiIm. L., C
& P.S. 16 (1961). But see, Kamisar, Public Safety v. Individual Liberties:
Some "Facts" and "Theories," 58 J. CRniv. L., C. & P.S. 171 (1962).
16. Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
17. See, e.g., Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961); Spano v. New York, 860 U.S. 815 (1959); Haley
v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
18. 373 U.S. 503, 513 (1963); see authorities cited note 8 supra.
19. Doc. No. 88808, at 5.
20. 872 U.S. 528 (1963); accord, MoDm. CoDE oF EvEN E rule 505 (1942);
Scott, Federal Control Ov&r Use of Coerced Confessions in State Criminal
Cases-Some Unsettled Problems, 29 IND. LJ. 151, 159 (1954).
21. See cases cited note 15 supra.
22. 370 U.S. 49 (1962) (4-8 decision).
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ever, reversed his conviction, stressing that the defendant was not
equal to the knowledge and experience of the police and was unable, without the aid of counsel, to understand the consequences
of his confession. The import of the Gallegos decision seems to be
that a youthful defendant's confession made without the aid of
counsel will not be admitted into evidence.m
The Minnesota- Court did not specifically inquire whether the
defendant in Biron was within the rationale of decisions such as
Gallegos, but it would seem that the misleading police questioning coupled with the background and inexperience of the defendant amply support the conclusion that the confession was "involuntary. 24 However, both the rights of defendants and the permissible scope of police interrogation would be better served if the
Court had clarified its standards for rejecting confessions. Although the Court apparently applied the "voluntariness" standard
based on police methods, the Court also stated that "the trustworthiness of a confession should not in every instance be discounted because investigative officers in their interviews might
have made discursive or imprecise statements to the defendant."25
The Court's statement does not necessarily indicate an adoption
of the "reliability" standard, but such confusing references should
be omitted for it seems clear that many confessions that are completely reliable may not be admitted under the "voluntariness"
standard. 6 Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that to instruct
a jury passing on the admissibility of a confession solely in terms
of its "reliability" or "trustworthiness" is not permissible.? The
Minnesota Court could significantly clarify the requirements for
the admissibility of confessions. (a) if it would make plain that
"reliability" or "trustworthiness" is no longer the sole touchstone
and (b)' if it would discard the "coercion"-"voluntary" terminology and instead enumerate the kinds of police misconduct
that evoke such conclusionary language.
23. Cf. 15 ALA. L. I~v. 234, 237 (1962). This result would seem to follow even in the face of an express waiver of counsel. Since the theory of
the Gallegos case is that immature defendants are unable to protect themselves, it would seem to follow that they are also unable to make an intelli-

gent waiver. 76 RHav. L. IRnv.

54, 110 (1962).

24. See Xamisar, supra note 9, at 754--59.
05. Doc. No. 88808, at 11.
26. Kamisar, s pra note 9, at 747--59.
27. Rogers,v. Richmond, $65 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1961).
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WAIVER OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE BY
ATTORNEY'S DISCLOSURE

The implied authority of an attorney to waive the attorneyclient privilege of his client by divulging a confidential communication to a third party not in concert of interest with the client
was considered in Sprader v. Mueller.28 Plaintiff's attorney had
accommodated the County Attorney by giving him a copy of a
statement made by the plaintiff to an investigator hired by her
attorney.29 At trial, defendant's counsel offered to prove by an
employee of the County Attorney's office: that the County Attorney's files contained a statement by the plaintiff;80 that plaintiff's
attorney had voluntarily released the statement to that office; and
that the statement contained facts impeaching plaintiff's testimony. 31 The trial court sustained an objection to the offer on the
ground that the statement was a privileged communication. On
appeal, however, the Court reversed and remanded, holding that
the privilege had been waived by the attorney.
The Minnesota statute8 2 on privilege basically provides that
neither an attorney nor his employees may be examined as to any
communication made to the attorney by the client or about any
advice given in the course of professional duty, unless the client
consents. A client's confidences are protected so as to encourage
full disclosure, thereby enabling the attorney to fully assess the
legal problem."3 The privilege attaches only to communications
that are made in confidence and are for the purpose of securing
legal advice. 4 Once established, the privilege belongs to the cli28. 121 N.W.2d 176 (Minn. 1968).
29. The County Attorney's office was investigating the accident involved.
Plaintiff's attorney apparently hoped that by disclosing the statement he
could persuade the Assistant County Attorney to secure the defendant's fingerprints from the steering wheel of the defendant's car. 121 N.W.2d at 180.
80. The plaintiff's statement said that her husband had made one stop at
the service road before entering the divided highway. In fact, there were two
stop signs, one at the service road and one at the highway. 121 N.W.2d at 179.
Plaintiff's statement indicated, therefore, that her husband may have turned
into the wrong one-way traffic lane believing that the service road was part
of the highway.
31. Defendant's counsel intended to use the plaintiff's statement for impeachment purposes only, but the Court held that the statement would be
admissible as substantive evidence as an admission against her interest. 121
N.W.2d at 180.
32. MIN. STAT. § 595.02(2) (1961).
38. 8 WIGmORE, EvmENcE § 2291 (3d ed. McNaughton rev. 1961).
34. Brown v. St. Paul City Ry., 241 Minn. 15, 62 N.W.2d 088 (1054);
MODEL CODE OF EvIDmcE rule 209(d) (1942).
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ent,35 and he may waive it expressly or waive it impliedly by acts

that are not consistent with secrecy. 0 For example, the client may
waive the privilege in court by testifying on direct examination to
privileged matters 7 or out of court by disclosure to a third party 8
The out-of-court disclosure voluntarily made by the client's attorney has caused much concern - on the basis of the attorney's
implied authority to make a disclosure the client's privilege might

be waived? 9 One view is that the statute conferring the privilege
cannot extend it to third parties because the statute does not

make the client's communication itself privileged, but only prevents the attorney to whom the confidence was made from testi-

fying.40 Wigmore opposes this interpretation of the statute for it
allows a clear evasion of the client's privilege if the out-of-court

disclosures of his attorney were indirectly admitted into evidence
35.
"Waiver" has been defined as the intentional relinquishment of a
known right with full knowledge of its existence, including all the facts.
In relation to the law of privileged communications, the principle is
firmly anchored only when the client elects to make an intentional
waiver of confidentiality, or when he takes a position which would give
him an advantage to which he is not entitled and which he would not
be able to maintain in the absence of the protection of his confidences
from disclosure.
Gardner, Principles of Waiver-Attorney-Client Privilege, 35 CAI. S.3J.
262 (1960). See Note, Waiver of Privilege,16 Mnr1r. L. REv. 818 (1932).
36.
In deciding [what is a waiver by implication] . . . There is always
also the objective consideration that when [the client's] conduct touches
a certain point of disclosure, fairness requires that his privilege shall
cease whether he intended that result or not. He cannot be allowed,
after disclosing as much as he pleases, to withhold the remainder.

8 WiGMORE, op. cit. supranote 83, § 2327.
37. See State v. Tall, 48 Mlnn. 278, 45 N.W. 449 (1890); 16 Mm-. L.
RIv. 818, 828-24 (1932).
38. See Note, Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege on Intm-Attorney Ez-

change of Information, 63 YALm L. 1030, 1031 &n.5 (1954).
39. Wigmore states the problem thus:
Clearly the privilege could not permit an evasion -by receiving the
voluntary extrajudicial disclosures of the attorney .... On the other
hand, the attorney must be credited with some authority for negotiating with the opposing party, and in the cause of such negotiations
it becomes necessary to make communications and to deliver documents or copies which ... may afterwards with propriety form the
subject of proof as part of the transactions between the parties. Indeed,
to refuse to examine them would often be to sanction the breaking of
faith with the opponent. How can these opposing considerations be
reconciled?
8 WiGMoRE, op. cit. supra note 83, § 2825.
40. Tays v. Carr, 37 Kan. 141, 14 Pac. 456 (1887).
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through the testimony of third persons. 1 Wigmore finds an exception, however, where the attorney's disclosure is to an adversary;12 in such a case, the client's privilege is lost on the theory
that his attorney had implied authority to waive it. 48

In two previous cases, the Minnesota Court had considered
attorneys' out-of-court disclosures of their clients' privileged communications as a question of waiver. In Schmitt v. Emery," the
Court held that it did not constitute a waiver for the attorney to
furnish a copy of his client's privileged statement to a joint defendant for the limited purpose of assisting the latter in preparing
a common defense.4 In a later case,"4 however, the Court held
that it was a waiver of the client's privilege for two adversary
insurance companies to exchange the privileged statements of
their insureds.
In Sprader the Court considered the separate questions of
whether the plaintiff's attorney as her agent had implied authority
to waive her privilege and whether her attorney's disclosure did
constitute a waiver. 4r The Court recognized that an attorney often
needs the implied authority to waive his client's privilege in order
to make voluntary disclosures of privileged matters for legitimate
bargaining purposes within the limits of professional propriety."
41. See note 39 supra.

op. cit. supra note 33, § 2325(1).
43.
[AIll disclosures (oral or written) voluntarily made to the opposing
party or to third persons in the course of negotiations for settlement,
42. 8 WIGMORE,

or in the course of taking adverse steps in litigation .

.

. are receivable

as being made under an implied waiver of privilege, giving authority
to disclose the confidences when necessary in the opinion of the attorney.
8 WIGMORE, op. ct. supra note 33, § 2326; accord, Hinmelfarb v. United
States, 175 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1949).
44. 211 Minn. 547, 2 N.W.2d 418 (1942).
45.
The copy is given and accepted under the privilege between the attorney furnishing it and his client. For the occasion, the recipient of the
copy stands under the same restraints arising from the privileged character of the document as the counsel who furnished it, and consequently he has no right, and cannot be compelled, to produce or disclose its contents.
Id. at 554, 2 N.W.2d at 417.
46. Halloran v. Tousignant, 230 Minn. 399, 41 N.W.2d 874 (1950).
47. The Court assumed that the plaintiff's statement was privileged even
though she did not make it directly to her attorney. See State v. Anderson,
247 Minn. 469, 78 N.W.2d 320 (1956); Schmitt v. Emery, 211 Minn. 547, 2
N.W.2d 413 (1949), 26 MI NN. L. REV. 744.
48. See notes 39 & 43 supra.
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The Court therefore held that in Sjorader it was proper for the
plaintiff's attorney to disclose a privileged statement in exchange
for information relevant to the defendant's liability. This holding
seems to conflict with the underlying policy of the statute - encouraging full disclosure. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to
confer such an authority on an attorney because its exercise must
be in good faith and the attorney is probably better qualified than
the client to evaluate the benefits of a disclosure. Moreover, the
Court's holding is consistent with an attorney's authority to make
admissions and otherwise control the management of his client's
litigation. 9 Also, the general policy of narrowly construing the
attorney-client privilege because its existence by itself obstructs
the ascertainment of truth supports the Court's result.5 0
Consistent with its liberal construction of the attorney's power
as agent, the Court also held that plaintiff's attorney had waived
the privilege by disclosing her statement to the Assistant County
Attorney, who wds a stranger to the litigation. The Court's characterization of the Assistant County Attorney as a stranger distinguishes Sprader from the Schmitt case, which seems correct for
disclosure to a joint defendant as in Schmitt presents a distinctive
fact situation.5 ' If the Court hadcheld. that the disclosure of a privileged communication to a joint 'defendant for purposes of preparing a common defense was a waiver, future joint defendants
could circumvent the rule by merely retaining a common attorney.52 Moreover, in the Schmitt case the Court also placed some
reliance on the fact that the attorney's disclosure had been for a
limited purpose ofily. In this respect Sprader is similar, but it
seems clear-that a distinction based on the purpose of the disclosure should not be the test of waiver. If purpose were the test, the
client might retain the benefit of his privilege even though his attorney had already disclosed information out of court in order to
gain a tactical advantage for his client.5 3 The standard of waiver
that the Court seems to have adopted in Sprader, however, re49. 8-Wi

oRE, op. cit. supra note 33, §'2326.

50. McCoRncK, EvmExcE § 291 (1954); 63 YAx LJ. 1030, 1034 & nR.5
(1954).
51. See 63 YALE LJ. 1030 (1954). The holding of the Schmitt case arguably

was not based on its special factual situation, but on the unexpressed rationale

that because-of the identity of the recipien-

a joint defendant- it was rea-

sonable to assume that the disclosure would not end up in evidence and con-

sequently'was not a waiver. There is no direct authority for such a rule, and

it seems so restrictive that only disclosure to an adversary would come within
it and result in a waiver.
52. Id. at 103-35.
53. 8 WIG' OE, op. cit. supra note S3, § 2327.
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quires the attorney to conduct himself consistently with the secrecy of the attorney-client privilege. 4 Thus, the client in Sprader
could not receive the benefit of an out-of-court exchange by his
attorney without losing the benefit of her privilege. Yet the holding will not result in unfairness to the client, for he will be protected by the requirement that the attorney's disclosure must be
made in good faith and for a legitimate bargaining purpose.
C.

STANDARD FOR AD.MISSION OF EVIDENCE BEFORE A

STATE ADIINISTRATIVE BODY

At the Licenses Committee of the Minneapolis City Council
meeting to consider revocation of petitioner's liquor license, police
files were introduced as evidence that his premises had been used
as a resort for prostitutes. 5 These files contained three types of
evidence: daily written reports of members of the morals squad;
transcribed statements of convicted morals offenders; and extracts
from police reports quoting third persons. On this evidence, corroborated in part by the testimony of the head of the Minneapolis
Morals Squad, the City Council voted to revoke petitioner's license. The Minnesota Court, in Sabes v. City of Minneapolis,16
affirmed the City Council's revocation, holding that although it
was based in part on hearsay evidence, it was supported by "substantial competent evidence."
Administrative bodies in Minnesota are not confined to the
strict exclusionary rules of evidence applicable to judicial proceedings;517 nevertheless, their findings must be based in part on evidence of a legal and substantial character. 5 The Court has indi54. See note 86 supra.
55. MIN. STAT. § 340.14(2) (1961) is violated if a liquor licensee permits
his premises to be used as a resort for prostitutes. The MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.,
O~iwNAcE CODE § 851.420 (1960) permits the City Council to revoke liquor

and other licenses for any violation of Minnesota law relating to the sale
of liquor or to the conduct of the business of the licensee.

56. 120 N.W.2d 871 (Minn. 1963).
57. State ex rel. Hardstone Brick Co. v. Department of Commerce, 174

Minn. 200, 219 N.W. 81 (1928); State ex rel. Kinsella v. Eberhart, 116 Minn.
813, 183 N.W. 857 (1911); State ex rel. Hart v. Common Council, 53 Minn.

238, 55 N.W. 118 (1893); see Note, Evidence Before Administrative Tribunals in Minnesota, 23 MINN. L. RFv. 68 (1938).
58. Hughes v. Department of Pub. Safety, 200 Minn. 16, 273 N.W. 618
(1937); State ex rel. Kinsella v. Eberhart, 116 Minn. 313, 138 N.W. 857 (1911).
The Minnesota Court has employed the verbal formula that an administrative finding be based on "substantial competent evidence." The requirement
means that some of the evidence supporting the finding must comply with
the strict exclusionary rules employed in jury trials. See Hughes v. Department of Pub. Safety, supra. In other jurisdictions the requirement is known
as the "residuum rule." See 2 DAvis, ADMINISTIVE LAW § 14.10 (1958).
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cated that the latitude allowed state and local administrative
bodies in their consideration of technically incompetent evidence
depends on the ability of the body to weigh the probative value
of such evidence, the policies underlying the body's function 0 and
the question before it. 60 In proceedings to revoke liquor licenses,

the Court has held that the City Council exercises a quasi-judicial
function in determining whether the licensee's continuance in business is detrimental to the public good 0
In the Court's view of Sabes, the significant question was
whether the evidence supporting the Council's decision complied
with the "substantial competent evidence" requirement - at least
part of the evidence must conform to the technical exclusionary
rules used in formal judicial proceedings. The Court aclmowledged
that nearly all of the evidence on which the revocation rested was
hearsay. It found substantial competent evidence to support the
2
revocation, however, by applying the statutory codification( of

the common law "official documents" exception to the hearsay
rule. The Court construed the "official documents" exception as
applicable to the daily written reports of members of the morals
squad recorded in the course of their investigation and arrest. Although most hearsay exceptions are based on a finding of necessity, the written observations of the morals squad officers are admitted out of expediency. Repeated appearances by public officers
to testify on the facts contained in their records interferes with
their efficiency. Moreover, the lack of cross-examination is offset
by the probable trustworthiness of their records.6
59. Jacobs v. Village of Buld, 199 Minn. 572, 278 N.W. 245 (1937), exemplifies the importance that the policy underlying an administrative function
may assume in determining the admissibility of evidence. In the Jacobs case,
the Court upheld the admission of the deceased's statement in a workmen's
compensation proceeding. The Court felt justified in extending the res gestac
concept to include the deceased's statement made 45 minutes after the fall
because of the purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act to compensate
injured workmen.
60. State ex 7el. Hardstone Brick Co. v. Department of Commerce, 174
Minn. 200, 219 N.W. 81 (1928); State ez rel. Hart v. Common Council, 53
Mim. 238,55 N.W. 118 (1893) (Mfitchell, J.).
61. Moskovitz v. City of St. Paul, 218 Mlinn. 543, 549, 16 N.W.2d 745, 748
(1944); State en rel. Sholund v. City of Duluth, 1 Mi. 425, 147 N.W.
820 (1914).
62.
The original record made by any public officer in the performance of
his official duty shall be prima facie evidence of the facts required or
permitted by law to be by him recorded ....
AMsw. STAT. § 600.13 (1961).

63. See Olander v. United States, 210 Fad 795, 801 (9th Cir. 1954); 5

W GmORE, EvmmcE §§ 1630-35 (3d ed. M\cNaughten rev. 1901). This is con-
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The remaining evidence - transcribed statements of convicted
morals offenders and extracts from police reports quoting third
persons - was not within the statutory exception, however, and
the Court concluded that it was patently hearsay and therefore
inadmissible. Yet, regardless of the Council's admission of such
evidence, the Court determined that it did not invalidate the
competent evidence admitted. The question, then, of whether an
administrative body's admission of too much incompetent evidence would require a reversal by the Court is still unsettled. If
a finding were not reversed6 4 in such a case, the party called before
an administrative body would have no protection from the admission of incompetent evidence, except the self-restraint of the
administrative body itself.
A better approach might be for the Court itself to determine
whether the supporting evidence is reliable, thereby making the
technical exclusionary rules irrelevant. The Court would then be
able discriminately to reverse cases in which evidence lacking
probative value had been admitted. The diversity of administrative bodies in both composition and purpose makes it desirable
that the Court adopt such a flexible rule. Moreover, an analysis
of the evidence is clearly within the discretion of the reviewing
court.6 5 In such a judgment the relevant factors are: the ability
of the administrative body to evaluate evidence; 0 the quasisistent with the Court's construction of the analogous statutes providing hearsay exceptions for business and hospital records is consistent. Boutang v.
Twin City Motor Bus Co., 248 Minn. 240, 80 N.W.2d 30 (1957); Chillstrom
v. Trojan Seed Co., 242 Minn. 471, 65 N.W.2d 888 (1954); Brown v. St. Paul
City Ry., 241 Minn. 15, 62 N.W.2d 688 (1954).
64. One reason the Court might refuse to reverse and remand is that, unlike a jury case where on retrial the evidence will be heard by a new jury,
the same administrative body would rehear the case, and it seems likely that
this body would be unable to review the evidence with a fresh mind.
65. See note 4 supra; 2 DAvis, op. cit. supra note 58, § 14.10, at 293
(1958). This seems to be the standard of the original draft of the MODax.
STATE ADMimSTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT § 9(1) (1946): "Agencies may admit
and give probative effect to evidence which possesses probative value commonly
accepted by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs." Compare, Federal Administrative Procedure Act § 7(c), 60 Stat. 241 (1946), 5 U.S.C.
§ 1006(c) (1958): "Any oral or documentary evidence may be received, but
every agency shall as a matter of policy provide for the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious evidence. . . ." For an analysis of the
various standards, see Merrill, Hearing and Believing: What Shall We Tell
the Administrative Agencies?, 45 MiN. L. R-v. 525 (1961).
66. Ladd, The Relationship of the Principles of Exclusionary Rules of
Evidence to the Problem of Proof, 18 im-x. L. Rav. 506, 520-22 (1934); Note,
23 Mimi. L. REv. 68, 80-81 (1938).
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judicial procedures of the body; 7 the importance of the subject
matter;68 and the policy underlying the creation of the body. The
Court should extend this analysis to all of the evidence to determine whether the evidence supporting the body's finding is reliable 9 and discard the requirement that an administrative finding
need be supported only by a residuum of competent evidence.
The rules designed to exclude hearsay evidence from a lay jury
should probably not be applied to an adminitrative body whose
members are, in most instances, experts capable of exercising a
sophisticated judgment. 0 In the Sabes case the City Council had
exercised a quasi-judicial function, and therefore requiring the
Council's findings to be supported by competent evidence was
consistent with the purpose of the hearing.
In conclusion, the Court should utilize its discretion regarding
the issue of admissible evidence in an administrative proceeding,
basing its judgment upon such considerations as the character
and purpose of the agency as well as the question that is to be
resolved. Such an approach eliminates any need to invoke the
residuum rule. Applying this standard, a reviewing court should
not reverse a finding unless a clear abuse of discretion is indicated.
67, Note, 23 m_-. L. REv. 68, 70-75 (1938).
68. 2 Divis, op. cit. supra note 58, § 14.10, at 293. Davis suggests the
follo.wing analysisshould be applied by a reviewing court:
(a) the, alternative to reliance on the incompetent evidence; (b) the
state of the supporting and opposing evidence, if any; (c) the policy of
the program being administered and the consequences of a decision either vay; (d) importance or unimportance of the subject matter and
consideration of economy of government; (e) the degree of efficiency
or lack of efficiency of.cross-examination with respect to particular hearsay declarations.'
Id. at 296.
.69.

Even though' the jury-trial rules of evidence have been tailored to
the particular needs of juries, the residuum rule requires the use of
those rules in cases in, which no jury sits. And even though the jurytrial rules, have been designed to guide admission or exclusion of evidence, not evolution of evidence, the residuum rule requires use of those
-rules for evaluation of evidence.
2 DAvis, op. cit. supra note 58, § 14.10, at 292.
70. Consider, for example, the fact situation presented in Rhodes Pharmacal Co.-v. FTC, 208 3.2d 382 (7th Cir. 1954): To disprove the governmentes allegation that it was falsely advertising, a drug company conducted a
survey of 300 consumers to determine the impression made on them by its
advertisements. If opinion evidence of this sort were the only evidence available on -which to base an administrative finding, the requirement of the residuum rule would probably not be fulfilled. See Note, Public Opinion Surveys as Evidence: The Pollsters Go to Court, 66 HInv. L. lEv. 489 (1953).
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DUTY To AMiEND RULE 33 DEPOSITIONS UPON
DISCOVERY OF NEWLY ACQUIRED INFORMATION

Rule 33 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure"' and the resultant duty to amend the answers to interrogatories upon the
discovery of new information was considered by the Court in Gebhard v. Niedzwiecki.72 Prior to trial defendant's counsel had served
interrogatories on plaintiff and his attorneys, requesting the names
and addresses of persons having knowledge of relevant facts;
plaintiff's attorneys answered the interrogatories to the fullest extent of their knowledge, but when a later investigation uncovered
another prospective witness, they failed to amend the answers."8
At trial the court suppressed the testimony of this witness, finding
that the "spirit" of rule 33 created a continuing duty to amend
the answers. On appeal the Court affirmed and held that a party
answering an interrogatory must disclose after-acquired information if it is material and if the failure to amend would render the
original answers untruthful, unreliable, or inaccurate.74
The initiation of discovery proceedings under Minnesota rule
71. M nN. R. Civ. P. 33 provides as follows:
Any party may serve upon any adverse party written interrogatories
to be answered by the party served . . . who shall furnish such information as is available.. . . The interrogatories shall be answered separately and fully in writing under oath. The answers shall be signed
by the person making them; and the party upon whom the interrogatories have been served shall serve a copy of the answers on the party
submitting the interrogatories within 15 days after the service of the interrogatories. . . . The number of interrogatories or sets of interrogatories to be served is not limited except as justice requires to protect the
party from annoyance, expense, embarrassment, or oppression.
72. 192 N.W.2d 110 (Minn. 1963).
73. Apparently, the interrogatories served upon plaintiff and his attorneys
did not contain a demand for amendment in the case of newly acquired information.
74. 122 N.W.2d at 114-15. The Court supplied two versions of its holding.
First, it held that the duty exists where the information is material or where
the original answer would otherwise be untrue, unreliable, or inaccurate. Id. at
114. However, the Court stated elsewhere that the information must be material and must render previous answers untrue, unreliable, or inaccurate. Id.
at 115. The Court probably meant to use the word "and" in both instances,
for it also said that "the application of this rule should not require the disclosure of every bit of information discovered after the answers are served."
Ibid. If the Court had meant to use the word "or," any information that made
earlier answers inaccurate, unreliable, or untrue would have to be furnished,
regardless of how trivial it might be. Because the Court did not require disclosure of all information, it probably intended that the requirement of materiality apply in addition to the other requirements.
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33, and similar rules, 75 early in the litigation may result in the acquired information later becoming inadequate, incomplete, or untrue. One of the main purposes of Rule 33, however, "is the discovery of facts which will enable litigants to prepare for trial free
from the element of surprise"' 7 - clearly the "spirit" of the rule
requires some procedure to guarantee that the depositions are true
at the time of trial as well as when answered.7 7 If pre-trial conferences are an established practice in the jurisdiction, supplemental
information might be obtained there 78 This procedure, of course,
does not solve the problem if no pre-trial conference is held or if
information is acquired after the conference7 To alleviate this
problem, therefore, the federal rules have been held to create a
continuous duty to disclose information where the interrogatories
contain a demand for amended answers8 0 Also, repeated requests
for information may be submitted to the respondent up to the
time of trial, unless the rule or statute provides differently.8'
In the Gebhard case, the Court rejected both written demands
for continuing answers in the original interrogatories and repeated
sets of interrogatories as unnecessarily burdensome methods of
75. See, e.g., FED. R.Civ. P. 33, which the Minnesota Court considers to
be substantially identical to the Mnnesota rule. 122 N.W.2d at 114. See 2
YouNiGuIsT & BIAcm, AMfiNESOTA RULES PRACTICE 146 (1953); Louisell, Discovery and Pre-Triil Under the Minnesota Rules, 36 Mn. L. Rv. 033 (1952).
76. 122 N.W.2d at 114.
77. McNally v. Yellow Cab Co., 16 FRD.460 (E.D. Pa. 1954); see
WmGur, AmEsoTA RUrS 205 (1954); Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HARV. L. Rav. 942, 961 (1961); Note, 68 HAv. L. REv. 673, 676 (1955);
Note, 42 IowA L. Rv. 579 (1957); Comment, 27 Mo. L. ].v. 242 (1962). See
generally Annot, 88 A.LR.2d 657 (1963).
78. See Novick v. Pennsylvania R.R., 18 F.R.D. 296 (WD. Pa. 1955);
Bentley, How To Do Pre-Trial in. State Courts, 14 Wyo. LJ.1, 6 (1959);
Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HAnv. L. R v. 942, 961 (1961).
79. But see NJ. RuLEas 423-12, which require the service of amended answers not later than ten days prior to the trial if after the pre-trial conference
a party receives information that renders the previous answers incomplete.
80. See, e.g., MdcNally v. Yellow Cab Co., 16 F-RD. 460 (E.D. Pa. 1954);
Wolf v. Dickinson, 16 F.RD. 250 (El). Pa. 1953); cf. Furmanek v. Southern
Trading Co., 15 F.RI). 405 (E). Pa. 1953).
81. The possibility of utilizing such a procedure in order to obtain supple.
mental information was recognized by the Court in Gebhard. 122 N.W.2d at
114. See Novick v. Pennsylvania R.R., 18 F.R.D. 290 (WD. Pa. 1955); Capone v. Norton, 8 NJ. 54, 83 A.2d 710 (1951); Troutner v. Philadelphia
Transp. Co., 5 Pa. D. & C-2d 545 (Columbia County Ct. 1956). In Smith v.
Superior Court, 189 Cal. App. 2d 6, 11 Cal. Rep. 165 (Dist. Ct. 1961), the
court interpreted § 2030 of the California Code of Civil Procedure as requiring
a court order before a party could demand continuing interrogatories. Under
that statute a court order would also be necessary for a party to serve the
same respondent with more than one set of interrogatories.
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disclosure. Instead, the Court found a continuous duty to disclose
after-acquired information of a material nature without a demand
from the proponent that the interrogatories be continuous. 2 This
procedure places the burden of disclosure on the party best able
to bear it. Clearly, a respondent aware of recently acquired information or newly discovered witnesses can amend his answers more
readily than the proponent can decide which questions require
continuing answers or which must be served again.
Although the Court indicated that there is no continuing duty
to disclose "every bit of information discovered after the answers
are served,""8 some question still remains as to whether the Court
might not have in effect made the duty overly comprehensive. The
failure to disclose a prospective witness, as occurred in Gebhard,
is inherently material, but the materiality of much other information is not as easily determined. Thus, until the "material" standard is more clearly delineated, respondent may be forced to amend
answers each time information of the slightest significance is acquired or risk the sanction of suppression.
In considering the appropriate sanction for violation of the
duty imposed by Rule 83, the Court adopted the position that
evidence should be suppressed in cases where nondisclosure is willful and the party guilty of the violation seeks to benefit from it
after the harm cannot be undone.8 4 Even though the Court also
suggested that a continuance might be the proper sanction if nondisclosure resulted from an "honest mistake" and the harm done
was not irreparable, suppression could effectively become the common sanction because of the difficulty of convincing a court that
amended answers were overlooked or that the significance of the
82. See Lunn v. United Aircraft Corp., 25 F.R.D. 186 (D. Del. 1000);
Smith v. Acadia Overseas Freighters, Ltd., 120 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. Pa. 1953);
Fidelis Fisheries, Ltd. v. Thorden, 12 F.R.D. 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Kling v.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 9 F.R.D. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1949); King v. Cardin,
229 Ark. 929, 819 S.W.2d 214 (1959); cf. Chenault v. Nebraska Farm Prods.,
9 F.R.D. 529 (D. Neb. 1949); R.C.A. Mfg. Co. v. Decca Records, Inc., 1
F.R.D. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1940). But see Novick v. Pennsylvania R.R., 18 F.R.D.
296 (W.D. Pa. 1955); Capone v. Norton, 8 N.J. 54, 8s A.2d 710 (1951) (overturned by an amendment to the New Jersey rule). See also White Tower
Management Corp. v. Erie Main Corp., 28 N.J. Super. 425, 100 A.2d 775
(Ch. 1953); N.J. RuLas 4:28-12.
83. 122 N.W.2d at 115.
84. See King v. Cardin, 229 Ark. 929, 319 S.W.2d 214 (1959); Sather v.
Lindahl, 43 Wash. 2d 463, 261 P.2d 682 (1958); cf. Newsum v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 97 F. Supp. 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Evtush v. Hudson Bus Transp. Co.,
7 N.J. 167, 81 A.2d 6 (1951); Kronmiller v. Caruso, 57 N.J. Super. 831, 154
A.2d 789 (App. Div. 1959); Branch v. Emery Transp. Co., 53 NJ. Super. 367,
147 A.2d 556 (App. Div. 1958).
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new information was misunderstood. If suppression of testimony
causes attorneys to disclose all relevant after-acquired information, the Gebhardcase will have achieved a praiseworthy increase
in the pre-trial exchange of information. 5 Another objective of the
discovery process, however, is a fair determination of the merits
on the basis of all material informationY8 Thus, if suppression of
evidence as a result of procedural violations often brings about an
"inaccurate" result, the sanction applied might be improper. Even
where the failure to disclose additional information is willful, a
continuance at the respondent's expense should be sufficient, unless the harm done to the proponent is irreparable.S7 A continuance
could conceivably encourage full disclosure just as readily as suppression without risking a decision based on only part of the facts.

V.
A.

INSURANCE

INSURER MUST DmEND AcTioN AGAiNST INSURED
KwowN To BE WITHn Poucy COVERAGE

Most liability insurance policies contain provisions granting
the insurer the right to control litigation against the insured for
all claims within the policy coverage. Under such provisions the
insurance company must defend whenever the facts of an injury
as alleged in the complaint come within the coverage of the policy.2 When a complaint, however, alleges a claim not covered by
85. See McNally v. Yellow Cab Co., 16 FIRD. 460 (E.D. Pa. 1954); Central & So. Truck Lines v. Westfall GM.C. Truck, Inc., 317 S.W.2d 841, 847
(Mo. Ct. App. 1958). See also Hicknan v. Taylor, 329 US. 495, 501 (1947);
Holtzoff, Origin and Sources of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, So
N.Y.UL. 11v. 1057, 1071-73 (1955); Note, 42 IowA L. RPv. 579 (1957).
86. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500-01, 507 (1947) (dictum);
Clark, A Modern Procedure for New York, 30 N.Y.UI.. REv. 1194, 1197
(1955); Note, 42 IowA L. REv. 579 (1957).
87. The Court might profitably have adopted the more flexible approach
of the New Jersey Superior Court in Abbatemarco v. Colton, 31 NJ. Super.
181, 106 A.2d 12 (App. Div. 1954); the court found the appellant's nondisclosure to be willful, but the information involved was so crucial to the case
that it declared a mistrial to allow the appellant to bring the evidence in a
later action.
1. See 7A Aprimma, INsunArcn LAw imw PnACTICE § 4681 (1962); Annot.,
.5 A.L.R.2d 458, 461 (1956).
2. E.g., Lee v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 178 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1949); Brodek
v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 292 Ill. App. 363, 11 N.E.Rd 228 (1937) (dictum);
Christian v. Royal Ins. Co., 185 Mlinn. 180, 240 N.W. 365 (1932); BloomRosenblum-Kine Co. v. Union Indem. Co., 121 Ohio St. 220, 167 N.E. 884
(1929). See generally 7A APPLax, op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 4082-83; Annot.,
50 ALR.2d 458 (1956).
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the policy but the actual facts known to the insurer suggest or do
constitute a claim covered by the insurance contract, the insurer's
obligation to defend is not clear.3
The Minnesota Court considered one aspect of this problem in
Crum v. Anchor Cas. Co.' The plaintiffs were sued by a part-time
employee for damages allegedly caused by the plaintiffs' negligence in maintaining their premises, which were insured by a liability policy with defendant. The employee's complaint stated a
cause of action covered by the policy and the insurer therefore
undertook plaintiffs' defense: The insurer sought to establish that
the employee was acting within the scope of her employment at
the time of the injury, for the liability policy expressly excluded
claims covered by the Workmen's Compensation Act or claims
arising out of an employee's course of employment. Although a
deposition taken from the employee conclusively established that
the injury was not suffered while in the service of the insured,6 the
insurer withdrew from the case when the employee later amended
her complaint to allege a claim within the Workmen's Compensation Act.' The plaintiffs settled with the employee and commenced
this action for indemnity. The Court held that if the insurer know
that the actual facts are in conflict with the allegations of the
complaint and that the facts, if established, would present a claim
within the policy coverage, the insurer must either undertake to
defend the action or seek an independent adjudication between
the insured and itself as to its duty to defend.
The allegations of the complaint have generally been held to
govern the insurer's duty to defend,7 but a growing minority of
3. See generally 7A APP--w", op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 4681-86.
4. 119 N.W.2d 703 (Minn. 1968).
5. Prior to taking the deposition, the insurer asserted as a defense to the
action that the caretaker's exclusive remedy was under the Workmen's Compensation Act. 119 N.W.2d at 705. When the deposition was taken from the
injured party, counsel for the insurer was in full charge of the plaintiff's defense and his questions were primarily directed toward procuring an admission from the injured party that she was an employee and within the scope of
her employment. Her answers conclusively established the contrary.
6. The plaintiff did not carry workmen's compensation insurance, and
under _iNN. STAT. § 176.031 (1961) an employer not maintaining workmen's
compensation insurance and failing to self-insure is subject to an action in the
courts for damages. In such an action, it is not necessary to plead or prove
freedom from contributory negligence.
7. See, e.g., Lee v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 178 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1949);
Fessenden School, Inc. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 289 Mass. 124, 193
N.E. 558 (1935); Wilson v. Maryland Cas. Co., 377 Pa. 588, 105 A.2d 304
(1954); Thomas v. American Universal Ins. Co., 80 R.I. 129, 93 A.2d 309
(1952). But see note 15 infra and accompanying text.
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courts have held the actual facts to be determinative.8 The majority rule basically subsumes the historical objective of pleading;
on this subsumption it is often stated that the formal complaint
offers the only clear and certain standard by which the insurer's
duty can be established.9 The Court in Crum reasoned, however,
that in a liberal-procedure jurisdiction a rule based on the known
facts is requisite. The complaint may provide a definite standard
under strict rules of pleading that require a lengthy complaint and
allow only few amendments, but Minnesota's modem rules of procedure permit loosely drawn pleadings and liberal amendments
even after judgment;'10 thus, the complaint is not always an adequate basis for determining whether the injured party's claim is
within the policy coverage." Although cognizant that an insurer's
obligation to defend is not always clear from the facts until the
case is actually tried, 2 the Court concluded that these doubts
should be resolved in favor of the insured.
The Crum case clearly evinces the shortcomings of the majority rule; by alleging a claim not covered by the policy, the injured
party maneuvers the insured into a tactical dilemma. The insurer
is then able to withdraw, forcing the insured to secure his own
counsel to defend the action -for no matter what facts are discovered during the pre-trial proceedings, the insurer cannot be
compelled to defend until the injured party amends his complaint. 3 If the injured party settle out-of-court or win at trial
without amending his complaint, the insurer cannot be forced to
indemnify the insured unless coverage is proved in a separate pro8. See, e.g., Journal Pub. Co. v. General Cas. Co., 210 F.-d 202 (9th Cir.
1954); Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 122 F. Supp. 197 (D.
3inn. 1954); Loftin v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 106 Ga. App. 287, 127
S.E.2d 53 (1962); State ex rel. Inter-State Oil Co. v. Bland, 354 Mo. 622, 190
S.W.2d 227 (1945). For a commentary on the roots of the minority rule, see
Cahoon, Company's Duty to Defend-Recent Developments, 1961 Ns. L.J.
151.
9. See cases cited note 3 supra; 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1019, 1021 (1955); 65
W. VA. L. 1Ev. 175, 177 (1963).
10. See Mnix. R. Civ. P. 15.01-.04; CLAIM, CoDs PLADnG 703-4 (2d
ed. 1947).
11. See Journal Pub. Co. v. General Cas. Co., 210 F.2d 202, 209 (9th Cir.
1954); 103 U. PA. L. REv. 445, 446 (1954).
12. See Lee v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 178 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1949); 80
N.Y.UL. Rnv. 1019, 1022 (1955).
13. See Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 122 F. Supp. 197, 201
(D. Mlnn. 1954). The insured can prove facts of coverage at trial so that the
insurer must idemnify, but, of course, trial is too late for the insured to assert his right to be defended.
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ceedling against the insurer. 14 Yet the prospect of waging this battle against the insurance company might deter the injured party
from amending his complaint so that the allegations constitute a
claim within the policy coverage.
In the context of Crum this analysis is certainly convincing,
but in most cases the injured party would readily accommodate
the insured and allege a claim within the policy coverage, for a
judgment against a solvent insurance company usually assures
collection. Furthermore, the discovered facts are not often likely
to be as plain as in Crum; the facts themselves may be difficult
to establish or there may be a question whether the facts as established present a claim within the policy language. To require the
insurer to defend any suit that the insured claims is within the
policy coverage ignores the underlying basis for the defense clause
and places the insurer in a severe tactical plight. The defense
clause is in the insurance contract not because the insured bargained for it, but because the insurer sought to control litigation
that might result in its liability.' If the insurer, however, defend
an action that might not in fact be within the coverage, the insurer
would possibly be estopped from denying lack of coverage.' 0 Since
the insurer is not as a matter of course entitled to either defend the
action under a non-waiver agreement 1'7 or stay the action until it
can secure a declaratory judgment defining its duty to defend,' 8
at the outset of the action it must decide whether to lose control
of the litigation or defend and perhaps be estopped from denying
non-coverage.
Once the insurer undertakes to defend the action, a complex
problem of conflicting interests between the insured and insurer
emerges. The insured aims for either nonliability or coverage to
be proved, while the insurer strives to prove either nonliability or
14. See Lee v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 178 F.2d 750, 752--53 (2d Cir. 1949);
30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1019, 1021 (1955); 103 U. PA. L. REv. 445, 4,6-47 (1954).
Where the insurer does not defend, some courts have stated that the insurer is precluded from contesting coverage under the policy in a later action
by a judgment in a trial between the injured party and the insured. Millcr
v. United States Fidel. & Cas. Co., 291 Mass. 445, 197 N.E. 75 (1935); Jackson v. Maryland Cas. Co., 212 NC. 546, 193 S.E. 703 (1937). But see Bettinger v. Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co., 218 F.2d 200 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 856 (1954) (applying Minnesota law).
15. Cf. 7A APPI mAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at § 4681, at 423.
16. See Nikkari v. Jackson, 226 Minn. 393, 33 N.W.2d 36 (1948); Ziegler
v. Ryan, 66 S.D. 491, 285 N.W. 875 (1939).
17. See Goldberg v. Lumber Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 297 N.Y. 148, 77 N.E.2d
131 (1948); Note, 2 STAN. L. REv. 383, 384-88 (1950).
18. See Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co. v. DeLozier, 213 N.C. 334, 196 S.E.
318 (1938); Note, 2 STAN. L. REv. 383, 388-91 (1950).
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non-coverage. Upon the discovery of actual facts that remove an
action from the coverage of the defendant insured's policy, the insurer may withdraw from the case;' 9 therefore, the conflict arises
whether the jurisdiction follows the majority rule or the minority
rule - the conflict is a natural concomitant of the scheme. The
Minnesota Court suggested that the solution to this problem is a
recognition of insurance counsel's duty to the insured: Where a
conflict exists between the interests of the insurer and the insured,
insurance counsel cannot take a position vis-a-vis the injured party adverse to'the iiiterests of the insureaY06
Again the Court's solution is reasonable within the facts of
Crum. In a case, however, that presents a close question of policy
coverage - either because of disputed facts or because of ambiguous policy language - the Court's approach appears to force the
insurer to make an absolute and irrevocable decision as to whether
it will defend and be estopped from aserting non-coverage or lose
control over the litigation.

B.

TWsunn's R1UGHT TO SUBROGATION BARRED BY
STATUTE OF LIMTATIONS

The workmen's compensation statutes of most states permit
an employee who receives an injury covered by worlanen's compefisation to pursue both his statutory and common-law remedies. ' The Minnesota statute provides in part:
19. In Weis v.State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 242 imi. 141, 64 N.W.2d
the Mmnesota Court allowed an insurer to withdraw where the
actual facts, contrary to the complaint, showed non-coverage. Cf. Bobich v.
Oja, 258 M iu. 287,104 N.W.2d 19 (1960).
Another situation of conflict occurs where the injured party alleges two
theorie.s, one within and one without coverage. The insurer must defend the
whole case. Christian v. Rlyal Ins. Co., 185 Mlinn. 180, 240 N.W. 365 (1932).
20.
As Jong as we follow the practice under which an insurer in this type
of action may not be joined as a party defendant, an attorney retained
by an insurer to defend its insured, so long as he represents the insured, is under the same obligations of fidelity and good faith as if the
insured had retained the attorney personally.
119 N.W.2d at 712. See also Newcomb v. Meiss, 263 Iinn. 315, 116 N.W.2d
593 (1962); American Employers Ins. Co. v. Goble Aircraft Specialties, Inc.
,05 Ais. 1066,131 N.Y.Sad 393 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
- 21. See ,generally James, Social Insurance and Tort Liability: The Problem of Alternative Remedies, 27 N.Y.U.. Rav. 537 (1952); McCoid, The
Third Person in the Compensation Picture: A Study of the Liabilities and
Rights of Non-Employers, 37 Tx. L. P-v. 389 (1959); Note, 48 Gao. LJ.
761 (1960).
366 (1954),
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Where an injury or death for which compensation is payable is caused
under circumstances which created a legal liability for damages on the
part of a party other than the employer ... legal proceedings may be
taken by the employee or his dependents against the other party to rethe payment by the employer or his
cover damages, notwithstanding
22
liability to pay compensation.
Further, in Minnesota the employer may deduct from the compensation payable by him any amount that the employee recovers
from the tort-feasor; or, if workmen's compensation were paid to
the employee, the employer is subrogated to the employee's claim
against the tort-feasor. 23 The Minnesota Court has extended this

statutory right so as to subrogate the employer's insurer as well."4

A problem might arise under this statutory-common-law
scheme where the employee settles with the tort-feasor and signs a
release without the employer's or his insurer's consent. 25 The set-

tlement and release, at common law, would cut off the employer's right of subrogation, although
be released from later liability to
men's compensation statutes silent
settlements were made without the

the employer would therefore
the employee.2 Under workas to the partys' rights where
consent of the employer, how-

22. Mwnq. STAT. § 176.061(5) (1961). Subdivisions 1, 2, 3, and 4 apply
only where the employer and the party legally liable are engaged in the furtherance of a common enterprise or the accomplishment of related purposes on
the premises. See McCourtie v. United States Steel Corp., 253 Minn. 501, 93
N.W.2d 552 (1958).
23.
If the action against such other party is brought by the injured employee or his dependents and a judgment is obtained and paid and settlement is made with the other party, the employer may deduct from
the compensation payable by him the amount actually received by the
employee or dependents after deducting costs, reasonable attorney's
fees, and reasonable expenses incurred by the employee or dependents
If the injured emin making collections or enforcing liability ....
ployee or his dependents agree to receive compensation from the employer or institute proceedings to recover the same or accept from the
employer any payment on account of such compensation, the employer
is subrogated to the rights of the employee or his dependents.
Mri x. STAT. § 176.061(5) (1961).
24. Wandersee v. Brellenthin Chevrolet Co., 258 Minn. 19, 102 N.W.2d 514
(1960); Dockendorf v. Lakie, 251 Minn. 148, 86 N.W.2d 728 (1957); Lang v.
William Bros. Boiler & Mfg. Co., 250 Minn. 521, 85 N.W.2d 412 (1957), 42
MINx. L. REv. 678 (1958). But cf. Orth v. Shiely Petter Crushed Stone Co.,
253 Minn. 142, 91 N.W.2d 463 (1958) (dictum), 43 MirN. L. Rav. 170.
25. See Note, 48 GEO. LJ. 761, 775-77 (1960); 42 MINN. L. REv. 678, 679
(1958).
26. Conard v. Moreland, 230 Iowa 520, 298 N.W. 628 (1941); Packham v.
German Fire Ins. Co., 91 Md. 515, 46 Atl. 1066 (1900); 55 Cotrm. L. Rv.
1076 (1955).
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ever, most courts have rejected the common-law doctrine; rather,
they have held that the employer or insurer still has a valid claim
against the tort-feasor and that the employee may still collect the
workmen's compensation payable to him less his settlement."
This result is plainly consistent with the policies underlying the
statutes: The employee should only be able to collect either workmen's compensation or tort damages, whichever is greater, thus
avoiding both a double recovery by the injured party28 and a
fortuitous meed to the tort-feasor through the workmen's compensation act.2 9

In American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. 'v. Reed Cleaner3 0 an employee of the insured sustained an injury covered by the Workmen's Compensation Act. The employee settled and released the
tort-feasor without the insurer's consent and without informing
the tort-feasor that his injury was covered by workmen's compensation. Four years after the accident plaintiff insurer received
notice that the employee had filed a claim for workmen's compensation; ' three years after that and a year after the statute of limitations on the employee's tort claim had run, the referee's findings
and the determination awarding benefits were filed. The employer
then served a complaint on the tort-feasor. The employer's insurer
was later substituted as plaintiff in the action. The insurer argued
27. Lang v. William Bros. Boiler &Mfg. Co., 250 ann. 521, 85 N.W-2d
412 (1957); Hugh Murphy Constr. Co. v. Serck, 104 Neb. 398, 177 N.W. 747
(1920); Doyle v. Teasdale, 263 Wis. 328, 57 N.W.2d 381 (1953). Some courts
apply common-law doctrine in a workmen's compensation setting. See White
v. New Mexico Highway Comm'n, 42 N.M. 626, 83 P.2d 457 (1938). Others
reason that the release has no effect. See Powe v. Jackson, 230 'As. 11, 109
So. 2d 546 (1959). Others do not bar the employee's workmen's compensation
right but permit the employer only a credit for the amount of the settlement.
See R. E. Spriggs, Inc. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 42 Cal. 2d 785, 269 P.2d
876 (1954).

28. See Wandersee v. Brellenthin Chevrolet Co., 258 Minn. 19, 102 N.W.2d
514 (1960); McCoid, =lira note 21, at 482.
29. See McCoid, supranote 21, at 451.
30. 122 N.Wed 178 (Minn. 1963).
31. The court's opinion does not make clear what caused the delayed notice to the insurer. Mnm. SAT. § 176.141 (1961) provides that unless knowledge or notice of injury is received by the employer within 90 days of
the injury, the employee is not entitled to compensation. Mnm;. STAT. §
176.185(4)(1) (1961) provides for a compulsory provision in insurance policies
to the effect that notice to or knowledge by the employer is notice to or
knowledge by the insurer. The cause of plaintiff's ignorance for such a long
period of time would therefore seem to be the employer's failure to pass the

employee's claim on to its insurer. Assuming that notice of the injury were
seasonably given to the employer, it is not unlikely that such notice would
not include the fact that a negligent third party was involved.
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that its action was one for indemnification which arose upon the
finding that workmen's compensation was due the employee. The
Minnesota Court held, however, that the insurer's right was one
of subrogation and that because a subrogee has no greater rights
than the subrogor, the claim was barred by the six-year statute of
2
limitationsf
As it seemed clear that the insurer's claim of subrogation would
be barred, the plaintiff sought to persuade the Court that Lang v.
William Bros. Boiler & Mfg. Co2 was controlling. In that case,
which involved the nature and extent of an insurer's rights against
a tort-feasor, the Minnesota Court declined to apply the commonlaw rule of subrogation to cut off the insurer's claim and referred
to the insurer's right as one of "indemnification." Further, the
Court apparently granted the insurer a "quasi-contractual right"
32. Arguably, since the courts are willing to abrogate the common-law rule
by permitting subrogation even after a release, they should be equally willing
to give the subrogee the full benefit of the right and begin the statute of limitations running at the time of adjudication of the insurer's liability to the injured party. Such an argument must, of course, be balanced against the policy
underlying the statute of limitations -preventing litigation of "stale" claims
- and the desire to protect the person with whom the injured party settled
and released.
The Court's clear holding on the issue of the statute of limitations in Reed
Cleaners was clouded by its distinction of Lang v. William Bros. Boiler & Mfg.
Co., 250 Minn. 521, 85 N.W.2d 412 (1957), on the ground that in Lang, the
tort-feasor knew of the presence of insurer and his subrogation right at the
time of settlement, whereas in Reed Cleaners, the third party was entirely unaware of any possible liability to another party.
The Court, in Lang, intimated that the presence of the insurer in the case
before settlement should be irrelevant. The dictum arose within a discussion
of Patterson v. O'Neil, 151 Minn. 15, 185 N.W. 948 (1921). In that case, the
employee settled with the third party before the insurer intervened in the suit.
The employee then claimed his workmen's compensation. The Court hold that
he was entitled to compensation payments minus the settlement amount and
then went on to state in dictum that the employer had lost his subrogation
rights. After discounting that language in Patterson,the Court stated in Lang:
The case probably is distinguishable from the one now before us on the
ground that, in the Patterson case, the employer had not intervened or
asserted his rights in any way, although failure to do so prior to a settlement, in the absence of estoppel or laches, should not be held to bar

such rights.
250 Minn. at 530-31, 85 N.W.2d at 419. The element of the third party's
knowledge raises two questions: what will the result be in a case where the insurer brings a complaint within the time allotted by the statute of limitations
against a third party who procured a release without knowledge of the insurer's possible presence, and what result will obtain when an insurer serves a
complaint after the running of the statute on a third party who had knowledge
of the insurer's presence.
83. 250 Minn. 521, 85 N.W.2d 412 (1957).
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to indemnification for future payments 4
Indemnification is an independent right existing between two
parties who owe the same obligation, one being primarily liable
and the other secondarily liable. Upon discharge of the duty by
the party secondarily liable, a right of indemnification arises in
his favor against the person primarily liableY5 Subrogation, however, is a derivative right, which transfers the rights that an injured party has against the one primarily liable to the party who
has compensated the injured party"' - the party primarily liable
and the subrogee need not owe the injured party the same duty.
The employer's statutory liability for injuries sustained in the
course of employment is clearly not coextensive with the tortfeasor's liability. Moreover, the Court has repeatedly noted that the
38
statute 7 explicitly grants the employer a right of subrogation
Therefore, the Court certainly had a sound conceptual basis for
identifying the insurer's right as one of subrogation;3 9 however,
the Reed Cleanersdecision placed ultimate liability for the injury
on the employer, which is contrary to the policy underlying the
40
statute.
The equities of Reed Cleaner8 are evenly balanced. The defendant tort-feasor settled the employee's claim approximately
one year after the collision, and as far as is apparent from the trial
court's findings of fact, the tort-feasor regarded the matter as completely closed until it was served with this complaint. On the other
hand, the referee's determination was not filed until after the stat34. See 42 Mnm. L. R11v. 678, 681 (1958). Although Lang may be read
either to create a new cause of action each time a future payment is made by
the insurer or merely to consider future payments as an element of damages
in the present suit, the latter appears to be the more reasonable interpretation.
Also, Lang may be distinguished from Re,cL Claers on the ground that the
tort-feasor in the former case had knowledge of the insurer's interest in the
action that was settled. See note 31 supra.
35. See R STATmW=, RESTrrUON § 76 (1937).
36. See mAins, SUBROaATION §§ 4-6 (1889); SMMEoX, SuaoaATION § 2-03
(2d ed. 1893).
37. M mns.
STAT. § 176.061(5) (1961), set forth in note 22 .upra.
38. E.g., City of Red Wing v. Eichinger, 163 Minn. 54, 56, 203 N.W. 622,
623 (1925); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. St. Paul Gas Light Co., 152 MAinn. 197, 199,
188 N.W. 265, 266 (1922).
89. The majority of courts have identified the right as subrogation. E.g.,
Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc, v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines, Inc., 251 F2d
97 (10th Cir. 1957); Exchange Mut. Indem. Ins. Co. v. Central Hudson Gas &
Elec. Co., 243 N.Y. 75, 152 N.E. 470 (1926). However, a few courts have
spoken in terms of a right to indemnity. E.g., Travelers In. Co. v. Northwest
Airlines, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 620 (W.D. W's 1950), 35 MmN-. L. Ray. 684 (1951).
40. See text accompanying notes 27-e8 supra.
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ute of limitations had run, and even though the Court criticized
both the employer and insurer for not taking action at the time
the employee filed his claim, apparently there was no action that
they could take. Although it is unclear in Minnesota,4 a claim
generally does not accrue to the employer at least until a judgment under the Workmen's Compensation Act has been entered
against him. 42 As a result, the plaintiff insurer would probably not
have had standing to either sue the defendant tort-feasor or even
seek a declaratory judgment before the Industrial Commission
had awarded workmen's compensation benefits.
The Court's holding in Reed Cleaners on the subrogation issue
seems to accord with both Minnesota precedent and the results in
other jurisdictions. 43 While this result might do an injustice to insurers, most courts have reasoned that, in light of statutory language granting only "subrogation," the legislature is the proper
body to give insurers the right of indemnity." Assuming that the
employee's workmen's compensation claim is preserved, if the insurer were not permitted to sue the tort-feasor, the employee
stands to recover and at the same time the tort-feasor's liability
is discharged; such a result could arguably lead to fraud and collusion between injured employees and their tort-feasors. Admittedly, if the tort-feasor were in fact unaware of the insurer's
subrogation claim and the insurer were permitted to sue, the tortfeasor would be inequitably prejudiced, but only to the extent
that he relied on the finality of the settlement with the injured
party. Absent such reliance, the tort-feasor is in no worse position
than one who has been subjected to suit by the insurer within the
statute of limitations.
41. The wording of the statute, that "if the injured employee or his dependents agree to receive compensation from the employer or institute proceedings to recover the same or accept from the employer any payment on account of such compensation, the employer is subrogated . . . ." might suggest
that the employer's right accrues earlier than judgment of an award. MINN.
STAT. § 176.061(5) (1961). However, the Court has never passed on this question, and dictum in one case suggests otherwise. City of Red Wing v. Eichinger, 163 Minn. 54, 56, 203 N.W. 622, 623 (1925).

42. E.g., Bauer v. Rusetos & Co., 306 I. 602, 607-08, 188 N.E. 206, 208
(1923) (dictum); Alford v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 202 N.C. 719, 720, 164 S.E.
125, 126 (1932).
43. E.g., Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Chicago Rys., 307 Il. 322, 138 N.E.
658 (1932); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. St. Paul Gas Light Co., 152 Minn. 197, 188
N.W. 265 (1922); 26 MINN. L. REV. 768 (1942).
44. E.g., Exchange Mut. Indem. Ins. Co. v. Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Co., 243 N.Y. 75, 152 N.E. 470 (1926); see Campbell, Subrogationunder Workmen's Compensation- Too Much or Too Little, 18 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 225,
242-45 (1940).
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VI.

A.

JURISDICTION

FOREIGN TRUSTEES AiENABLE TO PERSONAL SERVICE
OF PROCESS

Historically, the personal jurisdiction of a state was based on
its sovereign power over persons by virtue of their presence,' their
domicile,2 their consent,3 their appearance, 4 or their action5 within
the state. Corporations, where acting outside the state of incorporation, however, did not have a legal existence and therefore could
not fit any of these categories of personal jurisdiction Yet corporations are guaranteed due process of law and personal judgments
could not be entered against them unless the court had personal
jurisdiction Therefore, although a corporation had been permitted
the privileges and benefits of doing business within a foreign state,"
it was not subject to suit therein.
To secure personal jurisdiction over a corporation that was
doing intrastate business within one state although incorporated
in another, states enacted statutes requiring corporations to expressly or impliedly consent to suit within the state as a condition
for doing business This statutory requirement, however, could
not provide a means of obtaining jursidiction over corporations
engaged in interstate business without placing an unconstitutional
burden on interstate commerce; as a result, the courts developed
the presence theory of jurisdiction over foreign corporations. The
theory was based on the fiction that a corporation was a legal person; thus, a corporation, like a natural person, would be subject to
the jurisdiction of a foreign state whenever it was "present."1 0 The
United States Supreme Court, however, rejected the presence the1. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
2. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
3. Gilbert v. Burnstine, 255 N.Y. 348, 174 N.E. 706 (1931).

4. York v. Texas, 137 US. 15 (1890).
5. Hess v. Pawloskd, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
6. See Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 588 (1839).
7. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. v. Beck'with, 129 U.S. 26 (1889); see Santa
Clara County v. Southern Pac. R1R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
8. Corporations are not entitled to the guarantees of the privileges and
immunities clause, which is applicable only to citizens. Paul v. Virginia, 75
US. (8 Wall.) 168, 178-82 (1869). States could therefore exclude foreign
corporations.
9. See Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.. (18 Row.) 404 (1850) (judgment of Ohio court entered against Indiana corporation in an action where
Ohio court took jurisdiction on basis of a "consent" statute must be given
full faith and credit).
10. Philadelphia &R. Ry. v. Mcibben, 243 U.S. 264 (1917).
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ory, in InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington," because the determination of whether a corporation was present for purposes of the
due process clause begged the question -"presence" was merely
descriptive of the activities within the state that were deemed
sufficient to satisfy due process. 12 As an alternative, the Court suggested that a corporation would be subject to personal jurisdiction, although not served within the state, whenever the corporation has had sufficient contacts with the state so that maintenance
of the suit would not offend "fair play and substantial justice."1
The doctrine of InternationalShoe has been expanded to confer
jurisdiction over nonresident corporations having only the most
minimal contacts with the forum state. 4 The major inquiries now
are whether the plaintiff has a legitimate interest in securing relief
in the selected forum and whether the choice of forum imposes an
unreasonable burden on the nonresident defendant. 3 Although the
development of the InternationalShoe doctrine has been in the
context of jurisdiction over corporations, there are now indications that this due process standard may also be applicable to
individuals.'
In Danov v. ABC Freight Forwarding Co.,'7 the Minnesota
Court considered whether it could constitutionally enter a personal judgment against nonresident trustees. An ex-employee sued
his former corporate employer and the trustees of a profit-sharing
trust, alleging that he was entitled to a distribution of trust assets.
11. 826 U.S. 810 (1945).
12. Id. at 316-17.
13. Id. at 816.
14. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), which required only a minimal isolated activity, has resulted in near nationwide
service of process for many insurance companies. In such cases a finding of
no jurisdiction would deny residents their only forum although suit in a
foreign state would not cause undue inconvenience to the defendant. Cf. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), although
arguably sui generis since the determination involved a common trust fund
and thereby an unusually large number of interested parties, this case stressed
mainly the importance of "notice" in determining the jurisdictional issue. See
also text accompanying note 23 infra. The federal standard of "fair play and
substantial justice" has been accepted in Minnesota. Paulos v. Best Sees., Inc.,
260 Minn. 288, 109 N.W.2d 576 (1961).
15. See Carrington, The Modem Utility of Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction, 76
HAv. L. Rsv. 803, 306 (1962). It should be noted, however, that the United
States Supreme Court recently stated that it still required that the defendant
have some contact with the forum before jurisdiction over him could constitutionally be exercised. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958); see note
28 infra.
16. See text accompanying notes 22-26 infra.
17. 122 N.W.2d 776 (Minn. 1968).
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Although the corporate employer was subject to suit in Minnesota
because of its substantial contacts arising out of its Minnesota
business, the principal parties in interest, the trustees, were domiciled in New York and the situs of the trust was New York. The
trustees contended that the Minnesota Court could not, therefore,
constitutionally adjudicate their rights. The Court held that because of the corporate defendant's obligations under the trust
agreement, it was a Minnesota agent of the trustees; therefore, the
trustees were amenable to personal service in Minnesota.
The Court in Danov had a sound basis for holding that the
corporation was the agent of the trust. The corporation was obligated to hire employees, determine their eligibility to participate
in the plan, submit information to the trustees, and exercise judgment in terminating employment. This being the case, the trust
was doing sufficient business within the state through its agent to
give the Minnesota courts statutory jurisdiction. 8 Also, the activi18. The Court's finding that the corporation was the agent of the trustees
made the nonresident trustees amenable to personal service in Mnnesota by
virtue of Mmrs. STAT. § 540.152 (1961), which provides that:
The transaction of any acts, business, or activities within the State
of Minnesota by any officer, agent, representative, employee or member
of any union or other groups or associations... shall be deemed an
appointment by such union or other groups or associations of the secretary of state of the State of Minnesota to be the true and lawful attorney of such union or other groups or associations, upon whom may be
served all legal processes or notices in any action or proceeding against
or involving said union or other groups or associations growing out of
such acts, business, or activities within the State of Minnesota ....
Although this statute seemed to be designed primarily for labor organizations,
it was interpreted by a federal court to pertain as well to a nonresident partnership. Minnesota Wood Specialties, Inc. v. George S. May Co., 117 F.
Supp. 601 (D. Mlnn. 1954). This construction was justified on the bases that
the use of disjunctive language indicated the intent of the legislature not to
limit the statute to labor organizations, that the language of the Uniform
Partnership Act defines a partnership as "an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit," and that such a result
"satisfies natural justice." Id. at 60- n3. In State v. Ritholz, 257 Minn. 201,
100 N.W.2d 722 (1960), this rationale was approved by the Minnesota Court,
which stressed the definition in the Uniform Act but omitted the argument
based on "natural justice!' In Danov the Court extended the statutory construction to include nonresident trustees.
The Court might also have exercised jurisdiction over the trustees by virtue of Mnu. STAT. § 531.05(2) (1961) on the theory that the trust itself
was property within the State. See text accompanying notes 22-26 infra.
Arguably, a court may exercise jurisdiction as long as it does not violate
due process to do so, thus avoiding the necessity of fitting the parties within
the particular language of a jurisdiction statute. But cf. Wuchter v. Pizzutti,

276 U.S. 1 (1928).
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ties of the corporate agent in Minnesota would have satisfied the
"substantial connection" standard, so that the Minnesota courts
had constitutional jurisdiction over an action arising out of those
contacts.1 9
The plaintiff had asserted that the Minnesota courts had jurisdiction over the trustees on the basis of the corporation's complete
control of the trustees. Although the Court resolved the jurisdictional issue on the ground that the corporation was the agent of
the trustees, the plaintiff's argument seems to have some merit.
Since the corporation's employment practices benefited from the
activities of the profit-sharing trust that were carried on in Minnesota and with Minnesota residents, the corporation should bear
any resulting liability. If, as plaintiff alleged, a corporation exercises "control" over a related subsidiary organization whose activities give rise to a cause of action, the separation should be ignored
for jurisdictional purposes. The trustees in Danov were also officers of the corporation, and therefore, there is a strong possibility
that such control existed. Thus, as the corporation had undoubtedly enjoyed "the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum State,"20 the Minnesota courts should not be denied jurisdiction over the trustees. 21
Arguably, the trustees could have been subject to personal
service in Minnesota even if the trust were considered to be an
independent entity. An adjudication of the rights in a trust has
traditionally been based on in rem jurisdiction, which required a
finding that the situs of the res is the forum.2 2 In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 8 the United States Supreme
Court suggested, however, that due process did not depend on the
categorization of jurisdiction as in rem or inpersonam, but that
the test should be based on a weighing of conflicting interests.24
The Mullane approach was applied in Atkinson v. Superior Court,"
19. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
20. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
21. The argument has not, however, been received favorably by the
courts. See Echeverry v. Kellogg Switchboard & Supply Co., 175 F.2d 900
(2d Cir. 1949); Hudson Minneapolis, Inc. v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 124 F.
Supp. 720 (D. Minn. 1954). But see Foster, Personal Jurisdiction Based on
Local Causes of Action, 1956 Wis. L. R.v.522, 563, and cases cited nn.149-51.
22. Developments in the Law -State-Court
Jurisdiction, 73 HAIV. L.
REv. 909, 960 (1960). But see Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1957) (jurisdiction over trustees is sufficient).
23. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
24. Id. at 313.
25. 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957), appeal dismissed and cert. denied
sub nor . Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Atkinson, 357 U.S. 569 (1958).
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in which the California Supreme Court determined that California
courts had jurisdiction over a New York trust fund. The court ignored the concept of "situs of the trust" and relied on local contacts that satisfied "fair play and substantial justice"- a test
usually reserved for in personam jurisdiction2
In Atdnson the plaintiff sued to enjoin his employer from
making payments to a trust, pursuant to an agreement between
the employer and the union, until the completion of plaintiff's
pending suit against the union - the trustee was a necessary
party to the action for injunction. The facts that the employer's
obligations to the trust arose out of plaintiff's California employment, that the work giving rise to the payments was done in California, and that the principal defendant and the employer-stakeholder were before the court were cited in favor of taking jurisdiction.?7 In Danov the funds similarly moved from Minnesota to
New York according to an agreement entered into in Minnesota;
upon plaintiff's discharge, the funds were supposed to move back
into Minnesota pursuant to the same agreement; the trust res
consisted partly of plaintiff's contributions from Minnesota earnings; and the relationship between the trust and the corporation
indicated that the trust was enjoying the privileges of doing business in Minnesota. The analysis of the trustees' contacts with
Minnesota in Danov clearly indicates even a stronger basis for
asserting jurisdiction than in Atkinson itself?8
Jurisdiction has also been determined by considering the type
26. 49 Cal. 2d at 345, 316 Pad at 964. In New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 US. 518 (1916), the United States Supreme Court established that
although a state may assert jurisdiction over the property of a nonresident
that is within the forum and may apply that property to satisfy a claim
against the nonresident, the state has no jurisdiction to adjudicate adverse
rights in that property. Thus, even if the court in Atkinson had jurisdiction
over the res, it should not have been able to adjudicate the interests of the
foreign trustees in the res. Dunlevy, however, has perhaps been transcended
by the expanding concept of personal jurisdiction. Currie, Justice Traynor and
the Conflict of Laws, 13 STMw. L. REv. 719, 774 (1901); Developments in lhe
Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. REv. 909, 960 (1960); see text
accompanying notes 9-15 supra.

27. 49 Cal. Rd at 347, 316 P.2d at 966.
28. In Hanson v. Denka, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), the United States Supreme
Court apparently rejected the Atkinson approach and held that Florida did
not have jurisdiction over a Delaware corporate trustee. Yet, on the facts,
Atkinson and Hanson are not irreconcilable- the former presented the
stronger case for jurisdiction. See Developments in tie Law-State-Court
Jurisdiction, 73 HAuv. L. REv. 909, 903-65 (1960). Also, the Supreme Court
declined to review Atkinson subsequent to the Hanson determination. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Atkdnson, 357 U.S. 569 (1958).
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of action involved and the interest of the forum in the outcome
of the litigation.29 In Danov, the Minnesota interest was to protect the rights of a resident individual involving a relatively small
claim that might have gone unredressed if the forum had not exercised its jurisdiction. 0 Moreover, Minnesota was a convenient
forum and the trustees should have contemplated being imposed
upon to litigate claims arising in that state.
Thus, it appears that the Minnesota Court could have premised its jurisdiction on various theories. In addition to holding
that the corporation was the agent of the trust, the Court could
have held that the corporation and the trust were in fact only one
entity, thereby giving rise to personal jurisdiction since the corporation conducted substantial business in Minnesota. Although
the United States Supreme Court has not passed on the Atkinson
theory, the expanding nature of personal jurisdiction over individuals and corporations indicates that such a result might well
be approved by the Court.
B.

JumsmcTioN Ovim FoimIGN Buym
VioLATmv OF Dtn IocEss

CoRronAtioN

Defendant, an Ohio corporation, had written to several Minnesota firms inviting business negotiations, and in response, plaintiff corporation", sent its agent to defendant's place of business to
discuss terms. An agreement was reached, merchandise was ordered, and delivery was effected in Ohio. Defendant later refused
to pay certain promissory notes executed pursuant to the transaction and plaintiff sued on the notes in Minnesota. On appeal
from a denial of defendant's motion to quash service of process
and dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction, the Minnesota
Court held, in Fourth Northwestern Nat'l Bank v. Hilson Indus.,
Inc.,82 that the requirements for jurisdiction over a nonresident
corporate defendant had not been satisfied; therefore, service of
29. This is particularly true in an extensively mobile and well-regulated
business such as insurance. See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 855
U.S. 220 (1957); Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia ex rel. State Corp.
Comm'n, 839 U.S. 643 (1950). It could be argued that the trust fund in Danov
should be treated in the same manner for it provides a form of unemployment insurance in conjunction with the Minnesota system of compensation.
30. See note 37 infra.

31. The named plaintiff in this action was the Fourth Northwestern National Bank. Atland Manufacturing Co. negotiated notes to the bank, which
are the subject matter of this suit. The bank reassigned the notes to Atland
[hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff corporation) whom the parties have
treated as the proper substituted plaintiff under M-um. R. Cry. P. 25.03.
32. 117 N.W.2d 732 (Minn. 1962).
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process violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Further, the Court stated that even if jurisdiction could
have been constitutionally asserted, Minnesota was an inconvenient forum and the action could have been dismissed on the
basis of forum non conveniewn.
Before a court can enter a personal judgment against a corporation, of course, it must have jurisdiction; otherwise, the adjudication would deny the corporation due process of law.a The
Minnesota due process clause has been interpreted to be coextensive with the federal due process standards as set out by the
United States Supreme Court in InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington 4 the corporation's contacts with the forum state must be
of such a nature that maintenance of a suit will not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."33 The Minnesota statute providing for jurisdiction over foreign corporations,
states:
If a foreign corporation makes a contract with a resident of Minnesota to be performed in whole or in part by either party in mnnesota
...
such acts shall be deemed to be doing business in Minnesota [and
shall subject that corporation to personal service in Minnesota for] ...
any actions or proceedings against the foreign corporation arising from
or growing out of such a contract . .

.

The question, then, is whether the jurisdictional statute applies
to the facts of Hilson and if so, whether the defendant had sufficient contacts with Minnesota so that an adjudication of its
rights in a Minnesota court would not offend due process of law.
Arguably, the reason Minnesota seeks jurisdiction over foreign
corporations is to protect Minnesota residents, by providing a
means of redress in local courts, from faulty products that might be
sold in Minnesota.3 7 If the law were otherwise and the claim were
33. See note 7 supra.
34. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). In Schilling v. Roux Distrlib. Co., 240 MAn. 71,
59 N.W.2d 907 (1953), the Court considered in detail the question of whether
it could assert jurisdiction over a foreign corporation and the theoretical
bases for doing so. The Court applied the Irrernatonwl Shoe standard; hence,
there do not appear to be any state due process restrictions greater than those
required by the federal constitution.

35. 326 U.S. at 316.
36. Mumi.

STAT. § 303.13(1)(3) (1961).

87. See Atklins v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 258 Minn. 571, 580, 104
N.W.2d 888, 894 (1960):
While recognizing the merit of protecting rights of foreign corporations not doing business here, we feel that such considerations are outweighed by the general objective of our single-act statute, that is to
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small or the injured resident were in poor financial condition, the
wrong might not be remedied. In Hilson, however, the plaintiff
corporation presumably was sophisticated in business dealings
and could foresee and sustain the burden of a foreign suit. Thus,
in view of the underlying policy of the statute, perhaps it should
3 s
not be applied to benefit the plaintiff in Ililson.
Limiting the statute to suits against sellers of goods entering
Minnesota would also deny the benefit of the statute to Minnesota sellers who had made contracts with foreign corporations for
the sale of goods."' If any casual foreign purchaser of Minnesota
goods were subjected to suit in Minnesota, the domestic seller
would be in such an advantageous bargaining position that it is
not unlikely that foreign purchasers would curtail their buying
activities within the state. This fact has been recognized by other
jurisdictions; for example, in Conn v. Whitmore,40 cited by the
Court in Hilson 41 the Supreme Court of Utah refused to give full
faith and credit to an Illinois judgment entered against a Utah
buyer that was obtained under a statute similar to Minnesota's.4 2
The court expressly recognized that to permit a state to exercise
jurisdiction over casual nonresident buyers would ultimately dispermit a Minnesota citizen injured here by the wrongful act of a foreign
corporation to seek recompense therefor in our courts.
The statute, however, applies only to foreign corporations and not to nonresident individuals merely passing through the state. Minnesota also has a
statute providing for service of process over nonresident motorists who are
involved in accidents within the state. MmNN. STAT. § 170.55 (1961).
38. Domestic corporations are, of course, entitled to the protection of the
statute as are natural persons. See Dahlberg Co. v. Western Hearing Aid
Center, Ltd., 259 Minn. 30, 107 N.W.2d 381, cert. denied, 366 U.S. 961
(1961). However, facts such as business sophistication and ability to sustain a
foreign suit might mitigate in favor of disclaiming jurisdiction. See note 15
supra and accompanying text.
59. The courts' trend towards the relaxation of the amount of contact
with the state required to obtain jurisdiction over the seller has not been
paralled where buying is the activity concerned. See Waltham Precision Instrument Co. v. McDonnell Aircraft Corp., 203 F. Supp. 539, 541 (D. Mass.
1962). Otherwise, the buyer, assuming knowledge of the law, might avoid
products from the forum state. Subjecting the seller to the possibility of suit,
however, is the price for the protection and benefit received from the foreign
state. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958); 100 U. PA. L. REV.
598, 601 (1952).
40. 9 Utah 2d 250, 342 P.2d 871 (1959).
41. 117 N.W.2d at 736.
42. Accord, Allied Fin. Co. v. Prosser, 103 Ga. App. 538, 119 S.E.2d 813
(1961); O'Hagan v. Caballero, 52 N.Y.S.2d 863 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 269 App.
Div. 981, 59 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1945); cf. Waltham Precision Instrument Co. v.
McDonnell Aircraft Corp., 203 F. Supp. 539 (D. Mass. 1962).
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suade customers from doing business across state lines. Therefore,
where the plaintiff is a seller rather than a resident buyer, as was
the case in Hilson, the protective policy underlying the statute
is not applicable.43
The Minnesota Court, in Dahlberg Co. v. Western Hearing Aid
Center, Ltd.,4 considered the question of whether the statute
should be applied to a nonresident buyer in a suit by a resident
corporate plaintiff; it was held that there was proper service under
the statute4 1 The defendant in Dahlberg, however, had substantial contacts with Minnesota: the contract was executed in M'finnesota; notes were not only payable in Minnesota, but were also
executed and delivered there; several meetings between plaintiff
and defendant were held in Minnesota; the goods were delivered
f.o.b. Minnesota; and there was an extended course of business
dealings between the parties resulting from collaboration on advertising and promotion programs. In Hilson, the only contacts
the defendant had with Minnesota were the initial solicitation and
the designated place of payment of the notes. Thus, the Court
could have decided Hilson by reasoning that the legislature did
not intend the statute to provide for jurisdiction over a nonresident buyer having as few contacts with the state as the Hilson
defendant.
The InternationalShoe standard for due process has now been
expanded to require only the most minimal contacts with the
forum before jurisdiction may be constitutionally exercised 4 For
example, in McGee v. InternationalLife Ins. Co.,4T the United
States Supreme Court held that California could constitutionally
adjudicate the rights of a Texas insurance company that had no
office in California, solicited no business in California, and had
only one policy held by a California resident. This departure from
the strict jurisdictional requirements of Pennoyer v. Neff"8 appears to be justifiable since modern transportation and communication have made it much less burdensome for a party to defend
himself in a state where he engages in economic activity. Thus,
43. See Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 2060 US. 516 (19023);
A. G. Bliss Co. v. United Carr Fastener Co. of Canada, 116 F. Supp. 291 (D.
Mass. 1953); FLETCHcE, CORPORATI oNS § 8485 (rev. ed. 1960).
44. 259 Minn. 330, 107 N.W.2d 381, cert. denied, 360 U.S. 901 (1961).
45. Accord, Hub Mail Advertising Serv., Inc. v. Inter City Sales, Inc.,
340 Mass. 8, 162 NE.2d 760 (1959); cf. Melfi v. Goodman, 69 N.M. 488, 308
P.2d 582 (1962); Melvin Pine & Co. v. McConnell, 273 App. Div. 218, 76
N.Y.S.2d 279, af'd,298 N.Y. 27,80 NXE.2d 137 (1948).
46. See text accompanying notes 9-15 supra.
47. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
48. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). See notes 1-5 supra and accompanying text.
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the facts that the defendant corporation in Hilson had solicited
offers in Minnesota and had made notes payable in Minnesota
might satisfy the substantial contacts requirement of due process.
The Court's conclusion, however, that the defendant would be
denied due process if jurisdiction were assumed is not without
support. The United States Supreme Court, in Hanson v. Denokla,49 emphatically stated that it would be a mistake to assume
that the recent liberal trend of courts towards more readily assuming jurisdiction "heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts," for a defendant
may not be required to litigate in a foreign tribunal "unless he
has had the 'minimal contacts' with that State that are a prerequisite to its exercise of power over him." 0 The Minnesota
Court pointed out that the defendant in Hilson had not received
any of the benefits or protections offered by the forum nor had it
exercised any privilege giving rise to an obligation therein.," The
Court properly dismissed the only significant contact, the fact
that the notes were payable in Minnesota: "Fixing the place of
payment at plaintiff's business residence is hardly the kind of
commercial benefit to defendant that must be balanced by a
countervailing capitulation to jurisdiction.
...
"
Even if the statute could be constitutionally applied to make
the defendant amenable to service in Hilson, the Court indicated
that it would dismiss the action under the doctrine of forum non
convenien. This doctrine allows a court discretionary power to
decline jurisdiction wherever it appears that the cause may be
tried more conveniently elsewhere.5 4 The issue to have been adjudicated at the trial in Hilson was whether there was a breach
of warranty. The physical evidence relevant to the issue consisted
of heavy machinery that was in Ohio and would have needed
transport to Minnesota for the trial. Further, defense witnesses,
residing in the Ohio area, were not likely to come to Minnesota,
whereas they probably would have appeared in an Ohio adjudication. The Court also considered that since the plaintiff was a
49. 357 U.S. 285 (1958).
50. Id. at 251.
51. 117 N.W.2d at 784-85.
52. 117 N.W.2d at 736.
53. 117 N.W.2d at 786-37.
54. See Johnson v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 243 Minn. 58, 66 N.W.2d 763
(1954), for a discussion of the doctrine in Minnesota. See generally Barnett,
The Doctrine of Forum Non Convenienw, 35 CALip. L. REv. 880 (1947); Blair,
The Doctrine of Forum Non Convenien, in Anglo-American Law, 29 CoLivl.

L. Ruv. 1 (1929).
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corporation, it might better be able to sustain an action in a foreign jurisdiction than would an individualP5
Although the Court clearly reached the correct result, there
are several difficulties with basing the decision on forum non
conveniens. If a defense were frivolous, a dismissal on forum non
conveniens would inequitably deny access of residents to their own
forum even though jurisdiction could constitutionally be exercised.56 A forum, moreover, will rarely deny its own citizens access
to its courts and usually will refuse to entertain the action on7
forum no conveniens only when all parties are nonresidents.o
Also, the doctrine has been strictly applied in Minnesota and does
not seem to be in judicial favor. The better decision would be
either to find that the statute was not designed to protect the
plaintiff in Hilson, or to hold that jurisdiction could not be exercised without violating the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment 9
55. See note 88 supra and accompanying text. The effect of such a rationale
does not appear to have been considered with respect to a closely held corporation.
56. The Court in Hilson did not appear to doubt the veracity of Hilson
Industries' substantive defense. 117 N.W.2d at 737. See also authorities cited
note 54 supra.

57. See generally Note, 15 Mirm. L. Rlv. 83 (1930).
58. Minnesota courts were at one time bound to accept jurisdiction over
controversies any time the parties met the statutory requirements. Boright v.
Chicago RI. &P. Ry., 180 Mlinn. 52, 280 N.W. 457 (1930), 15 Mfnm-. L. lxEv.
115. In 1954, the Court overruled Boright in Johnson v. Chicago B. &Q.R.R.,
?43 Minn. 58, 66 N.W.2d 763 (1954), holding that the district courts may
exercise discretion to decline jurisdiction in some cases. However, in Hill v.
Upper Mississippi Towing Corp., 252 UMnn 165, 89 N.W.2d 654 (1958), 43
MINx. L. Itzv. 160, the Court limited Johnmon to cases in which the defendant
was amenable to involuntary service of process in a forum more convenient
than Ifnnesota. See generally Note, 43 BMnw. L. REv. 1199 (1959).
59. Defendant also argued that to exercise jurisdiction in this case would
unduly burden interstate commerce. Although the argument has been made
rather frequently, the United States Supreme Court has usually disposed of
it by considering whether the defendant has had sufficient contacts to warrant
the forum exercising jurisdiction. E.g., Denver & R.G.WIL v. Terte, 284
U.S. 284 (1932) (Suit against two railroads: one did not operate any line in
the forum state, but did own property, maintained offices, and employed
agents who solicited traffic while in the forum state; the other was licensed
to do business in the forum state and did in fact conduct business therein.
The Court held that the latter was subject to the forum's jurisdiction, but the
former was not.); Hoffman v. Mssouri ex rel. Foraker, 274 U.S. 21 (1927)
(Railroad was incorporated in forum state and owned and operated railroad
therein. The Court held that the state's exercise of jurisdiction was proper.);
Davis v. Farmers Co-op. Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312 (1923) (Railroad neither
owned nor operated railroad in forum - only maintained agent to solicit busi-
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SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

IMVMUNITY ABROGATED BY COURT THEN LEGISLATURE

Legal scholars en masse consider governmental tort immunity
to be archaic' - "whether this immunity is an absolute survival
of the monarchial privilege ...

or rests on abstract logical

grounds, . . . it undoubtedly runs counter to modern democratic
notions of the moral responsibility of the State." 2 Yet the doctrine

lingers still, although judicial' and legislative4 inroads have so riddled it with exceptions as to cause harsh inequities., Most courts
have declined to abolish governmental immunity completely, however, contending that this was a legislative and not a judicial function," while the legislatures have also failed to abrogate the immunity, apparently giving heed to the neglected problem of definness therein. The Court held that to exercise jurisdiction would violate the
commerce clause.). Thus, it would appear that if the corporation has had sufficient contacts to satisfy due process, there would be no violation of the commerce clause by exercising jurisdiction. See generally Farrier, Suits Againit
Foreign Corporationsas a Burden on Interstate Commerce, 17 MiNx. L. Ruv.
381 (1933).
1. For a survey of the literature, see Repko, American Legal Commentary
on the Doctrines of Municipal Tort Liability, 9 LAW & CONT&MP. PRon. 214
(1942).
2. Great No. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 59 (1944) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting). Historically, the doctrine of sovereign immunity stems from the
English king's personal immunity from the jurisdiction of the king's courts.
However, the application of the doctrine in the United States, where such a
prerogative is unknown, is "one of the mysteries of legal evolution." Borchard,
Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1924). In recent times, perhaps the only proponent of the doctrine has been Mr. Justice Holmes, who
philosophized that the sovereign was immune from suit "on the logical and
practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that
makes the law on which the right depends." Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205
U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
3. In Minnesota, for example, there is a judicially developed distinction
applied to municipal corporations between governmental functions, which are
immune from tort liability and proprietary functions, which are not. See Snider
v. City of St. Paul, 51 Minn. 466, 53 N.W. 763 (1892).
4. E.g., Minn. Laws 1961, ch. 230, § 3(4), which specifies that the procurement of insurance constitutes a waiver of the defense of governmental immunity to the extent of the coverage.
5. In Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 217-18, 350 P.2d
457, 460, 11 Cal. Rep. 89, 92 (1961), the court noted that the application of
the then existent California rule of sovereign immunity, which embodied the
governmental-proprietary distinction, would deny recovery to one injured in a
county hospital while allowing recovery to one injured in a city hospital.
6. See, e.g., Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 247-48, 111 N.W.2d
1, 8-9 (1961); cf. Fuller & Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation, 54
FIARv. L. Rnv. 437, 460-62 (1941).
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ing limits of liability. 7 The Minnesota Court had likewise indicated that the abolition of governmental immunity was a legislative task;8 nevertheless, in Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist.,'
the Court prospectively overruled this defense, except for discretionary acts and acts of the state itself, effective as of the adjournment of the 1963 Minnesota legislative session.
In reaction to the catalytic Spanet decision, the Minnesota legislature wholly recodified the law of governmental immunity ° so
that basically municipalities would be subject to liability for their
torts and the torts of their agents acting within the scope of their
employment," effective January 1, 1964.i The legislature, however, continued the immunity for certain significant claims: (1)
any claim covered by the workmen's compensation act; (2) any
claim in connection with the assessment or collection of taxes; (3)
any claim based on snow or ice conditions, unless affirmatively
caused by the negligent acts of the municipality; (4) any claim
based on an act or omission by a public officer, exercising due care,
in the execution of a valid or invalid statute; (5) any claim based
on the performance or nonperformance of a discretionary function.
7. Cf. Davis, Tort Liability of Governmental Units, 40 MInN. L. 11Ev. 751,
792 (1956). In 1961 the California Supreme Court overruled the doctrine of
sovereign immunity, Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359
P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rep. 89 (1961); later that same year the California legislature re-enacted the immunity as it existed as a rule of decisions before Muskopf, for a period ending 90 days after the close of the 1963 legislative session.
CA. Civ. CoDE § 22.3. The California court has interpreted this as a moratorium to give the legislature time to determine what legislation may be necessary as a result of the abolition of sovereign immunity. Coming Hosp. Dist.
v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d. 488, 370 Pad 325, 2o Cal. Rep. 621 (1062).
California then appointed a Law Revision Commission to consider legislative
solutions. See, e.g., CAL. LAw REvISIoN CommeN, A SrY RELATIG ro SovEmRN LmmuNr (Jan. 1963). See also Van Alstyne, Govemnmetal Tort Liability: A Public Policy Prospectus, 10 U.C.L.AJ.. REv. 463 (1963).
8. See Nissen v. Redelack, 246 Minn. 83, 74 N.W.2d 800 (1955); Allen v.
Independent School Dist., 173 Mlnn. 5, 216 N.W. 533 (1927); Bank v. Brainerd School Dist., 49 Mlinn. 106, 51 N.W. 814 (1892). But cf. Hahn v. City of
Ortonville, 238 Mumn. 428, 434, 57 N.W.2d 254, 259 (1953).
9. 118 N.W.2d 795 oMim. 1962).
10. Mnn. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 798.
11. For the purposes of this act, "'municipality' means any city

...

any

village, borough, county, town, public authority, public corporation, special
district, school district, however organized, or other political subdivision."
Minn. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 798, § 1(1).
12. The effective date of the act was postponed until January 1, 1968 for
school districts and drainage districts and related public corporations. Until
the act becomes effective, the doctrine of sovereign immunity from tort liability as a rule of decisions of the courts of Mkinnesota prior to Spand is to be
reinstated. Mnin. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 798, §§ 12-14.
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As suggested by the Court in Spanel, the act required prompt notice of a claim to be given" and provided a monetary limit on the
amount of liability. 4 Also, the act permitted any municipality to
procure insurance covering those torts for which the municipality
would be immune from liability and exceeding the maximum limit
of liability; however, the procurement of such insurance constitutes a waiver of the defense of immunity to the extent of the coverage.
Clearly, governmental units should not be liable in damages for
all injury to private interests caused by their acts. To hold a state
liable to a business adjacent to a highway for the resultant loss if
the state relocates the highway, for example, would be patently
impracticable. Nor would a standard of liability predicated on the
negligence or fault of the governmental unit be feasible; again,
payment of damages to the business adjacent to a highway would
still be impracticable even if a court were to find that the relocation of the highway was an abuse of discretion. The customary
answer to this problem of defining limits of liability, which is embodied in the Federal Tort Claims Act, 15 has been that governmental units should be liable if a private party would be liable in
the same circumstances. Perhaps this approach is sound, but it
fails to frame a system of liability and immunity for those many
governmental functions that have no private counterpart. Moreover, a governmental unit differs significantly from a private party, for it is financed by equitable taxation, not by private investment; as a result "a large enough governmental unit is the best
of all possible loss spreaders."'16 For this reason, exceptional losses
fortuitously inflicted by governmental activity should not be
borne by the individual- the basis for governmental liability
should be equitable loss spreading.
The Minnesota act bases liability on the municipality's "torts
and those of its officers, employees and agents acting within the
scope of their employment or duties."' 7 Similarly, the Federal
13. Notice of the claim must be given within 30 days from the date of the
alleged injury, unless incapacitated, if an action is to be maintained. Minn.
Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 798, § 5.
14. The liability of any municipality is limited to $25,000 for a claim of
wrongful death, $50,000 for any other claim, and $300,000 for all claims arising out of a single occurrence. Minn. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 798, § 4(1).
15. Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1958): "The United
States shall be liable . . . in the same manner and to the same extent as a
private individual under like circumstances .
16. Davis, supra note 7, at 811.
17. Minn. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 798, § 2.
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Tort Claims Act, which authorizes tort claims against the federal
government, confers jurisdiction upon the district courts for injury caused by the wrongful act of "any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment" 8
The FTCA clause has been interpreted as limiting the government's liability to claims based on respondeat superior principles;19 therefore, liability from governmental ownership of property"° or absolute liability for ultra-hazardous activities,2- for example, has been rejected. Yet upon an underlying basis of equitable loss spreading, a governmental unit should clearly be liable
for such claims. The language of the Minnesota statute, however,
should not permit the FTCA result, for the act indicates that the
municipality is liable both for its torts and the torts of its agents
acting within the scope of employment. The act, then, should be
read to fashion municipal liability on broad tort-law concepts
supplemented by the doctrine of respondeat superior. Moreover,
the underlying rationale of respondeat superior is basically the
same as the proper basis for governmental liability, to spread the
loss among the ultimate recipients of the services.
Although the Minnesota act bases liability on broad tort-law
concepts, it also provides that for certain enumerated claims the
municipality is to be liable only in accordance with other applicable statutes or is to be immune from liability. Municipalities are
thereby immune from tort liability but subject to statutory liability for both workmen's compensation claimss and tax claims.2 4
Tort liability probably should defer to statutory systems of claim
settlement if they are consistent with equitable loss spreading. Accordingly, the workmen's compensation act is basically scheduled
risk distribution; and governmental loss spreading requires equitable taxation, which is best achieved by an independent review18. Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946, 28 U.S.C. § 1846(b) (1958).
19. See United States v. Hull, 195 Fad 64, 67 (1st Cir. 1952) (Magruder,
J.); In re Texas City Disaster Litigation, 197 F-ad 771, 776 (5th Cir. 1952),
af'd sub nor. Dalebite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
20. See United States v. Dooley, 231 Fa2d 423 (9th Cir. 1955); Ray v.

United States, 228 Fad 574 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.. 908 (1950).

21. See cases cited note 18 supra- Peck, Absolute Liability and the Federal
Tort Claims Act, 9 STA. L. REv. 433 (1957).

22. See Morris, The Torts of an Independent Contractor,29 Ir.L. REv.
339, 340-41 (1934).
23. Mm. STAT. §§ 176.11-.651 (Supp. 1962).
24. E.g., nriN% STAT. § 274.01 (Supp. 1962) establishes a board of review

that is authorized to review the assessment of property, adding property that
has been omitted and correcting assessments, so that each "shall be entered on
the assessment list at its full and true value."

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:119

ing board rather than by individual tort claims.
The exceptions provision of the act, however, creates an unjustified immunity for claims based on accumulations of ice and
snow. By present Minnesota tort law, a municipality is liable for
harm caused by dangerous accumulations of ice and snow only if
they were not eliminated within a reasonable time." On a loss
spreading approach, a governmental unit should be liable at least
for such claims - nor would the basic provision of the act extend
liability beyond such claims, for it imposes liability only for a
municipality's "torts." Indeed, this exception apparently creates
an immunity where formerly the municipality was liable.
In addition, the act retains governmental immunity for two
major categories of claims patterned after exceptions in the Federal Tort Claims Act - claims based on the execution of a statute
and on a discretionary act.2" Specifically, the Minnesota act protects an "act or omission of an officer or employee, exercising due
care, in the execution of a valid or invalid statute. 2 7 The invalidity of a law plainly should not be the basis for governmental liability; for example, a finding that a law is invalid should not subject the government to liability for harm resulting from its enforcement. The converse, however, is not true, for a government
should not always be immune from liability where it is acting in
accordance with a valid statute. By analogy to governmental liability for the taking of property, the government perhaps should
also be liable for personal harm incurred through the execution of
a valid law. In essence, then, the standard is meaningless in light
of the proper basis for liability.
The immunity for claims based on the "performance or the
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function, 28 however,
sets an efficacious basis for liability. The very nature of governmental activity requires that some decisions be beyond judicial
review - the delineation probably should be based on "discretionary" acts as the Court indicated in Spanel. The losses that result from discretionary decisions are usually well spread and, when
they are not, they probably should still be borne by those upon
whom they fall. Moreover, the "discretionary function" immunity
lends itself to judicial development and possibly that is what is
needed, for defining limits of liability is "surely difficult enough to
25. Scott v. Village of Olivia, 260 Minn. 346, 110 N.W.2d 21 (1961); Squillace v. Village of Mountain Iron, 223 Minn. 8, 26 N.W.2d 197 (1946); of. Bury
v. City of Minneapolis, 258 Minn. 49, 102 N.W.2d 706 (1960).
26. Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1958).
27. Minn. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 798, § 3(5).
28. Minn. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 798, § 3(6).
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require the development of law through case-to-case adjudication. 2 9
The Minnesota legislature also failed to abrogate the immunity
from tort liability of the state itself, possibly on the basis of dictum in Spanel. Certainly the compelling reasons for subjecting a
municipality to liability apply to the state itself; in fact, the state
is a more efficient loss spreader than are lesser governmental units.
In Spanel, however, the Minnesota Court intimated that the federal constitution prohibits a suit against the state without its consent; 0 but the Constitution only prohibits such suits in the federal courts.' Unfortunately, the Minnesota legislature might have
relied on the Court's decision in retaining the immunity of the
state itself.
VIII. TRUSTS AND WILLS

A.

APPORTONMENT OF STOCK AND CAPrTA-GAIws

DiwviNDs

The creation of a trust with different principal and income
beneficiaries often leads to disputes between these parties as to
whether particular distributions of trust assets are "principal" or
"income." If the trust 7es is similar in nature to land, the principal
is fixed and the rents and profits are clearly income, but if the
trust 7es contains intangible assets such as stocks and bonds, the
proper allocation between principal and income is more difficult.
Two such apportionment problems were presented to the Minnesota Court by In re T s t for Gardner:' whether stock dividends 29. Davis, mnpra note 7, at 811. Because.the doctrine of governmental immunity is judge-made and because the courts have often adhered to the immunity despite legislative attempts to limit the immunity, see e.g., People v.
Superior Court, 29 Cal. 2d 754, 759, 178 P2d 1, 4 (1947) ("there was adopted
in this state the doctrine that state consent to be sued for negligence did not
waive sovereign immunity from liability for tort"), it has 'been suggested that
this solution is unworkable. Davis, sulira note 7, at 811. The Ainnesota Court,
however, has indicated a tendency to restrict immunity. Of. McCorkell v. City
of Northfield, Doc. No. 38767, Minn., Aug. 16, 1903, in which the Court held
that the duty to protect those confined in jails imposed by MIN. STAT. §§
642.02-.09 (1961) impliedly waived the governmental immunity.
So. The Court specified that its decision did not abolish sovereign immunity as to the state itself, quoting Berman v. M nnesota State Agricultural
Soc'y, 93 Mlnn. 125, 127, 100 N.W. 732 (1904): "since the adoption of the
eleventh amendment to the Constitution it has been uniformly held that a suit
by an individual cannot be maintained against a sovereign state without its
consent."

31. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI.
1. 123 N.W2d 69 (minn. 1963).
2. According to one writer,
a stock dividend does not distribute property, but simply dilutes the
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and capital-gains dividends should be allocated to the "principal"
or the "income" beneficiaries.
In general, where the trust instrument is indefinite, two basic
procedures have been developed to determine the apportionment
of stock dividends - the Pennsylvania rule and the Massachusetts rule. The Pennsylvania rule4 bases the apportionment on
the source of the dividend. A stock dividend would be considered
"income" if it were declared out of earnings that accrued to the declaring corporation during the term of the trust; conversely, if the
dividend were declared from earnings that had accrued prior to
the creation of the trust, it would be deemed "principal."' This
procedure provides an equitable apportionment formula,' but it
is often very difficult to apply." As a result, the Massachusetts
rule evolved, whereby all stock dividends were allocated to prinshares as they existed before. It is in no sense a distribution of surplus ....

It simply divides up the holdings of each shareholder into

a larger number of share units, representing together the same proportionate interest in the corporation.
BALLANTiNE, CORPORATIONS 482 (Rev. ed. 1946) (Footnotes omitted.); see
Machen, The Apportionment of Stock Distributionsin Trust Accounting Practice, 20 M)D. L. REv. 89, 90 (1960).
One practical problem, for example, arises where a trustee holds stock,
as an investment, in a corporation that has a policy of retaining earnings rather
than paying cash dividends; instead, the corporation declares a stock dividend
and capitalizes the retained earnings. The problem is whether such a stock
dividend is a distribution of earnings or a distribution that must be allocated
to the trust res so as not to dilute the trust's proportionate ownership of that
corporation. See Stipe v. First Natl Bank, 208 Ore. 251, 301 P.2d 175 (1956).
3. Capital-gains dividends are distributions of profits that have resulted
from the sale of appreciated securities. See Shattuck, Capital Gain Distributions- Principalor Income?, 88 TRuSTS & ESTATES 160 (1949).
4. This rule was first articulated in Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 868 (1857).
5. See Cohan & Dean, Legal, Tax and Accounting Aspects of Fiduciary
Apportionment of Stock Proceeds; the Non-Statutory PennsylvaniaRules, 106
U. PA. L. Rnv. 157, 160 (1957).
6. See In re Nirdinger's Estate, 290 Pa. 457, 139 At]. 200 (1997); Earp's
Appeal, 28 Pa. 368 (1857).
7. Because it is virtually impossible to "segment" the retained earnings of
a corporation, courts which applied the Pennsylvania rule were forced to resort to arbitrary presumptions- such as the presumption that a dividend is
declared out of the most recent earnings. Further, an apportionment under
the Pennsylvania rule required a determination of the "intrinsic value" of the
investment both at the date of purchase and after declaration of the dividend. Those determinations were complicated by such considerations as
whether the corporation maintained its inventory on a LIFO or a FIFO basis,
whether there had been capital gains or surplus contributions that did not result from earnings, and other factors that, as a practical matter, were indeterminable. See 3 ScoTT, TRusTs § 236.6 (2d ed. 1956).
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cipal. Basically, then, the Pennsylvania rule strives for equitable
apportionment whereas the Massachusetts rule aims at administrative expediency."
The Minnesota courts originally followed the Pennsylvania
rule;9 however, in 1951 the Minnesota legislature substantially enacted section five of the Uniform Principal and Income Act, which
adopts the Massachusetts rule.'0 The Gardner trust was created
when the Minnesota courts still followed the Pennsylvania rule
but the stock dividends in question were declared both before and
after Minnesota adopted the Massachusetts rule. The Minnesota
statute further provides that the Massachusetts rule is to be applied to all trusts silent as to stock dividends unless this would
"deprive persons of property without due process of law."" If the
income beneficiary had vested rights in certain stock dividends,
the retroactive application of the Massachusetts rule to the Gardner trust might deprive him of property in violation of his constitutional rights. Basically, the only rights of either the income or
8. See 8 ScoTT, Tuss § 2S6.3, at 1817-18 (2d ed. 1956); Machen, aupra

note 2, at 92-93 &n.14. Notably, the Restatement of Trusts reversed its position in 1948 and adopted the Massachusetts rule.
s.vTAmU
(SECN),
TusTs § 236(b), comment t (1959).
9. Goodwin v. McGaughey, 108 Mnn. 248, 122 N.W. 6 (1909). This rule
was applied in In re Trust of Koffend, 218 Min. 206, 15 N.W.2d 590 (19-44);
In re Trusts of Whitacre, 208 Mlnn. 286, 293 N.W. 784 (1940).
10. Mm-ni. STAT. § 501A7(2) (1961) provides that "all dividends on shares of
a corporation forming a part of the principal, which are payable only in
shares of the corporation, shall be deemed principaL"
11. MINN. STAT. § 501.47(1)(1)(c) (1961).
12. In In re Crawford's Estate, 362 Pa. 458, 67 A.2d 124 (1949), a Penn-

sylvania court held that the Uniform Principal and Income Act could be constitutionally applied only to trusts created after its enactment because the income beneficiary was held to have a vested right in the stock dividends. See
Franklin v. Margay Oil Corp., 194 Okla. 519, 158 P.2d 486 (1944) (the allocation of oil and gas royalties). See also King, Uniform Principal and Income
Act, Section 5: ,onatitutionality of Its Retroactive Application, 1960 WAsm
U-L.Q. 839. However, in In re Allis' Will, 6 Wis. 2d 1, 94 N.W.2d 226 (1959),
58 McHC. L. REV. 282, it was held that the earlier rule created no vested
rights because it was merely for convenient trust admiration. Soon after this
decision, the Pennsylvania court reversed In re Crawford's Estate, supra, and

adopted the In re Allis' Will holding. In re Catherwood's Trust, 405 Pa. 61,

173 Aad 86 (1961), 7 Vn.. L. Rnv. 497. But see 34 Trta. L.Q. 79 (1960). In
overruling Crawford, the court found the precedents relied on in that decision
to be distinguishable:
the rights therein held vested and beyond the reach of legislative interference were rights in property, whereas the rights claimed in Crawford
were to a rule of law and a method of interpretation.
405 Pa. at 70, 173 A.2d at 90. The court reasoned that the income beneficiary
had a vested right in all income arising from the trust, but that he did not
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the principal beneficiary are those conferred expressly by the settlor. Absent an expression of the settlor's intent, 3 however, rules
of law were needed, such as the Pennsylvania and Massachusetts
rules, that have been characterized as the presumed intent of
the settlor and that therefore confer the same rights on the beneficiaries4 as if they had been expressly granted in the trust instrument.

The Court recognized that although the settlor's intent is generally controlling, it should be sought "with a reasonable mixture
of common sense."' 5 If the settlor had felt strongly about the apportionment of stock dividends, she probably would have expressed her intent in the trust instrument. Of course, she may also
have felt strongly about their apportionment but merely did not
contemplate a change in the law, or she may have preferred allocation as determined by the law in force either when the trust was
created or at the time the dividends were declared. Absent any
clear evidence of the settlor's intention, however, the Court based
its opinion on perhaps the only rational premise: "it is doubtful
whether testatrix had any clear intention in mind at the time the
will was executed."'"
Clearly, then, the settlor's intent as manifested in the trust instrument was too indefinite to confer vested rights to stock dividends on the income beneficiary. The only vested rights of the income beneficiary were acquired by application of the rules of law
dictating the settlor's presumed intent. The Court held, therefore, that those stock dividends declared by the corporation when
Minnesota followed the Pennsylvania rule to which the income
beneficiary was entitled by that rule should be allocated to the
income beneficiary. Conversely, those stock dividends that were
not declared until after enactment of the Massachusetts rule
have vested rights in any particular rule or formula for ascertaining what was
income. The court also noted that after its decision in Crawford, it was the
only jurisdiction that had held the retroactive application of the Uniform
Principal and Income Act to be unconstitutional. 405 Pa. at 76, 173 A.2d at
93.
13. MINN. STAT. 501.47(1)(2) (1961) provides: "A specific provision, contained in any trust instrument or agreement or in any will, which governs the
allocation of principal and income, controls such allocation notwithstanding
this section."
14. See Laurent v. Randolph, 306 Ky. 134, 138, 206 S.W.2d 480, 483
(1947); In the Matter of Will of Strong, 198 Misc. 7, 96 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1950); cf.
Central Hanover Bank &Trust Co. v. Bruns, 16 N.J. Super. 199, 84 A.2d 475

(1951).
15. 123 N.W.2d at 73.
16. Ibid; see 3 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 236.3, at 1819-20 (2d ed. 1956).
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should be allocated to the principal beneficiary because the income
beneficiary had no right that attached to the dividends at the
time they were declared' 7
In re Tnust for Gardneralso presented the question of whether

capital-gains dividends declared by an incorporated, regulated investment company and by a Massachusetts trust, an unincorporated, regulated investment company, should be allocated to "principar' or "income."'' The Court defined capital-gains dividends as
being "derived from the profit or gain made in the purchase and
sale of securities due to the appreciation in value thereof while
held by the fund.' 9 These dividends are usually distributed in the
form of additional shares of stock or in cash, at the stockholders
option. The apportionment of a capital-gains dividend clearly
evinces the adverse interests of the income and principal beneficiaries: the income beneficiary claims that the dividend is tantamount to a cash dividend declared out of profits from the sale of
inventory; the principal beneficiary contends that the dividend
is
0
a return of capital due to the liquidation of capital assets.
The Minnesota statute provides that
where a trustee shall have the option of receiving a dividend, either in
cash or in the shares of the declaring corporation, such dividend shall
be considered a cash dividend and shall be deemed income irrespective
of the option selected by the trustee.21

Because the capital-gains dividends were in optional form, the

Court held that such dividends received from regulated investment companies were to be distributed to the income beneficiary.
Implicit in the Court's holding is the premise that because the
statute governing optional dividends fails to mention capital17. The Court recognized the difficulty of trustees who had distributed or
were under court order to distribute stock dividends to the income beneficiary

under the Pennsylvania rule. As to those distributions made under court order,
there is no problem if the time for appeal has expired. If the distribution has
been ordered, but not yet made, the Court indicated that the proper procedure
would he to petition for a change in instructions in accordance with Gardner.

As to distributions made without court supervision, the Court indicated that
either the doctrine of ratification or that of laches would protect the trustee.

123 N.Wad at 75.
18. A regulated investment company is defined in bhr. PEv. CODE OF 1954,

§ 851.
19. 123 N.Wad at 78.
20. Compare Shattuck, Capital Gain Distribufion-Principalor Income?,
88 TRusTs & ESTATES 160 (1949), wit& Young, A Dissent on Capital Gain Distributons, 88 TnusTs &EsTATES 280 (1949). $ee also 31 RocKy M . L. Rnv.
22

(1959).
21. MmN. S

oAT.§501.47(4)
(1961).
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gains dividends, there should be no distinction between ordinary
dividends and capital-gains dividends from a regulated investment company. The premise seems to be well founded, for the
capital-gains distribution of a regulated investment company is in
essence a distribution of the gains realized from dealings in its inventory. The distribution of gains of a non-investment corporation realized by the sale of inventory would clearly be allocable
to income. The fact that the inventory of a regulated investment
company consists of assets entitled to capital-gains treatment
should not dictate that a distribution of those gains be allocated
to the principal of the shareholder trust."
A different rule might be applied to Massachusetts trusts, for
the statute refers only to "corporations," which, of course, does
not literally include a Massachusetts trust. If a share of ownership in a Massachusetts trust represents a "true participation in
a pool of investments,"2 8 an investment therein should be treated
as a direct investment in the individual assets of the company.
Under this concept of ownership, the gains realized from the sale
of an individual asset of the company, a capital gain, would clearly be allocated to the principal of the trust. -4
The Court reasoned, however, that although the statute referred only to corporations, the share owners of the Massachusetts trust probably considered their interests to be no different
from an investment in an incorporated, regulated investment company and, moreover, there is no "logical reason why the same rule
should not apply to a Massachusetts trust operating exactly as
does the corporate entity .... -2 Thus, although there may be
a cognizable, theoretical distinction with respect to the nature of
ownership in the two types of regulated investment companies,
the Court looked to the substance of the relationships and adopted
a rule that will facilitate the administration of trusts. Capitalgains distributions in the form of optional stock or cash dividends
are therefore to be allocated to the income beneficiary of the recipient trust, whether received from an incorporated investment
company or a Massachusetts trust.
22. But see Shattuck, supra note 20.
3. Ewart, Principaland Income Problems of Trustees With Mutual Fund
Dividends, 95 TaoSm &ESTATES 1025 (1956).
24. See In re Trust of Koffend, 218 Minn. 206, 223, 15 N.W.2d 590, 509
(1944); cf. 3 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 286.6, at 1824 (2d ed. 1956).
25. 123 N.W.2d at 88.

MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT

B.

Docm= oF

DPEDET RELTIVE RxVOCATION
EFEcTs IwTENT OF TSTATOR

Decedent had executed four wills, each purporting to be his last
will and testament and each containing a clause expressly revoking all prior wills. In the district court, the fourth will was ruled
invalid, as being procured by undue influence; the second and
third wills were ineffective, for their proponents had failed to assert them; and the first will was admitted to probate. On appeal
the Minnesota Court, in In re Estate of Anthony*0 determined
that the second and third wills were effective to revoke the first
will although they were incapable of passing decedent's estate, unless the decedent intended the revocation clauses to be inoperative
if the instruments were not effective in toto.
The Minnesota statute providing for the revocation of wills
states that
no will in writing shall be revoked or altered otherwise than by some
other will in writing; or by some other writing of the testator declaring
such revocation or alteration, and executed with the same formalities
with which the will itself was required by law to be executed ...

The several instruments executed subsequent to the first will were
not capable of disposing of decedent's estate and therefore could
not qualify as a "will in writing." Prior to the enactment of this
statute, however, the Court had held that an instrument, executed
in compliance with the required statutory formalities, is valid as
a revocation of an earlier will "whether it might or might not
. . .be allowed as a will disposing of the estate."2 The fact that

Minnesota has now codified the requirements for revocation, including a provision for revocation by instruments other than wills,
further indicates the propriety of the Court's holding that the subsequent instruments were capable of revoking the first will 2

Upon finding the subsequent instruments within the purview
26. 121 N.W.2d 772 (AMnn. 1963).
27. MiNN. Sz&T. § 525.19 (1961). The required statutory formalities are
found in MmN. S'm&. § 525.18 (1961).
28. In re Cunningham, 38 Mann. 169, 171, 36 N.W. 269, 271 (1888).
29. See In re Lubbe's Estate, 142 So. 2d 130 (Fla.App. Ct. 1962), in which
the court stated that
generally when a second will is properly executed according to the statute, with an express revocation clause, though it should be prevented
from operating by the incapacity of the devisee or any other matter
dehors the will, the former will is nevertheless revoked by it.
Id. at 136; accord, In re Heazle's Estate, 72 Idaho 307, 309, 240 P.2d 821, 83
(1952); Crawford's Estate v. Crawford, 225 Miss. 208, 82 So. 2d 823 (1955);
ATXn~soN, Wumts 892 (2d ed. 1953).
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of the "some other writing" clause, the Court could have held that
the revocation clause in the third will caused the estate to pass by
the laws of intestacy. In some cases, however, such a result might
cause an obvious perversion of the testator's intention; for example, a testator who destroyed a will believing it to be another instrument probably did not intend for his estate to pass by the
laws of intestacy.30 For this reason, courts have often inquired
into the testator's intent. The Statute of Wills, however, reflects
the judgment that some persons who stand to benefit from the
disposition of an estate will act in their self-interest - the statute
is designed to deny them the opportunity."' The courts must
therefore balance their objective of effectuating the intent of the
testator against the possibility of encouraging fraud. The result
of this balancing process has been embodied in the judicial doctrine of dependent relative revocation. The doctrine provides that
in certain cases where a dispositive provision fails, the related
revocation also fails if the testator would have preferred a previously valid testamentory disposition over intestacy. 82
Basically, three fact situations might give rise to an inquiry
into the intent of a testator: the execution of a revocatory instrument under mistake of fact;' s the execution of a revocatory instrument under mistake of law; 4 and the execution of a subsequent
will that fails to dispose of the estate.85 Where there has been a
revocation under a mistake of fact, most courts have required, as
prerequisite to an inquiry into the testator's intent, that the factors as to which the testator was mistaken be indicated on the
face of the instrument and that these factors induced the revocation.36 For example, a statement in the subsequent instrument
to the effect that "my son being dead, I hereby revoke my prior
30. See ATKmIsoN, WnLs § 97 (2d ed. 1953); MODEL PROBATE CODE 298
apps. (Simes 1946); Evans, The Probate of Lost Wills, 24 NED. L. Rav. 283
(1945).
81. ATKmSON, WniLS §§ 84-92 (2d ed. 1953).
32. Id. § 88.
33. E.g., Whitlock v. Vaun, 38 Ga. 562 (1868); Gillespie v. Gillespie, 96
NJ. Eq. 501,126 At. 744 (Ch.),.aff'd, 98 N.J. Eq. 413, 129 Atl. 922 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1924); Mordecai v. Boylan, 6 Jones Eq. (59 N.C.) 365 (1863); see Gifford
v.Dyer, 2 RI. 99 (1852) (dictum).
34. E.g., Schneider v. Harrington, 320 Mass. 723, 71 N.E. 2d 242 (1947); In
re Marvin's Will, 172 Wis. 457, 179 N.W. 508 (1920).

85. E.g., Linkins v. Protestant Episcopal Cathedral Foundation, 187 F.2d
357 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Estate of Kaufnan, 25 Cal. 2d 854, 155 P.2d 831 (1945).
36. AmrnsoN, WnLS § 88, at 460 (2d ed. 1953); 2 PAaE, Wnus § 21.65
(Bowe-Parker ed. 1960).
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will" would satisfy the requirement 3 7 By so limiting the cases to
be considered, the courts avoid contravening the policy of the
Statute of Wills with respect to the issue of mistake, for this question lends itself to objective proof. Moreover, the prospective heirs
cannot fabricate a mistake because the motivating fact must appear on the face of the revoking instrument.
Certainly a testator might be mistaken as to the law as well as
to the facts3 8 For example, a revoking instrument might have dispositive provisions drafted so as to violate the rule against perpetuities0 9 The existence of a mistake should be relatively clear in
this case - testators do not intend to execute invalid wills. Arguably, the third fact situation should be analyzed the same as a
mistake of law. The situation arises where the dispositive provisions of the revoking instrument are ineffective for some extrinsic
reason; for example, the testator executes a will including a bequest to charity and then dies within a statutory period that invalidates the charitable bequest.04 To call this a mistake would
be erroneous, for a person cannot be mistaken as to facts, or rules
of law applied to facts, that are not yet in existence. If the testator were presented with the facts as they ultimately occur, however, it is likely that he would prefer a re-examination of his
will - as testators do not intend to execute invalid wills they certainly do not intend to make wills that will not pass their estate.
Further, to nullify the effect of the revocatory clause in the second
instrument to avoid intestacy is no greater evil than in the case
of mistakes of law.
Once it is determined that the courts should seek the testator's
intent, it becomes necessary to consider the nature of evidence
that should be considered. To permit the prospective beneficiaries
to introduce extrinsic evidence of the testator's intent would contravene the policy of the Statute of Wills. Perhaps the more reasonable approach would be to look only to the testamentary instruments themselves to determine intent - if no clear answer
can be gleaned from them, then the estate should pass under the
laws of intestacy.4 '
37. ATuxsoN, Wmus § 88 nnAO &41 (2d ed. 1953); 2 PAGE, op. cit. supra
note 36, § 21.57. See Campbell v. French, 3 Ves. 321, 322, 30 Eng. Rep. 1033
(Ch. 1797).
38. See Note, 2 VA. L. REv. 327, 330 & n.17 (1915).
39. E.g., Charleston Library Soc'y v. Citizens & So. Nat'l Bank, 200 S.C.
96, 20 S.E.2d 623 (1942).
40. E.g., Linkins v. Protestant Episcopal Cathedral Foundation, 187 F.2d
357 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Estate of Kaufnan, 25 Cal. 2d 854, 155 P.2d 831 (19-15).
41. See McGill v. Trust Co., 94 NJ. Eq. 657, 121 AtL 760 (Oh. 193),
modified, 96 NJ. Eq. 331, 125 At. 108 (Ct. Err. &App. 192-4); Ely v. Megie,
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In the case of a revocation under mistake of fact, the hypothetical will stating "my son being dead, I hereby revoke my prior
will" clearly indicates that the inquiry should be limited to the
instruments. For if it can be determined from the faces of the two
instruments that the son had a clear interest in the first will, or
that the son had only a minor interest in the first will, but the major beneficiaries remained unchanged, it would seem contrary to
the testator's intent to permit the revocation.42 Similarly, in cases
of mistake of law and failure of dispositive provision, the testator's
intent would seem to be embodied in the second instrument. 3
Thus, if the beneficiaries under the first and second wills are substantially identical, the testator's intent that they should take
4
rather than an intestate disposition would appear clear. ' Moreover, such an objective standard is clearly within the policy of the
Statute of Wills, for it limits the opportunity for fraud and per4
jury. 1

In Anthony, the Court held that on remand the district court
should seek the testator's intent to determine whether the revocatory clauses of the second and third wills should be given effect.
An analysis of the four wills, however, shows little, if any, similarity.4 6 Unless the testator's intent is clear from the faces of the
219 N.Y. 112, 113 N.E. 800 (1916); Phillips v. Smith, 186 Okla. 6086, 100 P.2d
249 (1939); Melville's Estate, 245 Pa. 318, 91 AtI. 679 (1914).
42. See Estate of Kauhnan, 25 Cal. 2d 854, 155 P.2d 831 (1945).
43. See, e.g., Linkins v. Protestant Episcopal Cathedral Foundation, 187
F.2d S57 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Security Co. v. Snow, 70 Conn. 288, 89 AtI. 153
(1898); Charleston Library Soc'y v. Citizens & So. Nat'l Bank, 200 S.C. 90, 20
S.E.2d 623 (1942).
44. See, e.g., Linkins v. Protestant Episcopal Cathedral Foundation, 187
Fad 357 (D.C. Cir: 1950); Estate of Kaufman, 25 Cal. 2d 854, 155 P.2d 831
(1945).
45. A comparison of Anthony with the leading decision of Linkins v. Protestant Episcopal Cathedral Foundation, 187 F2d 357 (D.C. Cir. 1950) might
best illustrate the results of the application of dependent relative revocation
under these criteria. In Linkins, the testatrix executed three wills, the last will
containing a clause expressly revoking all prior wills. All three wills provided
for disposition of one half of the residual estate to two religious institutions.
These gifts failed -because the last will was executed within a statutory period
that invalidated the charitable bequest. All beneficiaries of the residual estate
under all three wills were identical. Clearly the testatrix's intent was to benefit
the religious institutions -if this objective may not be achieved under the last
valid instrument, but may be done under the prior valid instruments, the
courts should see that it is done.
46. The first will bequeathed all of testator's property to his sister for life,
with a remainder to the Evangelical Lutheran Church; the second gave the
property to three of testator's nephews; the third made specific bequests of one
hundred dollars each to a cousin, nephew, niece, and brother, with the residue
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various instruments, the estate should pass by intestacy. 7 To permit extrinsic evidence would be to invite the very evils the Statute of Wills was designed to prevent.
to the Lutheran Bible Institute; and the fourth bequeathed all of the estate,
in equal shares to two of decedent's brothers.
47. See Warren, Dependent Relative Revocation, 33 Hv. L. Rnv. 337,
356 (192o).

